Competition Law and Future Development of Danish Competition Law Reforms

1. Introduction

Danish competition law is entering a reform-oriented phase in which traditional rules on cartels, abuse of dominance and merger control are being supplemented by stronger tools for dealing with below-threshold mergers, structurally weak markets, digital platforms, algorithmic conduct, market-wide competition problems and increasingly complex economic ecosystems.

The central statute is the Danish Competition Act (Konkurrenceloven), which operates alongside Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and EU merger-control principles. The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) and the Danish Competition Council (Danish: Konkurrencerådet) play the principal enforcement roles.

A particularly important development occurred in 2024, when Denmark amended its Competition Act to introduce, among other things:

1. power to require notification of certain mergers below the ordinary turnover thresholds;
2. a new market-investigation mechanism;
3. revised principles for fines and sanctions;
4. additional enforcement powers; and
5. procedural changes concerning appeals and limitation periods. 

The reforms are significant because they move Danish competition law toward a more preventive and structural model of enforcement, rather than relying exclusively upon traditional ex-post infringement proceedings.

2. Existing Legal Framework

The principal Danish framework consists of:

A. Danish Competition Act

The Act regulates:

• restrictive agreements;
• abuse of dominance;
• merger control;
• competition-distorting public support;
• sanctions and fines;
• investigations by the competition authorities.

The Danish rules substantially reflect EU competition-law principles, particularly Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

B. Article 101 TFEU

Article 101 addresses:

• cartels;
• price fixing;
• market sharing;
• output restrictions;
• information exchange;
• resale-price restrictions;
• other anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices.

C. Article 102 TFEU

Article 102 concerns abuse of a dominant position, including:

• exclusionary conduct;
• discriminatory conditions;
• tying;
• unfair trading conditions;
• refusal to supply;
• loyalty-inducing practices.

D. Merger Control

Denmark traditionally relied substantially on turnover thresholds. The 2024 reform introduced a significant additional mechanism permitting the authority to require notification of certain transactions even when the ordinary turnover thresholds are not satisfied.

3. The 2024 Danish Competition Law Reform

The 2024 amendment is the most important starting point for considering the future direction of Danish competition law.

A. Below-threshold merger intervention

Under the amended law, the DCCA can require notification of a merger falling below the ordinary turnover thresholds where:

• the parties together have Danish annual turnover of at least DKK 50 million; and
• the authority considers that there is a risk that the transaction may significantly impede effective competition, particularly through creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

There are also statutory time limits concerning when the authority may require notification.

Importance

This addresses the so-called killer-acquisition problem.

A start-up or innovative company may have:

• valuable technology;
• data;
• intellectual property;
• network effects;
• strategic infrastructure;
• AI capabilities;

while having very little turnover.

A turnover-based system can therefore fail to capture economically significant acquisitions.

4. First Major Test: Uber–Dantaxi

The significance of the reform became particularly clear in 2025.

The DCCA required notification of Uber's acquisition of Dantaxi even though the transaction did not satisfy the ordinary turnover thresholds. The authority stated that this was the first application of the new Danish below-threshold merger provision.

Competition-law significance

The case demonstrates a transition:

From turnover-based merger jurisdiction → toward effects-based and structural merger scrutiny.

This can become particularly important for:

• digital platforms;
• AI companies;
• fintech;
• health technology;
• energy technology;
• mobility platforms;
• data-driven businesses;
• innovative start-ups.

5. Market Investigation Powers

Another major reform is the introduction of market investigations (markedsefterforskning).

The DCCA may investigate conduct or structures across one or more sectors where competition appears to be substantially weakened.

Following the investigation, and subject to statutory conditions and procedural safeguards, the Competition Council can require relevant businesses to modify their future conduct.

This represents an important conceptual development.

Traditional model

Specific infringement        ↓ Investigation        ↓ Finding of violation        ↓ Order / fine

Emerging Danish model

Market-wide competition problem        ↓ Market investigation        ↓ Structural/economic analysis        ↓ Identification of competition weakness        ↓ Behavioural intervention        ↓ Future-oriented remedy

This approach could become particularly relevant where no individual undertaking's conduct easily satisfies the traditional requirements of Articles 101 or 102.

