Competition Law and Autonomous Dispute Resolution Monopolies

1. Introduction

Autonomous Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) refers here to digital systems that use artificial intelligence, algorithms, automated decision-making, or smart-contract technology to resolve disputes with little or no continuous human involvement. Such systems may be used by online marketplaces, payment platforms, insurance providers, financial services, employment platforms, e-commerce businesses, or other digital ecosystems.

Examples include automated systems that:

• classify complaints and determine their priority;
• recommend settlements;
• automatically refund or reject claims;
• resolve buyer–seller disputes;
• select procedural rules or decision criteria;
• enforce contractual remedies automatically; or
• use AI to predict or determine outcomes.

Competition-law problems arise when one undertaking gains sufficient control over the infrastructure through which these disputes must be resolved. The concern is not simply that a company becomes large. Competition law generally focuses on whether market power is acquired or maintained through conduct that restricts competition—for example, exclusionary agreements, discriminatory access, tying, self-preferencing, or practices that prevent effective entry.

There is not yet a large body of reported competition cases specifically concerning autonomous dispute-resolution monopolies. Therefore, the most useful legal framework comes from established cases concerning digital platforms, essential facilities, access restrictions, network effects, vertical integration, and monopolisation.

2. Defining the Relevant Market

The first major question is whether autonomous dispute resolution constitutes a separate relevant product market.

A competition authority would examine whether customers could realistically substitute other services for an autonomous dispute-resolution system. Possible markets could include:

Automated dispute-resolution services, AI arbitration software, online marketplace dispute-resolution infrastructure, automated consumer complaint systems, or a broader market covering both human and automated dispute-resolution services.

The answer depends on substitution.

For example, suppose a large marketplace processes millions of disputes every year through a proprietary AI system. Sellers cannot use an independent arbitrator because participation in the marketplace requires acceptance of the platform's automated process. In such circumstances, the platform's dispute-resolution mechanism could potentially constitute a distinct service or form part of a wider platform market.

Market definition becomes particularly complicated where the service operates as a multi-sided platform.

In Ohio v. American Express Co. (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court explained the importance of indirect network effects when analysing certain two-sided transaction platforms. The value of such platforms may depend upon participation on both sides of the system.

That principle can be important for autonomous dispute-resolution platforms because their attractiveness may increase as more businesses, consumers, arbitrators, data providers, and digital platforms use the same infrastructure.

3. How Monopoly Power Could Develop

Several economic characteristics could make autonomous dispute-resolution markets susceptible to concentration.

Network effects

A system handling millions of disputes accumulates substantial information about claims, settlements, fraud patterns and successful resolutions.

More users can produce more data.

More data can improve the system.

A better system can attract more users.

This creates a potential feedback loop:

Users → dispute data → improved algorithms → better service → additional users.

Network effects do not themselves violate competition law, but exclusionary practices built around them may make entry difficult.

Data advantages

Historical dispute data may become an important competitive input.

A new ADR provider might have sophisticated software but lack sufficient real-world disputes to train or evaluate its models.

A dominant provider could therefore obtain an advantage that becomes increasingly difficult to reproduce.

Switching costs

Businesses may integrate a dispute-resolution provider into:

• customer databases;
• payment systems;
• contractual systems;
• identity verification;
• marketplace APIs;
• transaction records; and
• compliance systems.

Moving thousands or millions of disputes to another provider could consequently become expensive.

Standards and interoperability

A company controlling the technical protocol used for autonomous dispute resolution might effectively determine which competitors can interact with the ecosystem.

Closed standards can therefore become an important competition issue.

4. Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation

Having monopoly or dominant market power is not automatically unlawful in most competition-law systems.

The central concern is generally the conduct used to obtain, preserve or extend that power.

Under EU competition law, Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position.

Under U.S. law, Section 2 of the Sherman Act addresses monopolisation and attempted monopolisation.

Potentially problematic ADR practices could include:

• excluding competing dispute-resolution providers;
• requiring exclusive use of one ADR engine;
• tying ADR services to another dominant platform service;
• discriminating against independent ADR providers;
• preventing users from exporting dispute histories;
• restricting interoperability;
• favouring affiliated businesses through dispute algorithms;
• imposing unfair API restrictions;
• acquiring emerging ADR competitors to eliminate competitive threats.

Each practice would require a fact-specific legal and economic assessment.

5. Exclusive ADR Arrangements

Suppose a dominant e-commerce platform tells merchants:

To sell through this marketplace, every dispute must be determined by our proprietary autonomous dispute-resolution system.

Independent ADR companies would lose access to those merchants.

The competition question would include whether the restriction substantially forecloses competitors from an important source of demand.

An analogous principle appears in United States v. Google LLC. In the U.S. search case, the District Court found that Google maintained monopoly power in general search services and general search text advertising through exclusionary distribution agreements. The court's findings emphasized that restrictions affecting access to important distribution channels could deprive rivals of the scale necessary to compete effectively.

The analogy for autonomous dispute resolution would be straightforward: control over the principal distribution channel for disputes could potentially prevent rival ADR systems from acquiring the users, transactions and data necessary to develop into effective competitors.

