Competition Law in Menu Delivery App Commission Power in Morocco

1. Introduction

Menu delivery applications connect restaurants, consumers, and delivery couriers through digital platforms. They may generate revenue by charging restaurants commissions on completed orders, imposing delivery or promotional fees, selling preferential placement, and offering subscription-based marketing services.

In Morocco, commission practices in this sector may raise competition-law concerns where a platform possesses substantial market power and uses its position to impose excessive or discriminatory commissions, restrict restaurants from using rival platforms, penalize restaurants for offering lower prices elsewhere, or make access to customers dependent on purchasing additional services.

The central legal issue is not whether a delivery app charges a high commission, but whether its conduct restricts competition or constitutes an abuse of market power under Moroccan law.

The principal legal framework is Morocco's Law No. 104-12 on freedom of prices and competition, as amended, together with Law No. 20-13 concerning the Competition Council, as amended. The analysis must also account for the country's market structure, restaurant bargaining power, consumer choice, and the two-sided nature of delivery platforms.

An important qualification: the cases below include relevant international judicial precedents that can help analyse Moroccan disputes. They should not be mistaken for six reported Moroccan judgments specifically concerning food-delivery app commissions.

2. Applicable Moroccan legal framework

A. Law No. 104-12: Freedom of prices and competition

The statute establishes the general framework for competitive markets in Morocco.

Relevant principles include:

Free pricing: Commission rates are generally determined by market conditions, subject to applicable legislation and any lawful price regulation.

Anti-competitive agreements: Agreements between competing platforms or other undertakings may be unlawful where they restrict competition, such as agreements to coordinate commission rates or divide restaurant customers.

Abuse of dominance: A dominant platform may face scrutiny if it uses its position to exclude competitors, impose unjustified discriminatory conditions, or engage in other abusive practices prohibited by the statute.

Merger control: Acquisitions or combinations involving delivery platforms may require notification where the statutory criteria are met and may be assessed for their effect on competition.

A high commission rate alone does not automatically establish an infringement. The relevant assessment considers market power, the nature of the conduct, its commercial justification, and its actual or likely competitive effects.

B. Law No. 20-13: Competition Council

The Competition Council is central to the enforcement of Moroccan competition law. Its functions include examining anti-competitive practices, reviewing qualifying concentrations, and providing opinions within its statutory remit.

In a delivery-app dispute, the Council may need to investigate:

The platform's share of restaurant orders and consumer demand.

The availability and effectiveness of rival platforms.

Restaurant dependence on online delivery channels.

Contractual restrictions and commission structures.

Whether exclusionary conduct harms competing platforms or ultimately consumers.

C. Market definition and platform power

A delivery platform operates in a multi-sided market. Its value to consumers increases when more restaurants participate, while restaurants may find it more valuable as consumer demand grows.

The relevant markets could include:

Online food-ordering intermediation.

Restaurant delivery services.

Platform access and promotional placement.

Particular geographic markets, such as Casablanca, Rabat, or Marrakech, depending on evidence.

Whether these are separate markets or parts of a broader market must be determined empirically. Traditional takeaway, direct restaurant ordering, telephone orders, and rival apps may constrain commission power, but their effectiveness cannot simply be assumed.

3. When do restaurant commissions become anti-competitive?

The following conduct may require investigation under Articles 6 and 7 of Law No. 104-12.

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These practices are not automatically unlawful in every case. Their legal classification depends on the statutory elements, market conditions, evidence, and any legitimate commercial justification.

A. Excessive commission rates

Suppose a leading app charges restaurants a 30% commission, while the restaurants have limited access to alternative channels. The rate may create serious commercial pressure, but the percentage alone does not prove abuse.

Investigators would examine:

The platform's costs for technology, payments, customer acquisition, and delivery.

The extent to which restaurants can reach consumers directly.

The commissions charged by comparable platforms.

The platform's profitability and the duration of the alleged excessive pricing.

Whether restaurants face economic dependence because alternatives are not equivalent.

Article 7 expressly addresses abuse of dominance and economic dependence. A restaurant may therefore have a potential claim even where the precise legal theory differs from a conventional cartel complaint.

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B. Exclusivity and price parity

A platform might require participating restaurants to avoid rival delivery apps, or prohibit them from offering lower prices through their own websites or telephone ordering.

These clauses can reduce competition if they make it difficult for new apps to attract restaurants or prevent restaurants from passing lower intermediation costs on to consumers.

However, exclusivity can also support investment in delivery capacity, marketing, or service quality. The assessment should distinguish proportionate, limited commitments from restrictions that unnecessarily close the market.

