Competition Law and Connected Vehicle Ecosystem Dominance

1. Introduction

Connected vehicles are no longer merely automobiles. A modern connected vehicle may integrate:

• vehicle operating software;
• infotainment systems;
• navigation;
• telematics;
• cloud platforms;
• vehicle-generated data;
• mobile applications;
• charging networks;
• repair and maintenance services;
• insurance and financing;
• autonomous-driving functions;
• app stores and payment systems;
• voice assistants; and
• third-party mobility services.

This creates a connected vehicle ecosystem in which one undertaking may control several vertically or horizontally related layers. For example, an automobile manufacturer may control the vehicle, embedded software, cloud infrastructure, diagnostic data and authorised repair network. Alternatively, a technology company may control the mobile operating system, app store, mapping service and vehicle-integration platform.

Competition concerns arise when control over one layer is used to restrict competition in another.

The European Commission has specifically recognised that access to vehicle-generated data is increasingly important as a competitive factor. Its work on the motor-vehicle sector notes concerns that vehicle manufacturers may obtain privileged control over data generated by connected vehicles.

The central competition-law question is therefore:

When does control over a connected-vehicle ecosystem become market power capable of excluding competing services, technologies or aftermarket providers?

2. Meaning of Connected Vehicle Ecosystem Dominance

A connected vehicle ecosystem can be represented as:

Vehicle → Sensors/ECUs → Operating Software → Connectivity → Cloud → Data → Apps/Services → Aftermarket

A firm can potentially occupy several of these layers simultaneously.

For example:

OEM

→ vehicle
→ embedded operating system
→ telematics platform
→ vehicle data
→ authorised repair network
→ charging service
→ insurance/financing
→ proprietary applications.

The competitive concern becomes particularly strong where competitors cannot effectively reach consumers without access to an input controlled by the ecosystem owner.

3. Relevant Markets

A competition authority should avoid assuming that the entire connected-vehicle ecosystem constitutes one market.

Several separate markets may exist.

A. Vehicle market

Competition between:

• passenger vehicles;
• commercial vehicles;
• electric vehicles;
• autonomous vehicles.

B. Connected-vehicle operating-system market

Competition between:

• OEM-developed operating systems;
• Android Automotive;
• proprietary infotainment platforms;
• other vehicle software platforms.

C. Vehicle-data market

Potential competition concerning:

• telematics;
• diagnostics;
• location data;
• battery information;
• driving behaviour;
• vehicle-health information.

D. Aftermarket services

Including:

• independent repair;
• diagnostics;
• maintenance;
• insurance;
• roadside assistance.

E. Charging and mobility services

Including:

• EV charging;
• charging-location applications;
• payment applications;
• route optimisation.

F. Digital advertising and commercial services

Vehicle-generated data can potentially be used for:

• targeted advertising;
• insurance pricing;
• personalised offers;
• navigation;
• retail services.

Market definition must therefore be based on substitutability, consumer behaviour, functionality and competitive constraints.

4. Sources of Market Power

A. Control over vehicle-generated data

Connected cars continuously produce information concerning:

• location;
• battery condition;
• mileage;
• mechanical condition;
• driving patterns;
• charging;
• maintenance requirements.

Exclusive access can create a significant competitive advantage.

The European Commission's Joint Research Centre has observed that manufacturers can architect connected-car systems so that they retain exclusive access to vehicle data, potentially allowing them to leverage that position into aftermarket services.

B. Network effects

More connected vehicles can produce:

more users → more data → better services → more users → more data.

This creates a feedback loop.

A large installed vehicle base may therefore become an important barrier to entry.

C. Switching costs

Consumers may face substantial switching costs where changing ecosystems requires:

• replacing applications;
• losing historical vehicle data;
• learning another interface;
• changing charging accounts;
• changing insurance arrangements;
• losing compatibility with accessories;
• replacing hardware.

D. Ecosystem lock-in

An OEM may combine:

vehicle + software + cloud + data + applications + repair + charging.

A consumer who purchases the vehicle may consequently become dependent on the manufacturer's ecosystem.

5. Major Competition Concerns

5.1 Refusal to Provide Vehicle Data

A dominant OEM could refuse to provide relevant vehicle data to independent:

• repairers;
• insurers;
• charging operators;
• navigation providers;
• fleet-management companies.

The legal issue is whether the data constitutes an indispensable input and whether refusal forecloses effective competition.

This connects directly with the essential-facilities/refusal-to-supply doctrine.

6. Self-Preferencing

An ecosystem operator may use its control over vehicle data or software to favour its own downstream services.