6. Essential Infrastructure and Access

A difficult issue arises where the dominant company controls infrastructure that competitors need.

Imagine that almost every large marketplace uses one dispute-processing protocol and independent ADR providers cannot operate without access to it.

Competition authorities might investigate whether denying access constitutes abusive conduct.

EU law sets demanding conditions around compulsory-access theories. Slovak Telekom v Commission (C-165/19 P) examined restrictions on competitors' access to telecommunications infrastructure and clarified aspects of Article 102, including the relationship between abusive access conditions and the stricter indispensability principles associated with refusal-to-supply cases.

Accordingly, merely showing that access would make competition easier would generally not automatically establish that competitors have a legal entitlement to the infrastructure.

7. Self-Preferencing Through Autonomous Decisions

A vertically integrated ADR provider could simultaneously:

1. operate a marketplace;
2. sell products or services through that marketplace; and
3. control the algorithm deciding disputes between marketplace participants.

That structure creates a possible competition concern.

Suppose disputes involving the platform's own products are systematically treated differently from comparable disputes involving independent sellers.

Competition authorities could investigate whether the system is being used to disadvantage competitors rather than simply improve dispute resolution.

Important evidence might include:

• algorithmic decision rules;
• internal communications;
• comparative outcome statistics;
• override policies;
• training datasets;
• appeal rates; and
• treatment of affiliated versus independent firms.

A high success rate for the platform's own businesses would not alone establish an antitrust violation. Authorities would need to establish the relevant legal elements and examine legitimate explanations.

8. Tying and Bundling

Another possible problem is tying ADR services to another dominant product.

For example:

Businesses wanting access to Platform X must also purchase Platform X's autonomous dispute-resolution package.

A competition investigation would normally consider matters such as market power, whether separate products exist, the degree of coercion, foreclosure of competing ADR providers, competitive effects, and potential efficiency justifications.

The issue becomes more significant if independent ADR providers cannot realistically reach customers through alternative distribution channels.

9. Algorithmic Discrimination Against Competitors

Autonomous systems can implement exclusionary policies automatically.

For example, an ADR system might:

• impose greater evidential requirements on competitors;
• automatically suspend rival merchants after disputes;
• process affiliated merchants' cases more quickly;
• impose different remedies on competing services; or
• rank complaints involving competitors differently.

Competition law would normally focus on the competitive consequences and the dominant undertaking's conduct rather than simply the fact that an algorithm executed the rule.

Using AI does not ordinarily remove the undertaking's responsibility for its commercial practices.

10. Six Important Case Laws

Because autonomous ADR is emerging technology, these cases provide analogies and governing competition principles, rather than decisions specifically declaring an autonomous ADR system unlawful.

1. United States v. Microsoft Corp. — United States

This is a foundational technology-monopolisation case.

Microsoft possessed monopoly power in PC operating systems and was accused of using contractual and technological restrictions that protected its operating-system monopoly from competitive threats.

The case demonstrates an important principle for autonomous ADR:

A dominant digital ecosystem can face antitrust liability where exclusionary practices protect its monopoly by preventing emerging technologies from developing into meaningful competitive threats.

For ADR markets, similar questions could arise where a dominant provider prevents rival AI-resolution systems from connecting with its platform or obtaining sufficient distribution.

2. United States v. Google LLC — United States

The U.S. District Court concluded in 2024 that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining monopolies in general search services and general search text advertising through exclusionary distribution agreements. The subsequent remedies proceedings resulted in a final judgment in December 2025.

The relevance to autonomous ADR is substantial.

A dominant ADR provider could potentially create comparable foreclosure concerns if it secures default or exclusive placement across major marketplaces and thereby deprives competitors of users, disputes and scale.

3. Ohio v. American Express Co. — United States

This 2018 Supreme Court case concerned a two-sided transaction platform.

The Court emphasized that certain transaction platforms must be analysed with attention to interactions between both sides and the indirect network effects connecting them.

An autonomous dispute-resolution network could similarly connect several groups:

Consumers ↔ ADR platform ↔ merchants

or even:

Consumers ↔ AI ADR provider ↔ businesses ↔ digital marketplace.

Consequently, competitive effects may sometimes need to be evaluated across the structure of the platform rather than looking at one group in isolation.

4. Slovak Telekom v European Commission — European Union

Case C-165/19 P, Slovak Telekom a.s. v European Commission (2021) involved alleged abusive practices concerning access to broadband infrastructure, including conditions for unbundled access and margin squeeze. The Court of Justice addressed when the strict indispensability requirements associated with refusal-to-supply doctrine apply.

Its relevance to ADR lies in infrastructure access.

If a dominant autonomous ADR company controls APIs, datasets, identity systems or dispute-processing infrastructure, competition authorities would need to determine whether particular restrictions constitute abusive conditions or a genuine refusal of access and then apply the appropriate legal test.

5. MOTOE v Elliniko Dimosio — European Union

Case C-49/07, MOTOE (2008) involved an organisation participating economically in motorcycle events while also possessing special influence over authorisation for competing events.