6. Why Market Investigations Matter for the Future

Market investigations may be useful in markets characterized by:

• high concentration;
• network effects;
• barriers to entry;
• data advantages;
• switching costs;
• weak interoperability;
• vertical integration;
• platform dependence;
• structural information asymmetry;
• access bottlenecks.

Potential future sectors include:

Digital markets

• app stores;
• online marketplaces;
• food-delivery platforms;
• search engines;
• digital advertising;
• cloud computing;
• AI infrastructure.

Infrastructure

• ports;
• airports;
• energy networks;
• telecommunications;
• payment systems.

Consumer markets

• grocery retail;
• financial services;
• mobility;
• healthcare;
• housing-related services.

7. Case Law 1 — Wolt

Danish Competition Council, Wolt Denmark, 26 August 2026

The Competition Council found that Wolt had abused a dominant position in the Danish market for meal-ordering platforms with delivery.

The authority identified three forms of abuse, including a price-parity clause and unfair trading conditions imposed on restaurants. The investigated period was 2022–2024.

Future significance

Wolt demonstrates the increasing importance of platform competition law.

Traditional dominance analysis must increasingly address:

• platform dependency;
• network effects;
• price-parity clauses;
• multi-sided markets;
• access to customers;
• platform-to-business relationships.

It also demonstrates how Article 102 and Danish competition law can be applied to digital-platform ecosystems.

8. Case Law 2 — Uber/Dantaxi

The Uber–Dantaxi matter is particularly important because it represents the first application of the 2024 below-threshold merger mechanism.

Uber acquired Greenfleet Holding, the parent company of Dantaxi, in May 2025. Although the transaction fell below the ordinary turnover thresholds, the DCCA required notification because of potential competition concerns.

Future significance

This case provides an important precedent for:

• start-up acquisitions;
• platform consolidation;
• digital markets;
• nascent competition;
• acquisitions involving low-turnover but strategically valuable businesses.

9. Case Law 3 — FK Distribution

In FK Distribution, the Maritime and Commercial Court upheld the finding that the company abused its dominant position.

FK Distribution became the sole nationwide distributor of unaddressed mail and subsequently required customers purchasing physical distribution of advertising newspapers to also purchase digital display services from FK Distribution.

Competition issue

The conduct illustrates:

Dominance + leveraging + tying/bundling → foreclosure risk.

Future significance

The case is relevant to the future regulation of:

• essential facilities;
• vertically integrated infrastructure;
• bundling;
• digital add-ons;
• platform leverage.

It also illustrates why competition law increasingly needs to examine the interaction between physical and digital markets.

10. Case Law 4 — Deutz AG / Diesel Motor Nordic

In Deutz AG and Diesel Motor Nordic, the Danish Supreme Court found violations involving both abuse of dominance and an anti-competitive agreement.

The dispute concerned access to Deutz spare parts required for renovation of DSB's IC3 trains. The conduct affected the ability of another supplier to perform the renovation work.

Future significance

This case is important for the future doctrine of:

• access to essential inputs;
• aftermarket competition;
• interoperability;
• refusal to supply;
• infrastructure dependency;
• vertical foreclosure.

It is particularly relevant to increasingly complex technological ecosystems in which a manufacturer controls proprietary components, software, data or technical interfaces.

11. Case Law 5 — Clear Channel / AFA JCDecaux

The Danish courts considered coordination between Clear Channel Denmark and AFA JCDecaux concerning discounts.

The Eastern High Court found that the undertakings had infringed competition law through agreements and coordinated practices and that the unlawful coordination continued to have effects even after the written agreements formally expired.

Future significance

The case is significant for the future treatment of:

• tacit coordination;
• continuing effects;
• concerted practices;
• information exchange;
• algorithmic coordination.