For example:

OEM controls vehicle data

↓

OEM operates repair network

↓

OEM gives its repair network real-time diagnostic information

↓

independent repairers receive delayed or incomplete information

↓

customers are steered toward authorised repairers.

Such conduct may constitute an exclusionary strategy where the necessary elements of dominance and abusive effect are established.

7. Tying and Bundling

A connected-vehicle operator may tie:

• navigation to its own charging service;
• vehicle software to its own cloud service;
• telematics to its own insurance product;
• infotainment to its own app store;
• vehicle purchase to proprietary connected services.

Competition authorities would examine whether the products are distinct, whether the undertaking possesses substantial market power and whether the tying strategy forecloses competitors.

8. Interoperability Restrictions

Interoperability is especially important in connected vehicles.

A platform operator could prevent competing applications from functioning through:

• APIs;
• infotainment systems;
• voice assistants;
• charging interfaces;
• vehicle diagnostic interfaces.

The recent Google Android Auto litigation is particularly relevant because it concerned refusal to make a third-party EV-charging application interoperable with Android Auto. The CJEU considered whether such conduct could constitute abuse under Article 102 TFEU even where the platform was not strictly indispensable to the downstream business.

This is highly relevant to connected vehicles because vehicle software platforms can operate as gateways between consumers and competing digital services.

9. Six Important Case Laws

1. Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint

Case: C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint

Principle

The CJEU established the demanding conditions applicable to refusal to supply/access cases.

The relevant infrastructure must generally be indispensable, meaning there is no actual or potential substitute.

Connected-vehicle relevance

An OEM's:

• vehicle-data platform;
• diagnostic system;
• proprietary API; or
• connectivity infrastructure

could potentially raise a Bronner-type issue.

However, merely being useful or commercially advantageous would not automatically make access legally indispensable.

2. Magill

Cases: Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission

Principle

The refusal to license information can constitute abuse in exceptional circumstances, particularly where:

1. the input is indispensable;
2. refusal prevents emergence of a new product;
3. refusal is unjustified; and
4. competition is excluded.

Connected-vehicle application

Consider an OEM controlling unique vehicle-generated information required for an innovative:

• predictive-maintenance service;
• insurance product;
• mobility service; or
• safety application.

If competitors cannot develop a meaningful competing service without that information, Magill-type reasoning may become relevant.

3. IMS Health v Commission

Case: C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG

Principle

The CJEU reaffirmed the exceptional nature of compulsory access to intellectual property and infrastructure.

The case concerned the refusal to license a system necessary for competing pharmaceutical-data services.

Connected-vehicle relevance

Connected vehicles may involve:

• proprietary software architectures;
• APIs;
• databases;
• technical standards;
• diagnostic interfaces.

A dominant ecosystem owner cannot automatically be required to disclose every proprietary technology. The exceptional conditions for compulsory access must be examined.

4. Microsoft v Commission

Case: T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Commission

Principle

Microsoft's refusal to provide interoperability information was found abusive in circumstances where competitors required interoperability to compete effectively in the work-group server market.

Connected-vehicle significance

This is particularly important because connected vehicles are interoperability-intensive ecosystems.

A vehicle platform may need to interact with:

• smartphones;
• charging networks;
• navigation applications;
• repair systems;
• insurance platforms;
• fleet-management systems.

Where a dominant platform controls the technical gateway, interoperability restrictions can potentially exclude competing services.

5. Google Shopping

Case: C-48/22 P, Google and Alphabet v Commission

Principle

The EU courts considered Google's conduct involving preferential positioning of its own comparison-shopping service within its general search results.

The case is important for the broader principle that a dominant digital platform can potentially leverage its position in an upstream gateway to favour its own downstream service.

Connected-vehicle relevance

An analogous connected-vehicle scenario could involve:

dominant vehicle platform

↓

controls consumer interface

↓

ranks its own charging/repair/navigation service preferentially

↓

competitors receive inferior access or visibility.

The precise legal analysis would depend on the relevant market, dominance and effects.

6. Google Android Auto / Enel X

Case: C-233/23, Alphabet and Google v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato

This is arguably the most directly relevant modern case to connected-vehicle ecosystem competition.

Google's Android Auto platform allowed users to access applications through a vehicle's infotainment system. Enel X sought interoperability for its JuicePass EV-charging application. Google did not initially provide the necessary interoperability solution.

The CJEU held that refusal by a dominant digital platform to ensure interoperability with a third-party application can constitute abuse under Article 102 TFEU, even where the platform is not indispensable to the downstream commercial operation of the application, provided the relevant conditions are satisfied.

