Global Streaming Platform Licensing Competition Issues

Introduction

Global streaming platforms have transformed audiovisual markets from territorially limited broadcasting systems into multi-sided, data-driven and internationally integrated digital markets. Platforms such as Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, Disney+, YouTube and regional services compete not merely for subscribers but also for exclusive content, licensing rights, production talent, advertising inventory, distribution channels, data and technological infrastructure.

Competition concerns arise when a powerful streaming platform uses its market position to obtain or preserve exclusive licensing rights, foreclose rival platforms, impose restrictive contractual terms, engage in self-preferencing, bundle content with other services, or coordinate licensing conditions across territories.

The legal challenge is therefore to distinguish legitimate investment and exclusivity from conduct that substantially reduces competition.

1. Meaning of Streaming Platform Licensing Competition

Streaming-platform licensing involves agreements under which a rights holder permits a platform to exploit audiovisual content through specified:

• territories;
• languages;
• platforms or devices;
• subscription or advertising models;
• periods of time;
• customer categories; and
• technological formats.

A licensing agreement may be:

1. Exclusive – only one platform receives the relevant streaming rights.
2. Non-exclusive – several platforms can distribute the same content.
3. Territorial – rights are divided geographically.
4. Windowed – different platforms obtain rights during different periods.
5. Vertical – a studio or producer licenses content to a downstream platform.
6. Cross-platform – rights cover television, cinema, streaming and mobile distribution.

The competitive problem becomes acute where a platform has enough market power that acquiring exclusive rights makes it difficult for competitors to obtain commercially viable alternatives.

2. Relevant Competition Markets

A streaming licensing investigation may require several overlapping markets.

A. Content-licensing market

The market for acquiring rights to films, television programmes, sports, documentaries or other audiovisual content.

B. Streaming distribution market

The downstream market in which platforms compete for viewers.

C. Advertising market

For ad-supported streaming, the platform may simultaneously operate in:

• video advertising;
• audience-data markets;
• programmatic advertising; and
• digital advertising technology.

D. Production market

A vertically integrated streaming platform may compete with independent producers for:

• actors;
• directors;
• screenwriters;
• studios;
• production capacity.

E. Device/ecosystem markets

Competition can also involve smart TVs, app stores, connected devices and operating systems.

3. Major Competition Issues

A. Exclusive Content Licensing

Exclusivity is not automatically unlawful.

A platform may legitimately pay for exclusive rights because exclusivity can:

• encourage investment;
• differentiate services;
• finance original programming;
• reduce free-riding; and
• create incentives for content producers.

However, exclusivity can become problematic where a dominant platform systematically acquires the most commercially important content.

The key questions are:

• How important is the content?
• How long is exclusivity?
• Are rival platforms realistically able to obtain substitutes?
• Does the agreement cover multiple territories?
• Does the platform already possess substantial market power?
• Can consumers switch to alternatives?

B. Territorial Licensing and Geo-Blocking

Streaming rights have historically been divided territorially.

A rights holder may grant:

exclusive streaming rights in Country A to Platform X and Country B to Platform Y.

This can facilitate legitimate investment in local markets, but territorial restrictions can also prevent cross-border competition.

EU competition law has paid particular attention to clauses that prevent consumers from accessing content services across national borders.

The central distinction is between:

• legitimate territorial exploitation of intellectual property; and
• contractual restrictions that partition the internal market.

4. Vertical Foreclosure

A dominant streaming platform may operate simultaneously as:

content producer → content owner → licensing intermediary → streaming platform → advertising distributor.

This creates opportunities for foreclosure.

For example:

Platform A owns a major studio → obtains exclusive rights → refuses equivalent licensing to rival platforms → rival platforms lose attractive content → consumers migrate to Platform A.

The competition authority must determine whether the conduct excludes rivals on the merits or instead exploits market power to prevent effective competition.

5. Bundling and Tying

Streaming services may be bundled with:

• telecommunications subscriptions;
• broadband;
• mobile plans;
• smart-TV services;
• cloud services;
• music services;
• gaming subscriptions;
• e-commerce memberships.

Bundling can benefit consumers through lower prices.

It may become problematic if a dominant undertaking uses one market to force consumers or distributors to purchase another service, thereby foreclosing competing streaming platforms.

6. Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses

Streaming agreements may contain MFN clauses, requiring a content supplier or platform partner to provide terms no less favourable than those offered to competitors.

There are several forms:

Wide MFN

The supplier cannot offer better terms to another platform.

Narrow MFN

The supplier cannot offer better terms through a specified sales channel, such as its own website.

MFNs may:

• reduce transaction costs;
• prevent discriminatory treatment; and
• protect investment.

But wide MFNs can potentially soften competition by preventing platforms from competing aggressively through better licensing or pricing terms.

7. Self-Preferencing

A vertically integrated platform may give preferential treatment to its own content.

For example, it might:

• place its own productions at the top of search results;
• recommend its own programmes more prominently;
• provide better promotional placement;
• use proprietary viewer data to improve its own content;
• restrict rivals' access to recommendation systems.

This raises competition concerns where the platform controls an important distribution gateway.