The underlying principle becomes particularly important in digital markets, where firms can coordinate through:

• pricing algorithms;
• automated monitoring;
• shared datasets;
• common software;
• AI-driven pricing systems.

12. Case Law 6 — ECIT Account

In ECIT Account A/S, the company was found responsible for facilitating a cartel involving independent nightclubs and their purchasing company.

The conduct involved geographic market sharing and continued for more than 15 years. In January 2025, the Maritime and Commercial Court imposed a DKK 20 million fine.

Future significance

This case demonstrates that competition liability may extend beyond the traditional cartel participants.

Potentially relevant intermediaries can include:

• consultants;
• software providers;
• accountants;
• trade associations;
• data providers;
• algorithm suppliers.

This becomes increasingly important as businesses outsource pricing and market-management functions to technological intermediaries.

13. Case Law 7 — Botex

In Botex, the Danish Competition Council reconsidered the case following a 2023 remittal by the Competition Appeals Tribunal.

The case concerned an agreement among independent stores restricting advertising in each other's geographical areas. In March 2025, the Competition Council again found an infringement.

Future significance

Botex illustrates the continuing importance of distinguishing legitimate cooperation from prohibited restrictions among supposedly independent businesses.

This is particularly relevant to:

• franchise systems;
• voluntary chains;
• purchasing cooperatives;
• digital seller networks;
• platform seller ecosystems.

14. Case Law 8 — ØnskeBørn

In ØnskeBørn, the Danish Competition Council had previously found coordination of prices among members of a voluntary retail chain.

In 2025, the Maritime and Commercial Court imposed a DKK 9 million fine following the bankruptcy of ØnskeBørn and a default judgment.

Future significance

The case reinforces the continuing Danish focus on:

• retail price coordination;
• voluntary chains;
• horizontal cooperation;
• independent retailers;
• price communication.

Future competition policy will need to reconcile legitimate collective purchasing with restrictions on independent price competition.

15. Case Law 9 — Rema 1000 / Aldi

In the Rema 1000/Aldi merger proceedings, the DCCA found that Rema 1000 had supplied incorrect, incomplete or misleading information in its merger notification.

The Competition Council had approved the transaction subject to divestiture commitments, but the authority subsequently pursued the information issue.

Future significance

This demonstrates that future merger control will not concern only:

whether a merger should be approved.

It will increasingly also concern:

• quality of notification;
• completeness of data;
• internal documents;
• accuracy of market information;
• compliance with remedies;
• post-notification supervision.

16. Case Law 10 — A.P. Møller-Mærsk / Pilot Air Freight

In A.P. Møller-Mærsk, the Maritime and Commercial Court imposed a DKK 10 million fine concerning failure to notify a merger and implementation without the required approval.

The matter involved Damco USA's acquisition of Pilot Air Freight Holdings.

Future significance

The case reinforces the importance of:

• merger notification;
• standstill obligations;
• gun-jumping;
• internal merger-control compliance.

The combination of this enforcement approach with the 2024 below-threshold power suggests that Danish merger control is becoming both broader and more compliance-intensive.

17. Major Future Reform Direction No. 1 — Digital Competition

Digital markets are likely to remain one of the most important areas of Danish competition-law development.

Future issues include:

A. Platform dominance

Platforms may control:

• consumers;
• merchants;
• payment systems;
• advertising;
• logistics;
• data.

B. Self-preferencing

A platform may operate both:

marketplace + competing seller.

This creates potential conflicts of interest.

C. Data advantages

Competition authorities may increasingly examine whether control over data creates durable barriers to entry.

D. Interoperability

Future remedies may require:

• API access;
• data portability;
• technical interoperability;
• access to interfaces.

E. Platform parity clauses

The Wolt decision demonstrates the continuing relevance of contractual restrictions between platforms and business users.

18. Major Future Reform Direction No. 2 — Artificial Intelligence

AI introduces new competition-law problems.

Potential concerns

1. AI firms controlling essential datasets;
2. exclusive access to computing resources;
3. concentration in foundation models;
4. algorithmic price coordination;
5. AI-enabled collusion;
6. discriminatory ranking;
7. preferential access to cloud infrastructure;
8. acquisitions of AI start-ups;
9. interoperability restrictions;
10. vertical integration between AI models and platforms.