C. Ranking and advertising conditions

If a platform gives higher visibility only to restaurants accepting a premium commission or purchasing advertising, the arrangement may disadvantage smaller restaurants.

The concern becomes stronger where the platform controls a substantial share of consumer demand, ranking rules are opaque, and restaurants cannot obtain comparable visibility elsewhere. Transparent, objective, and consistently applied ranking criteria can reduce these risks.

4. Six relevant case laws and competition precedents

The following six precedents provide useful legal principles for analysing menu-delivery commissions. They arise from other jurisdictions, so they are persuasive comparative authorities, not binding Moroccan judgments. The examples illustrate how a Moroccan authority might analyse similar conduct under its own legislation.

Case 1: United Brands v Commission (Case 27/76, 1978)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Communities.

Facts and issue: United Brands was accused of abusing a dominant position in the banana market. The case considered, among other matters, whether prices could be excessive in competition law.

Legal principle: A price may be abusive where it bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product or service supplied. The assessment of excessive pricing requires an appropriate comparison of price, cost, and economic value.

Application to Moroccan delivery apps: A platform's commission could be examined if it is persistently high and the platform enjoys substantial market power. Relevant evidence would include its operating costs, the value of its intermediation and delivery services, margins, comparable commission rates, and barriers to entry.

Limitation: The case does not establish a fixed commission ceiling. A 20%, 25%, or 30% commission is not automatically unlawful.

Case 2: Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission (Case 85/76, 1979)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Communities.

Facts and issue: The case concerned a dominant undertaking's loyalty-inducing arrangements with customers, including exclusive purchasing and fidelity rebates.

Legal principle: A dominant undertaking may infringe competition law by using loyalty-inducing conditions that restrict customers' ability to deal with competitors and make market entry more difficult.

Application to Moroccan delivery apps: A dominant app that conditions favourable commission rates on a restaurant's refusal to use rival apps could face scrutiny. The investigation should assess the duration and scope of the commitment, the restaurant's share of sales tied to the platform, and the effect on competing delivery services.

Limitation: Exclusivity is not automatically prohibited merely because a platform offers a discount. Its competitive effects and commercial context matter.

Case 3: Commercial Solvents v Commission (Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, 1974)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Communities.

Facts and issue: A dominant supplier restricted supplies of an essential input to a customer competing in a downstream market.

Legal principle: A dominant undertaking may abuse its position by restricting access to an important input in a way that eliminates or seriously impairs competition in a related market.

Application to Moroccan delivery apps: Restaurant access to a platform's customer base, order-management infrastructure, or delivery network may be commercially important. If a dominant app selectively withdraws that access to disadvantage a restaurant or rival service, the conduct may warrant investigation.

Limitation: A delivery app's customer network is not automatically an essential facility. The claimant would need to establish the relevant market circumstances and the legally required elements of the alleged abuse.

Case 4: United States v Apple Inc. (U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, 2013)

Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Facts and issue: Apple was found liable for conspiring with publishers to raise e-book prices, involving agency agreements and contractual restrictions.

Legal principle: Commercial agreements and distribution arrangements can facilitate unlawful coordination when they are part of an agreement among competitors to restrict price competition.

Application to Moroccan delivery apps: The case is relevant if competing platforms coordinate commission rates, agree on common commercial restrictions, or use information exchanges to align their pricing strategies. It is less directly relevant to a single platform independently setting its own commission.

Limitation: Independent parallel pricing is not, without additional evidence, proof of a cartel. An agreement or other legally sufficient evidence of coordination must be established.

Case 5: Booking.com hotel price-parity proceedings (European Commission and national competition authorities)

Authorities: European Commission and national competition authorities in Europe; relevant proceedings span multiple jurisdictions.

Facts and issue: Hotel-booking platforms faced scrutiny over clauses that restricted hotels' ability to offer better prices through their own websites or other channels.

Legal principle: Price-parity clauses can limit price competition between platforms and constrain direct sales. Their effects depend on the clause's scope, the platform's market position, and the availability of alternative distribution channels.

Application to Moroccan delivery apps: A restaurant should not necessarily be prevented from offering a lower price on its own ordering channel simply because it also uses a delivery platform. A broad parity clause could weaken competition from direct ordering and make it harder for lower-cost rival platforms to compete.

Limitation: The treatment of narrow and wide parity clauses differs across jurisdictions and legal regimes. The result must be assessed under Moroccan law rather than imported automatically.

Case 6: European Commission, Delivery Hero/Glovo food-delivery cartel decision (Case AT.40795, decision of 2 June 2025)

Authority: European Commission.