8. Data as a Competitive Advantage

Streaming platforms possess extensive data concerning:

• viewing time;
• abandonment rates;
• search behaviour;
• household preferences;
• geographic consumption;
• demographic information;
• subscription cancellations;
• advertising engagement.

A dominant platform can use this data to improve content acquisition and production decisions.

The competition concern is not simply possession of data. The issue is whether:

data advantages become sufficiently difficult for rivals to reproduce that they create or reinforce durable market power.

9. Algorithmic Content Promotion

Recommendation algorithms can influence which programmes consumers discover.

Competition issues may arise if an algorithm:

• systematically favours affiliated content;
• disadvantages licensed third-party content;
• manipulates visibility of rival services;
• uses competitor information strategically;
• creates discriminatory access to platform audiences.

The legal analysis must distinguish legitimate recommendation optimisation from anticompetitive discrimination.

10. Long-Term Licensing Agreements

Long-term exclusive agreements can create barriers to entry.

Suppose a major sports league, film studio or broadcaster grants a platform exclusive streaming rights for ten years.

Even if the agreement is initially competitive, its cumulative effect may:

• deprive rivals of attractive content;
• increase subscriber-acquisition costs;
• prevent new entry;
• reduce innovation;
• reinforce network effects.

Duration therefore matters greatly.

11. Sports Streaming

Sports content is particularly sensitive because certain events are effectively must-have content.

Examples include:

• football;
• cricket;
• Olympic events;
• Formula One;
• major tennis tournaments.

If a dominant platform acquires exclusive rights to a large portfolio of important sporting events, competitors may struggle to offer a viable alternative.

Competition authorities may therefore examine:

• exclusivity duration;
• sublicensing;
• rights fragmentation;
• access to highlights;
• broadcasting windows;
• resale obligations.

12. Film and Television Libraries

A large catalogue may generate economies of scale and consumer loyalty.

If a platform acquires a significant share of valuable film and television libraries, rivals may face:

content scarcity → weaker catalogue → fewer subscribers → lower revenues → lower licensing budgets → further content scarcity.

This can create a self-reinforcing competitive advantage.

13. Licensing and Merger Control

Competition concerns do not arise only from contracts.

A major streaming platform may acquire:

• a film studio;
• sports rights company;
• broadcaster;
• production house;
• content library;
• advertising technology company.

The resulting transaction may combine substantial upstream content assets with downstream streaming distribution.

Authorities may examine whether the merger creates:

vertical foreclosure + portfolio effects + data concentration + increased entry barriers.

14. Important Case Laws

1. Premier League v QC Leisure / Murphy

This is one of the most important European cases concerning territorial licensing of audiovisual sports content.

The Court of Justice examined territorial exclusivity arrangements surrounding Premier League broadcasting rights and the use of foreign decoder cards.

Principle

Absolute territorial restrictions designed to eliminate cross-border trade can conflict with EU competition principles.

Importance for streaming

The case demonstrates that intellectual-property rights do not automatically justify contractual arrangements that partition markets.

It is highly relevant to:

• geo-blocking;
• territorial streaming licences;
• sports broadcasting;
• cross-border subscriptions;
• exclusive national streaming rights.

2. Coditel v Ciné-Vog Films

The Coditel litigation concerned territorial copyright licensing for cinematographic works.

The European courts recognised that copyright licensing can involve legitimate territorial exploitation, but the exercise of intellectual-property rights must still be distinguished from anticompetitive agreements.

Principle

Intellectual property rights do not create an unlimited immunity from competition law.

Streaming significance

The case provides foundational reasoning for analysing territorial film and television licensing.

3. Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios

The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the manufacture and sale of VCR technology facilitated copyright infringement.

Although not a streaming-platform licensing case, the decision is important for understanding the relationship between technological innovation, copyright and competition.

Principle

A technology capable of substantial lawful uses is not automatically condemned merely because it may facilitate infringement.

Streaming significance

The case illustrates the need to distinguish:

• legitimate technological innovation;
• rights-holder protection; and
• exclusionary strategies.

This principle remains relevant to streaming technologies and digital distribution.

4. United States v Apple Inc.

The U.S. antitrust litigation concerning Apple's conduct in the e-books market is highly relevant to digital content distribution.

The government alleged that Apple facilitated coordination among publishers concerning e-book pricing.

Principle

A digital platform can face antitrust liability where contractual and organisational arrangements facilitate horizontal coordination.

Streaming significance

The case is relevant where a streaming intermediary structures licensing arrangements in ways that reduce competition among content suppliers or distributors.

5. Apple v Pepper

The U.S. Supreme Court considered Apple's App Store distribution model and whether consumers could sue Apple under antitrust law.

Principle

A platform may be exposed to antitrust scrutiny where it operates as an intermediary between suppliers and consumers.

Streaming significance

The reasoning is relevant to platform-based streaming ecosystems because streaming services increasingly operate through:

• app stores;
• connected devices;
• platform fees;
• subscription transactions.

It reinforces the importance of analysing the economic role of the digital intermediary.