Merger control

The 2024 below-threshold merger reform is particularly relevant because an AI start-up may possess substantial strategic value despite limited turnover.

19. Major Future Reform Direction No. 3 — Killer Acquisitions

Traditional merger thresholds are largely turnover-oriented.

But innovative companies may have:

• patents;
• algorithms;
• datasets;
• intellectual property;
• technological know-how;
• highly scalable products.

Consequently, Danish merger policy is moving toward a model capable of capturing transactions whose competitive significance exceeds their immediate turnover.

The Uber–Dantaxi matter demonstrates the practical significance of this reform.

20. Major Future Reform Direction No. 4 — Market Investigations

Market investigations may become one of the most important Danish competition-policy tools.

They allow the authorities to examine competition conditions across an entire market, rather than restricting intervention to an individual infringement.

This could be especially useful where problems arise from:

• structural concentration;
• entry barriers;
• network effects;
• common ownership;
• vertical integration;
• consumer switching costs;
• technological dependency.

The 2024 reform expressly introduced this mechanism.

21. Major Future Reform Direction No. 5 — Sustainability and Green Transition

The Danish Competition Council has identified the green transition as an area of competition-law focus.

Future questions include whether competitors may cooperate on:

• environmental standards;
• carbon reduction;
• sustainable supply chains;
• green technologies;
• recycling;
• shared charging infrastructure;
• climate-related data.

The challenge is to distinguish:

legitimate sustainability cooperation

from

disguised cartel coordination.

22. Major Future Reform Direction No. 6 — Energy and Infrastructure

Denmark's transition toward renewable energy creates competition issues involving:

• offshore wind;
• electricity grids;
• energy storage;
• hydrogen;
• charging networks;
• district heating;
• energy data;
• balancing markets.

Competition law may increasingly interact with sector regulation.

Particularly important will be access to infrastructure where one undertaking controls an indispensable input.

23. Major Future Reform Direction No. 7 — Stronger Sanctions

The 2024 reform also changed the Danish framework concerning fines and sanctions.

The amended legislation introduced additional provisions concerning civil fines, fines applicable to individuals, and limitation periods.

The objective is to make sanctions:

• effective;
• proportionate;
• deterrent.

This means Danish businesses will increasingly need sophisticated competition compliance programmes.

24. Major Future Reform Direction No. 8 — Compliance by Design

Competition compliance is likely to move from:

legal review after conduct occurs

toward:

competition compliance embedded in business systems.

For example:

AI pricing system       ↓ Competition-law screening       ↓ Algorithmic safeguards       ↓ Human oversight       ↓ Audit logs       ↓ Periodic compliance review

This could become particularly important for automated pricing and recommendation systems.

25. Major Future Reform Direction No. 9 — Algorithmic Collusion

Traditional cartel law assumes that humans communicate or coordinate.

AI systems can create similar outcomes without conventional communication.

Potential scenarios include:

• competing algorithms observing each other's prices;
• autonomous price adjustment;
• machine-learning systems learning parallel pricing;
• common pricing software;
• common third-party data providers.

Future Danish enforcement will therefore need to determine:

When does algorithmic adaptation become legally attributable coordination?

26. Major Future Reform Direction No. 10 — Merger Remedies

Future Danish merger remedies are likely to become more sophisticated.

Possible remedies include:

Structural

• divestiture;
• asset separation;
• business-unit separation.

Behavioural

• non-discrimination;
• access obligations;
• interoperability;
• licensing.

Digital

• API access;
• data portability;
• technical separation;
• interoperability.

The Rema/Aldi proceedings demonstrate the importance of divestiture commitments in Danish merger control.

27. Relationship With EU Competition Law

Danish competition reform cannot be understood in isolation.

