Competition Law and Future Digital Competition Architecture

1. Introduction

Digital competition architecture refers to the legal, institutional, technological, and economic framework through which competition is preserved in digital markets. It goes beyond traditional antitrust enforcement because digital markets are frequently characterized by network effects, data accumulation, ecosystems, interoperability dependencies, algorithms, artificial intelligence, multi-sided platforms, switching costs, self-preferencing, app stores, cloud infrastructure, and rapid technological innovation.

The future architecture of digital competition law is therefore likely to combine:

1. Traditional competition law;
2. Ex-ante digital regulation;
3. Platform and gatekeeper regulation;
4. Data and interoperability rules;
5. Merger control;
6. Algorithmic and AI oversight;
7. Consumer-choice protections;
8. Competition remedies directed at digital ecosystems.

The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA) illustrates this movement. The Commission initially designated Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta and Microsoft as gatekeepers in 2023, and later designated Apple's iPadOS and Booking.com under the regime.

2. Meaning of Digital Competition Architecture

Digital competition architecture can be understood as the institutional design for regulating competitive conditions throughout the digital economy.

It encompasses several interconnected layers:

A. Market-structure layer

This concerns:

• market concentration;
• monopoly and dominance;
• digital ecosystems;
• platform power;
• network effects;
• economies of scale;
• economies of scope.

B. Platform-governance layer

It examines:

• access to platforms;
• ranking;
• recommendation systems;
• app-store rules;
• platform fees;
• self-preferencing;
• parity clauses;
• exclusionary contractual conditions.

C. Data layer

Future competition law must address:

• data accumulation;
• data portability;
• data interoperability;
• access to commercially significant datasets;
• combining datasets;
• privacy as a competitive parameter.

D. Infrastructure layer

Digital competition increasingly depends upon access to:

• operating systems;
• cloud infrastructure;
• app stores;
• search engines;
• payment systems;
• advertising exchanges;
• APIs;
• telecommunications networks;
• AI computing infrastructure.

E. Algorithmic layer

Competition authorities increasingly need to consider:

• algorithmic pricing;
• algorithmic collusion;
• automated discrimination;
• ranking algorithms;
• recommendation systems;
• AI agents;
• autonomous commercial decision-making.

3. From Traditional Antitrust to Digital Competition Architecture

Traditional competition law generally asks whether a particular conduct produces or is capable of producing anticompetitive effects.

Digital markets create additional difficulties.

A digital platform can simultaneously act as:

Infrastructure + marketplace + competitor + data collector + regulator of access.

This creates a structural conflict.

For example, a platform may operate a marketplace while simultaneously selling products on that marketplace. It may therefore control:

• access;
• ranking;
• consumer data;
• seller information;
• advertising;
• payment;
• recommendation;
• dispute resolution.

This is why future competition architecture increasingly considers the architecture of the platform itself, rather than merely individual transactions.

4. Principal Elements of Future Digital Competition Architecture

4.1 Gatekeeper regulation

A central development is the emergence of ex-ante regulation.

Instead of waiting until a dominant platform commits an abuse, legislation can impose obligations in advance.

The EU DMA represents this approach.

Its architecture addresses matters including:

• anti-steering;
• interoperability;
• data portability;
• restrictions on combining personal data;
• default settings;
• access to platform services;
• business-user rights;
• interoperability with certain platform functions.

The Commission's 2026 materials indicate that designated gatekeepers continue to submit updated compliance reports and independently audited reports concerning consumer profiling.

5. Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing is likely to remain one of the most important digital competition issues.

A platform may give preferential treatment to its own:

• products;
• applications;
• advertising services;
• comparison services;
• payment services;
• search results;
• logistics services.

The fundamental concern is that the platform controls the competitive environment in which it competes.

Competition-law questions

Authorities may ask:

1. Is the platform dominant?
2. Does it control an important gateway?
3. Does it discriminate between its own service and rivals?
4. Does the conduct foreclose competitors?
5. Does it reduce innovation?
6. Are there legitimate technical or quality justifications?