6. European Commission v Apple – Music Streaming / Spotify

The European Commission's proceedings concerning Apple's App Store practices and music-streaming services are highly relevant to the broader digital-content ecosystem.

The competition concerns included Apple's control over app distribution and restrictions affecting competing music-streaming services.

Principle

A vertically integrated digital platform may have competition-law obligations when it controls an important distribution channel through which competing digital services reach consumers.

Streaming significance

The same structural issue can arise with video streaming where a platform controls:

operating system + app store + payment system + recommendation interface + competing streaming service.

7. Google Android

The European Commission's Android decision examined Google's contractual arrangements concerning mobile devices, search and app distribution.

Principle

Contractual restrictions imposed by a dominant digital ecosystem can reinforce dominance by limiting competing distribution channels.

Streaming significance

The case is relevant to connected-TV and mobile-streaming ecosystems where platform operators can influence:

• default applications;
• search;
• app placement;
• installation;
• access to consumers.

8. Google Shopping

The Google Shopping case concerned preferential treatment of Google's own comparison-shopping service.

Principle

A dominant platform's control over an important gateway can make preferential treatment of its own service competitively significant.

Streaming significance

The principle can be applied by analogy to streaming recommendation systems.

If a platform controls the principal interface through which users discover content, systematic preference for affiliated content may become a competition concern.

15. Competition-Law Tests

Authorities generally examine several dimensions.

Market power

Factors include:

• subscriber numbers;
• market shares;
• switching costs;
• network effects;
• catalogue strength;
• exclusive rights;
• access to data.

Foreclosure

Would the licensing agreement make it materially harder for rivals to compete?

Duration

Longer exclusivity generally creates greater foreclosure potential.

Coverage

An agreement covering a small niche is different from one covering most commercially important content.

Counterfactual

Authorities may ask:

What would competition look like without the disputed licensing arrangement?

Efficiencies

The platform may argue that exclusivity:

• finances production;
• reduces free-riding;
• encourages investment;
• improves quality;
• provides consumer benefits.

These efficiencies must generally be credible, relevant and sufficiently connected to the restrictive arrangement.

16. Remedies

Competition authorities can employ several remedies.

Structural remedies

In exceptional circumstances:

• divestiture of content assets;
• separation of businesses;
• restrictions on acquisitions.

Behavioural remedies

More commonly:

• shorter exclusivity periods;
• sublicensing obligations;
• non-discrimination;
• interoperability;
• prohibition of tying;
• limits on MFN clauses;
• access to content on reasonable terms.

Transparency remedies

Authorities may require greater transparency regarding:

• licensing terms;
• ranking criteria;
• recommendation practices;
• platform fees;
• access conditions.

17. Global Regulatory Dimension

The same streaming agreement may be examined under different regimes.

The same licensing practice may therefore be lawful in one jurisdiction but restricted or subject to remedies in another.

18. Emerging Issues

A. AI-generated content

AI-generated films and programmes may dramatically increase the supply of content while simultaneously creating new licensing questions concerning:

• training data;
• copyright;
• voice and likeness;
• synthetic actors;
• exclusive AI-content libraries.

B. Sports-rights fragmentation

Streaming may lead to several platforms dividing rights to the same sporting competition.

Consumers may consequently need multiple subscriptions.

This raises questions about:

• consumer welfare;
• market definition;
• bundling;
• interoperability;
• exclusive rights.

C. FAST and AVOD services

Free ad-supported streaming television introduces competition between:

• subscription platforms;
• broadcasters;
• FAST channels;
• traditional television;
• advertising platforms.

D. Cloud and infrastructure dependence

Streaming platforms depend on:

• cloud computing;
• content-delivery networks;
• app stores;
• smart-TV operating systems.

Competition therefore increasingly extends beyond content licensing into infrastructure licensing.

19. Overall Legal Framework

The central competition-law inquiry can be represented as:

Content ownership
↓
Exclusive licensing
↓
Control of attractive programming
↓
Subscriber acquisition
↓
More revenue and data
↓
Greater ability to acquire additional exclusive content
↓
Rival foreclosure
↓
Potential entrenchment of market power

The presence of this cycle does not by itself establish an infringement. Authorities must demonstrate sufficient market power, exclusionary effects, or coordination and then assess legitimate efficiencies and consumer benefits.

Conclusion

Global streaming-platform licensing presents a distinctive competition-law problem because content is both an intellectual-property asset and a strategic input into digital-platform competition.

Exclusive licensing can stimulate investment and provide consumers with differentiated services. However, systematic acquisition of must-have content, long-term territorial exclusivity, restrictive MFNs, tying, self-preferencing and vertical integration can potentially transform licensing from a legitimate commercial strategy into a mechanism of market foreclosure.

The leading cases—particularly Premier League v QC Leisure/Murphy, Coditel, United States v Apple, Apple v Pepper, Google Android and Google Shopping—demonstrate the broader principles governing territorial restrictions, digital intermediaries, vertical restraints, platform power and self-preferencing.

The emerging global approach is therefore likely to focus not simply on who owns the content, but on whether control over content, data, distribution interfaces and digital infrastructure allows a platform to prevent effective competition in streaming markets.