Importance

This case demonstrates how competition law can address digital gatekeeping in the automotive environment.

It is directly relevant to:

• vehicle infotainment;
• EV charging applications;
• navigation;
• mobility applications;
• vehicle APIs;
• connected-car software.

10. Additional Automotive Case: Car Emissions

Daimler, BMW and Volkswagen — Car Emissions

The European Commission fined Daimler, BMW and Volkswagen in 2021 for coordination concerning technical development of emissions-cleaning technology. The Commission characterised the coordination as restricting competition in technical development and customer choice.

This is not a connected-vehicle dominance case, but it demonstrates that technical cooperation between automobile manufacturers can itself become a competition-law issue where cooperation restricts technological competition.

The lesson for connected vehicles is that cooperation involving:

• vehicle software;
• charging standards;
• data interfaces;
• cybersecurity;
• autonomous-driving technology;
• communication protocols

must be examined carefully where competitors coordinate technological parameters.

11. Data as a Strategic Competition Asset

Connected-vehicle data has several distinctive economic characteristics.

Data feedback loop

Vehicles

↓

Data

↓

Analytics

↓

Better services

↓

More customers

↓

More vehicles

↓

More data

This can produce substantial economies of scale and scope.

Academic and policy research has specifically identified the possibility that exclusive control over connected-car data could give manufacturers leverage in aftermarket maintenance services.

12. Aftermarket Foreclosure

The aftermarket is particularly vulnerable.

A manufacturer could potentially control:

Vehicle → diagnostic data → repair information → software updates → replacement parts → authorised service

Independent service providers may therefore become dependent upon access to manufacturer-controlled information.

Competition concerns may include:

• discriminatory access;
• delayed access;
• excessive access charges;
• incomplete APIs;
• proprietary encryption;
• technical incompatibility;
• preferential access to authorised dealers.

13. Connected Vehicle and Charging Ecosystems

EVs intensify these concerns because the vehicle ecosystem overlaps with the energy ecosystem.

A connected EV may simultaneously interact with:

Vehicle

→ battery-management system
→ navigation
→ charging application
→ charging station
→ payment platform
→ electricity supplier
→ energy-management system.

Control over the interface could therefore allow a platform to favour its own charging ecosystem.

The Google Android Auto/Enel X case illustrates precisely why interoperability between vehicle interfaces and competing charging applications can become a competition-law issue.

14. China-Specific Dimension

China presents an important connected-vehicle data dimension.

Research on China's NEV data architecture has documented systems requiring connected electric and hybrid vehicles to transmit electro-mechanical and real-time navigation information to government-linked data platforms for regulatory and subsidy-related purposes.

This creates a different competition question from ordinary private-platform dominance:

Who controls economically valuable vehicle-generated data, and under what access conditions can competitors use it?

Potential Chinese competition-law issues may arise under the Anti-Monopoly Law, particularly where a platform or manufacturer uses data or technological control to:

• exclude competitors;
• impose discriminatory conditions;
• restrict interoperability;
• refuse necessary access;
• bundle services;
• engage in self-preferencing;
• exploit network effects.

The analysis must, however, distinguish state-mandated data sharing from private anticompetitive conduct.

15. Dominance Through Multiple Layers

A particularly significant risk is multi-layer leverage.

For example:

The more layers controlled by one undertaking, the greater the possibility of leveraging market power from one layer into another.

16. Competition Theories Applicable

A. Refusal to deal

Dominant undertaking refuses necessary access.

B. Discriminatory access

Competitors receive inferior data/API access.

C. Self-preferencing

Platform privileges its own service.

D. Tying

Access to one product requires purchase/use of another.

E. Exclusive dealing

Customers or suppliers are restricted from using rival ecosystems.

F. Margin squeeze

A vertically integrated platform may charge competitors for an essential input while competing against them downstream.

G. Predatory or exclusionary pricing

A dominant platform could potentially use below-cost pricing in one layer to eliminate rivals in another.

H. Exploitative conduct

Excessive charges or unfair conditions could potentially become relevant, depending on jurisdiction and applicable doctrine.

17. Merger Control

Connected-vehicle ecosystems also raise concentration concerns.

Potential transactions include:

• OEM acquiring a telematics company;
• technology company acquiring a vehicle-software provider;
• charging company acquiring a navigation platform;
• OEM acquiring an insurance platform;
• cloud provider acquiring connected-car data analytics;
• battery-management company merging with charging software.