6. Case Law 1 — Google Shopping

Google and Alphabet v Commission, Case T-612/17

The Google Shopping litigation is one of the foundational cases for digital competition architecture.

The European Commission found that Google abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison-shopping service over competing comparison-shopping services.

The General Court largely upheld the Commission's decision and the €2.42 billion fine.

Importance

The case demonstrates that digital competition can be harmed through control over visibility and ranking, rather than through conventional exclusionary contracts.

It establishes an important principle for future digital markets:

Control over digital attention and ranking can itself become a source of competitive power.

This is particularly relevant to:

• search engines;
• AI search;
• marketplaces;
• recommendation systems;
• app stores;
• travel platforms.

7. Interoperability as a Competition Principle

Future digital competition architecture is likely to increasingly rely upon interoperability.

Interoperability means allowing different technological systems to communicate or work together.

Examples include:

• messaging interoperability;
• payment interoperability;
• operating-system interoperability;
• API access;
• cloud portability;
• device interoperability;
• AI-agent interoperability.

Without interoperability, users may become locked into an ecosystem.

8. Case Law 2 — Microsoft v Commission

Microsoft v Commission, Case T-201/04

The Microsoft case involved two important digital competition issues:

1. refusal to provide interoperability information; and
2. tying Windows with Windows Media Player.

The General Court upheld the Commission's findings concerning Microsoft's abuse of dominance.

Significance

Microsoft demonstrates that competition law can intervene where control over a technological platform allows a dominant firm to extend its power into neighbouring markets.

Its significance extends to modern:

• operating systems;
• cloud platforms;
• AI ecosystems;
• digital assistants;
• app ecosystems;
• interoperability standards.

The case provides an early foundation for the modern concept of ecosystem competition.

9. Data as a Competitive Asset

Data is becoming a major component of digital market power.

A future digital competition framework must consider:

Data advantages

A platform may obtain:

• behavioural data;
• transaction data;
• search data;
• location information;
• purchasing histories;
• interaction data;
• professional data;
• device data.

This can generate powerful feedback loops:

More users → more data → better service → more users → more data.

Such feedback mechanisms can strengthen entry barriers.

10. Data Portability

Data portability can reduce switching costs.

If users can transfer their data easily between competing services, competitors may find it easier to enter established ecosystems.

The EU's current digital competition architecture expressly incorporates data-portability mechanisms, including portability of certain information from social media, search and marketplace ecosystems.

Future competition policy may therefore treat portability as a form of competitive infrastructure.

11. Case Law 3 — Google Android

Google and Alphabet Android litigation

The Google Android case concerned Google's contractual arrangements involving Android devices and applications.

The European Commission found several practices abusive, including arrangements concerning pre-installation and search/browser distribution.

The litigation demonstrated the competitive importance of:

• default applications;
• pre-installation;
• operating-system control;
• search distribution;
• mobile ecosystems.

Importance for future architecture

The case demonstrates that defaults can influence competition even when consumers technically remain free to choose alternatives.

This is particularly important for:

• AI assistants;
• AI search;
• digital wallets;
• browsers;
• smart devices;
• autonomous systems.

12. Defaults as a Competition Instrument

The future architecture of digital competition must therefore distinguish between:

formal choice and effective choice.

A consumer may technically change a default but still face:

• complicated settings;
• repeated prompts;
• inferior interoperability;
• loss of functionality;
• switching costs.

Consequently, competition authorities may increasingly examine choice architecture.

The European Commission has reported changes concerning browser choice and default settings following its DMA proceedings involving Apple.

13. App Stores and Anti-Steering

App stores occupy a unique position because they can function simultaneously as:

• infrastructure;
• marketplace;
• payment intermediary;
• distribution channel;
• competitor.

Anti-steering rules prevent platforms from restricting businesses from informing users about alternative purchasing channels.

14. Case Law 4 — Apple App Store / Spotify

European Commission — Apple App Store anti-steering proceedings

The European Commission's Apple Music Streaming case concerned Apple's restrictions on developers informing users about cheaper purchasing options outside the App Store.