Danish authorities operate within the broader European framework involving:

• Articles 101 and 102 TFEU;
• EU Merger Regulation;
• European Commission enforcement;
• Court of Justice jurisprudence;
• Digital Markets Act;
• Digital Services Act;
• Foreign Subsidies Regulation;
• EU sustainability initiatives.

Consequently, future Danish competition law will probably become increasingly EU-integrated while retaining specifically Danish enforcement mechanisms.

28. Institutional Development

The Danish Competition Council and DCCA have acquired an increasingly important enforcement role.

The authority itself identifies major focus areas including:

• financial services;
• digitalisation;
• competition-restricting regulation;
• green transition;
• abuse-of-dominance cases. 

The current institutional direction therefore points toward a broader conception of competition enforcement.

29. Emerging Concept: From Conduct Regulation to Market Regulation

The historical model can be represented as:

CARTEL   ↓ INVESTIGATION   ↓ INFRINGEMENT   ↓ FINE

The future model is broader:

MARKET STRUCTURE       ↓ DATA / NETWORK EFFECTS       ↓ MARKET INVESTIGATION       ↓ MERGER SCRUTINY       ↓ DOMINANCE ANALYSIS       ↓ BEHAVIOURAL / STRUCTURAL REMEDIES       ↓ ONGOING SUPERVISION

The 2024 reforms are an important step toward the second model.

30. Challenges for Future Danish Competition Law

A. Over-enforcement

Greater intervention powers may create uncertainty for legitimate investment and innovation.

B. Under-enforcement

Insufficient intervention could allow dominant platforms or infrastructure operators to become entrenched.

C. Regulatory overlap

Businesses may simultaneously be subject to:

• Danish competition law;
• EU competition law;
• DMA;
• GDPR;
• sector regulation;
• consumer law;
• AI regulation.

D. Economic complexity

Modern markets are increasingly multi-sided and technology-driven.

E. Speed

Digital markets can evolve much faster than conventional administrative proceedings.

F. Remedies

A remedy appropriate for a traditional market may be ineffective for an AI or platform ecosystem.

31. Likely Future Danish Competition-Law Architecture

A future Danish system may increasingly contain five interconnected layers:

Layer 1 — Traditional Competition Law

• Article 101;
• Article 102;
• Danish Competition Act.

Layer 2 — Merger Control

• traditional thresholds;
• below-threshold intervention;
• nascent-competition analysis.

Layer 3 — Market Investigations

• sector-wide investigations;
• structural analysis;
• behavioural remedies.

Layer 4 — Digital Competition

• platforms;
• algorithms;
• data;
• interoperability;
• AI.

Layer 5 — Regulatory Coordination

• competition authority;
• sector regulators;
• EU institutions;
• consumer authorities;
• data regulators.

32. Overall Legal Significance of the Case Law

33. Conclusion

The future development of Danish competition law is increasingly characterized by a movement from traditional infringement-based enforcement toward broader, preventive and structurally oriented competition regulation.

The 2024 reform is the central milestone. Its below-threshold merger mechanism and market-investigation powers give Danish authorities tools to address competitive risks that conventional turnover thresholds and individual infringement cases may not adequately capture.

The subsequent Uber–Dantaxi intervention demonstrates the practical importance of below-threshold merger control, while Wolt illustrates the growing significance of digital-platform dominance. The FK Distribution, Deutz, Clear Channel/AFA JCDecaux, ECIT Account, Botex and ØnskeBørn cases demonstrate continuing development of Danish principles concerning dominance, access, coordination, intermediary responsibility and horizontal restrictions.

The likely long-term direction is therefore a Danish competition regime capable of addressing traditional cartels and monopolistic conduct while also responding to digital platforms, AI, data concentration, nascent competitors, algorithmic coordination, infrastructure bottlenecks, sustainability cooperation and structurally weak markets.

In legal terms, the emerging Danish model can be summarized as:

Traditional Competition Law + Expanded Merger Control + Market Investigation + Digital Competition + Structural Remedies + Stronger Compliance Enforcement.

This makes Denmark an increasingly important jurisdiction for studying the evolution of modern European competition law.