Facts and issue: The Commission's decision concerned anti-competitive coordination between food-delivery businesses, including market sharing, exchanges of commercially sensitive information, and no-poach arrangements.

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Legal principle: Rival delivery platforms must make independent competitive decisions. Agreements to allocate geographic markets or exchange sensitive strategic information can undermine competition even where the platforms remain separate businesses.

Application to Morocco: If rival apps agree to maintain similar commission rates, avoid recruiting each other's personnel, divide restaurant territories, or exchange future pricing and commercial strategy, the conduct may raise concerns under Article 6 of Law No. 104-12.

Limitation: The European decision is not a Moroccan enforcement decision. Its relevance lies in the factual and economic parallels between digital food-delivery markets.

5. Additional case law relevant to digital-platform commissions

Case 7: Amazon/Deliveroo — UK merger review (2020)

Authority: UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).

Issue: The CMA examined Amazon's proposed investment in Deliveroo and its implications for competition in online food delivery and related services.

Principle: Merger analysis must consider the competitive constraints between digital platforms, the potential development of competition, and the effect of a transaction on consumers and businesses.

Application in Morocco: If one delivery app acquires a rival, a restaurant-ordering intermediary, or a business with important delivery infrastructure, the Competition Council may need to assess whether the transaction could strengthen commission-setting power or reduce alternatives available to restaurants.

Limitation: Merger review is distinct from an allegation that a commission is excessive. The relevant statutory merger-notification and substantive assessment requirements must be satisfied.

6. Hypothetical application under Moroccan law

Consider a hypothetical delivery platform operating across Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakech.

Illustrative commission dispute

Commission charged

30%

Restaurant order value

200 MAD

Platform commission

60 MAD

Amount remaining before other costs

140 MAD

Illustrative calculation only. Taxes, delivery charges, discounts, refunds, and other contractual deductions are excluded.

Assume the platform also requires restaurants to:

Avoid listing their menus on competing apps.

Maintain the same menu prices on the platform and their direct ordering channels.

Purchase promotional placement to maintain visibility.

Accept a higher commission or risk suspension.

These facts would justify examining several possible legal theories.

The analysis should not presume that all four contractual conditions are unlawful. Investigators would need to determine the platform's market power, the effects of each restriction, and whether objective commercial justifications exist.

7. Evidence required for a complaint

A restaurant association, affected restaurant, or other eligible complainant should assemble evidence capable of demonstrating both the contractual practice and its competitive impact.

Commission records: Contracts, invoices, historical commission changes, promotional charges, and payment statements.

Market data: Platform shares, order volumes, restaurant participation, geographic coverage, and the presence of viable competitors.

Contractual restrictions: Exclusivity, parity, ranking, advertising, termination, and suspension clauses.

Commercial effects: Profitability before and after commission changes, reduced direct orders, and evidence of lost access to customers.

Comparator evidence: Comparable platform rates and the services, costs, and risks associated with each.

Communications: Documents that may show coordination between competing platforms or retaliation against restaurants.

A complaint is more persuasive when it shows not merely that a restaurant has lost money, but how the challenged conduct restricts competitive opportunities or exploits a position of dominance or economic dependence.

8. Potential remedies and enforcement

Under Morocco's competition framework, the appropriate response depends on the infringement established and the powers available under the applicable statutory provisions.

Potential measures may include:

Termination or modification of restrictive agreements: For example, removing unjustified exclusivity or parity requirements.

Changes to discriminatory conditions: Establishing objective, transparent terms for restaurant participation and ranking.

Interim measures: Where the statutory requirements for serious and immediate harm are met.

Financial sanctions: Where an infringement is established and the relevant statutory conditions are satisfied.

Merger remedies: Where a qualifying concentration raises competition concerns, subject to the applicable review procedure.

Article 20 addresses the modification, supplementation, or termination of agreements or acts connected with abusive dominance or economic dependence. Articles 35–39 contain provisions concerning interim measures, commitments, injunctions, and financial sanctions. The exact remedy and penalty must be determined under the applicable amended legislation and the facts of the case.

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9. Conclusion

Menu delivery app commission power in Morocco is principally a question of market power, economic dependence, contractual fairness, and the preservation of competition.

Law No. 104-12 provides the central legal framework. Article 6 is relevant to agreements that restrict competition, while Article 7 is particularly important when a platform is alleged to abuse dominance or a customer's or supplier's economic dependence.

The international precedents discussed above help explain excessive pricing, exclusionary arrangements, access restrictions, price parity, and cartel coordination. They do not establish a fixed permissible commission rate for Morocco.