The Commission concluded that Apple's anti-steering provisions restricted competition and imposed a €1.8 billion fine in 2024. The matter became an important precursor to the broader DMA framework.

In 2025, the Commission separately found Apple in breach of the DMA's anti-steering obligation and imposed a €500 million fine.

Architectural significance

The case illustrates the movement from:

individual antitrust enforcement → continuing platform governance.

The question is no longer simply whether Apple violated competition law at a particular point in time. It also concerns how the rules governing an entire digital ecosystem should operate.

15. Case Law 5 — Microsoft Teams

Microsoft Teams — European Commission

The European Commission's Microsoft Teams investigation concerned the tying of Teams with Microsoft's productivity software.

In September 2025, the Commission accepted commitments addressing the competition concerns associated with the bundling.

Significance

The case demonstrates the continuing relevance of traditional tying principles in cloud-based ecosystems.

Future questions include whether companies can use:

• cloud dominance;
• enterprise software;
• AI assistants;
• productivity suites;
• operating systems

to extend market power into adjacent markets.

16. Case Law 6 — Amazon Marketplace

FTC v Amazon

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission and multiple states sued Amazon alleging that Amazon used interconnected strategies to maintain monopoly power in online retail.

The allegations include practices concerning sellers, pricing, marketplace competition and competing retail services. The case remains litigation rather than a final judicial finding on all allegations.

Architectural significance

The Amazon litigation illustrates a central problem of digital competition:

A marketplace operator may simultaneously regulate sellers and compete against those sellers.

This creates a need for future competition architecture concerning:

• platform neutrality;
• seller data;
• ranking;
• pricing mechanisms;
• fulfilment;
• advertising;
• marketplace access.

17. Case Law 7 — FTC v Meta

FTC v Meta Platforms

The FTC's case against Meta concerns allegations that Meta unlawfully maintained monopoly power in personal social networking through a broader strategy involving acquisitions and contractual conduct.

The FTC specifically identifies the acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp and alleged restrictions involving developers. The case is litigation and the allegations should not be treated as final judicial findings.

Importance

The case demonstrates the growing importance of digital merger architecture.

In digital markets, an acquisition may eliminate:

• an emerging competitor;
• a future substitute;
• a technological challenger;
• a source of innovation.

This has encouraged greater attention to nascent-competition theories and innovation effects in digital merger control.

18. Digital Mergers and Killer-Acquisition Concerns

Future digital competition architecture will increasingly examine acquisitions involving:

• startups;
• AI companies;
• data-rich companies;
• cybersecurity firms;
• cloud technologies;
• foundation-model developers;
• digital infrastructure.

Traditional turnover thresholds may not adequately identify strategically important acquisitions.

Therefore, future merger-control systems may consider:

• transaction value;
• data assets;
• user base;
• technological capability;
• innovation pipeline;
• access to critical infrastructure.

19. Algorithmic Competition

Algorithms create a new category of competition concern.

Algorithms can independently:

• set prices;
• change prices;
• rank sellers;
• recommend products;
• allocate advertising;
• determine credit;
• match buyers and sellers.

The principal legal question is:

When does automated decision-making become legally attributable to an undertaking?

20. Algorithmic Collusion

Future competition law will need to distinguish:

Explicit collusion

Human actors intentionally coordinate algorithms.

Algorithmic implementation

Businesses agree on an anticompetitive strategy but algorithms implement it.

Tacit algorithmic coordination

Algorithms independently respond to market information in ways that generate parallel pricing.

The third category presents the greatest doctrinal difficulty because conventional cartel law generally requires some form of legally relevant coordination.

21. AI Agents and Autonomous Competition

The next stage may involve AI agents negotiating directly with other AI agents.

For example:

Consumer AI agent → searches market → compares suppliers → negotiates price → executes transaction.

This raises new questions:

• Who is the economic actor?
• Who is responsible for an AI agent's conduct?
• Can AI agents form prohibited coordination?
• Can an AI agent exploit competitors?
• Can an AI platform manipulate autonomous purchasing agents?
• Can an AI system discriminate between users?