The structural principle is particularly relevant to autonomous ADR.

Consider a platform that both:

competes with merchants and controls the dispute mechanism governing those merchants.

Such a combination can create conflicts between regulatory or decision-making authority and commercial interests. Competition law may therefore scrutinise whether the power is exercised in ways that distort competition.

6. Google Shopping — European Union

The European Commission's Google Shopping proceedings, subsequently litigated before the EU courts, concerned Google's treatment of its own comparison-shopping service relative to competing comparison-shopping services.

The broader relevance is the concept of a dominant digital platform using control over an important interface or infrastructure in a manner that advantages its own downstream activity.

Applied to autonomous ADR, authorities could investigate a platform that designs dispute outcomes or procedural access so that affiliated services receive systematically more favourable competitive treatment.

Again, the legal conclusion would depend upon the particular jurisdiction, market structure and evidence.

11. Additional Relevant Case: Bronner

Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint (Case C-7/97) is another important EU authority when considering demands for access to infrastructure controlled by a dominant undertaking.

Bronner established a demanding framework for certain refusal-to-supply claims, particularly concerning whether access is indispensable and whether realistic alternatives exist.

This prevents competition law from automatically converting every commercially useful platform or dataset into infrastructure that competitors must be allowed to use.

For autonomous ADR, therefore, a competitor could not ordinarily argue simply:

“Your dispute database would help us compete, therefore you must share it.”

The legal threshold can be considerably higher.

12. Data as a Barrier to Entry

Autonomous dispute-resolution systems may depend heavily on historical data.

Imagine:

Company A: 500 million historical disputes.

Company B: 50,000 historical disputes.

Even if Company B possesses excellent AI technology, Company A may potentially possess advantages in training, testing and improving its models.

Competition concerns become stronger where Company A uses contractual restrictions to prevent customers from:

• exporting dispute records;
• authorising rival systems to process their data;
• using multiple ADR providers;
• transferring reputation histories; or
• connecting competing systems through APIs.

Authorities would need to distinguish advantages resulting from legitimate investment and innovation from exclusionary conduct that artificially prevents competition.

13. Autonomous ADR and Lock-In

Lock-in could become one of the most significant issues.

A business might spend years integrating a particular ADR system and accumulating:

• dispute histories;
• consumer profiles;
• precedent databases;
• settlement patterns;
• reputation scores; and
• specialised AI models.

Switching provider could mean losing some of those benefits.

A dominant provider might strengthen this lock-in through non-portable proprietary formats.

Competition authorities could therefore examine interoperability and data portability as part of the competitive-effects analysis.

14. Merger Control

Competition concerns may also arise when established ADR providers acquire emerging AI dispute-resolution companies.

Authorities would potentially investigate whether the acquisition:

• removes an emerging competitor;
• combines strategically important datasets;
• eliminates future innovation;
• increases barriers to entry;
• gives one firm control over important ADR technology; or
• enables foreclosure of competing platforms.

This is especially relevant where the acquired business currently has modest revenue but possesses technology capable of challenging an incumbent in the future.

15. Possible Efficiency Justifications

Not every restriction imposed by an autonomous ADR platform is anticompetitive.

Companies may argue that particular arrangements produce legitimate benefits such as:

• faster dispute resolution;
• lower administrative costs;
• fraud prevention;
• consistent decisions;
• cybersecurity;
• privacy protection;
• improved system reliability;
• reduced frivolous claims; and
• better integration between payments and dispute processing.

Competition authorities would examine these explanations under the applicable jurisdiction's legal framework.

The important distinction is between competition on the merits and conduct that unlawfully excludes competitors.

16. Potential Competition-Law Remedies

Where an infringement is established, remedies will depend upon the jurisdiction and violation.

Possible measures could include:

Interoperability requirements — allowing competing ADR systems to communicate with dominant infrastructure.

Contractual restrictions — prohibiting unlawful exclusivity arrangements.

Data portability — enabling customers to transfer appropriate dispute records between providers, subject to privacy and security requirements.

Non-discrimination obligations — requiring equivalent treatment of affiliated and independent participants where legally justified.

API access remedies — in appropriate circumstances, requiring access under specified terms.

Separation measures — separating particular functions where conflicts of interest cannot adequately be addressed through less intrusive remedies.

Modern digital-market remedies can target distribution and access rather than merely imposing monetary penalties. For example, remedies in the U.S. Google search litigation restrict certain exclusive distribution arrangements and include specified data and syndication obligations designed to restore competitive opportunities.

Conclusion

Autonomous dispute resolution could produce substantial benefits by making disputes faster, cheaper and more consistent. At the same time, the combination of network effects, proprietary data, ecosystem integration, switching costs and algorithmic control can create conditions in which market power becomes durable.

Competition law would therefore concentrate principally on whether a dominant ADR provider uses exclusionary or discriminatory conduct to preserve or extend its position.

The most important legal issues are likely to involve market definition, monopolisation or abuse of dominance, exclusive dealing, essential infrastructure, tying, self-preferencing, discriminatory access, interoperability, data portability and merger control.