Authorities may examine:

Horizontal effects

Will the transaction eliminate an existing competitor?

Vertical effects

Could the merged firm deny competitors access to data or software?

Conglomerate effects

Could products be bundled across several connected-vehicle markets?

Data effects

Will the merged entity acquire a uniquely valuable vehicle-data resource?

18. Essential Facility Analysis

A connected vehicle platform could potentially become an essential facility where the factual requirements are established.

Possible candidates include:

• unique diagnostic data;
• indispensable vehicle APIs;
• technical communication interfaces;
• charging interoperability infrastructure.

But competition law should not automatically classify every proprietary database or API as an essential facility.

The Bronner–Magill–IMS Health line of authority demonstrates that compulsory access is exceptional and requires careful examination of indispensability, foreclosure and justification.

19. Objective Justifications

A manufacturer may legitimately restrict access for reasons such as:

• cybersecurity;
• passenger safety;
• protection against hacking;
• system integrity;
• privacy;
• intellectual-property protection;
• technical reliability;
• regulatory compliance.

However, a claimed security justification should be examined against alternatives.

For example:

Complete exclusion

may not be necessary if

certification + API permissions + security testing + access controls

can protect the system while permitting competition.

The CJEU's Android Auto judgment specifically addresses the relevance of objective justification when a dominant digital platform refuses interoperability.

20. Competition Remedies

Possible remedies include:

1. Data access

Require non-discriminatory access to specified vehicle-generated data.

2. API access

Require technically effective interoperability.

3. FRAND-type access

Access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms where appropriate.

4. Data portability

Allow consumers to transfer relevant data.

5. Non-discrimination

Prevent the platform from providing materially better access to its own services.

6. Interoperability

Require compatibility with competing applications.

7. Structural separation

In exceptional circumstances, separate infrastructure from downstream services.

8. Monitoring

Require independent compliance monitoring.

21. Key Compliance Issues for Connected Vehicle Companies

A connected-vehicle company should maintain:

1. documented API-access criteria;
2. transparent data-access policies;
3. equal treatment of competing applications;
4. objective interoperability requirements;
5. cybersecurity-based access restrictions supported by evidence;
6. internal safeguards against self-preferencing;
7. non-discriminatory access pricing;
8. competition-law review of bundling;
9. controls on exclusive agreements;
10. competition review of acquisitions involving vehicle data.

22. Examination-Oriented Legal Framework

The analysis can be reduced to the following sequence:

Step 1 — Identify the ecosystem

↓

Vehicle / software / data / cloud / apps / aftermarket

↓

Step 2 — Define relevant markets

↓

Vehicle / data / software / charging / repair / applications

↓

Step 3 — Determine dominance

↓

Market share + data + network effects + switching costs + entry barriers

↓

Step 4 — Identify conduct

↓

Refusal / discrimination / tying / self-preferencing / exclusivity

↓

Step 5 — Examine competitive effects

↓

Foreclosure + reduced innovation + reduced consumer choice

↓

Step 6 — Consider objective justification

↓

Security / privacy / safety / IP / technical necessity

↓

Step 7 — Select remedy

↓

Access / interoperability / non-discrimination / data portability / structural remedy

23. Important Case-Law Principles at a Glance

24. Conclusion

Connected vehicle ecosystem dominance represents a convergence of traditional automotive competition law and digital-platform competition law.

The central concern is not simply whether an automobile manufacturer has a large share of the vehicle market. Market power can increasingly arise from control over data, software, APIs, interfaces, cloud infrastructure, applications and aftermarket access.

The most important competition-law questions are therefore:

• Does the undertaking control a competitively significant gateway?
• Is the gateway indispensable or otherwise subject to special access obligations?
• Does the undertaking discriminate against competing services?
• Does it favour its own downstream products?
• Does it use vehicle data to foreclose independent aftermarket providers?
• Does it tie vehicle functionality to proprietary services?
• Does it restrict interoperability?
• Do mergers combine vehicle, data and digital-platform power?

The Google Android Auto/Enel X judgment is especially significant because it demonstrates how Article 102 TFEU can address interoperability problems involving a digital platform embedded in the automotive environment.

At the same time, Bronner, Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft establish important boundaries: competition law does not automatically convert every proprietary technology, database or platform into a compulsory-access facility. The decisive assessment depends upon dominance, indispensability or competitive significance, exclusionary effects, objective justification and the structure of the relevant market.

Thus, the emerging legal model is moving from regulation of competition between cars toward regulation of competition within the connected vehicle ecosystem itself.