Competition architecture will therefore have to incorporate machine-to-machine commerce.

22. Platform Neutrality

Future regulation may develop a stronger concept of platform neutrality.

A platform controlling essential digital infrastructure could be required to apply certain rules transparently to:

• its own services;
• affiliated businesses;
• independent businesses;
• competitors.

This does not necessarily require absolute neutrality. Competition law must still allow legitimate differentiation based upon:

• security;
• privacy;
• technical performance;
• consumer protection;
• fraud prevention.

The challenge is preventing legitimate platform governance from becoming disguised exclusion.

23. Interoperability and Access Remedies

Future remedies may increasingly include:

Structural remedies

• divestiture;
• separation of business units;
• prohibition of acquisitions.

Behavioural remedies

• non-discrimination;
• access obligations;
• interoperability;
• data portability;
• transparency.

Technical remedies

• API access;
• technical interfaces;
• data-transfer mechanisms;
• switching tools;
• interoperability protocols.

Digital competition therefore increasingly requires technical remedies rather than purely monetary penalties.

24. Advertising Technology

Digital advertising presents another architectural challenge because a single undertaking may operate several layers:

Advertiser → ad exchange → publisher → data provider → measurement service → consumer

Vertical integration across these layers can create conflicts of interest.

The European Commission's 2025 enforcement record includes a €2.95 billion decision concerning Google's online display advertising technology services and alleged favouring of its own ad-tech services.

This illustrates how future competition architecture may increasingly examine entire digital supply chains, rather than isolated markets.

25. Digital Ecosystems

A future competition authority may have to analyse ecosystems rather than conventional product markets.

An ecosystem could contain:

• operating system;
• browser;
• search;
• cloud;
• advertising;
• payment;
• app store;
• hardware;
• AI assistant;
• digital identity.

The competitive issue becomes:

Can power in one layer be leveraged to control another layer?

This is an evolution of the traditional leveraging doctrine.

26. Competition and Privacy

Privacy can also operate as a competitive parameter.

A platform may compete through:

• stronger privacy;
• reduced tracking;
• less profiling;
• local processing;
• consumer control over data.

The EU's DMA architecture already addresses certain forms of personal-data combination and consumer choice concerning data use.

However, competition law must avoid automatically equating:

privacy protection = competition protection.

The two fields overlap but have distinct legal objectives.

27. Consumer Choice Architecture

Future digital competition law will increasingly focus on effective consumer choice.

Relevant factors include:

• default settings;
• dark patterns;
• switching costs;
• cancellation barriers;
• interoperability;
• data portability;
• subscription design;
• recommendation systems.

This creates an intersection between:

competition law + consumer protection + digital regulation.

28. Remedies in the Future Digital Competition Architecture

A future enforcement framework may use a graduated remedies system.

29. Institutional Architecture

Future digital competition regulation is likely to require cooperation among:

Competition authorities

For:

• dominance;
• cartels;
• mergers;
• exclusionary conduct.

Digital regulators

For:

• gatekeepers;
• platform obligations;
• interoperability;
• systemic digital risks.

Data-protection authorities

For:

• personal data;
• profiling;
• lawful data processing.

Consumer-protection authorities

For:

• dark patterns;
• deceptive interfaces;
• subscription practices.

Sector regulators

For:

• telecommunications;
• financial technology;
• energy;
• healthcare;
• transport.

The future model is therefore increasingly multi-regulatory.

30. International Convergence

Digital platforms operate across borders.

A platform may be:

• incorporated in one jurisdiction;
• host infrastructure in another;
• process data in several countries;
• sell to consumers globally.

Consequently, digital competition architecture increasingly requires coordination among:

• EU institutions;
• U.S. agencies;
• UK authorities;
• Asian competition authorities;
• national digital regulators.

However, jurisdictions may differ concerning:

• market definition;
• privacy;
• remedies;
• merger control;
• platform designation;
• economic objectives.

31. Emerging Digital Competition Risks

The future architecture must address several developing risks:

1. AI concentration

Control over:

• compute;
• models;
• chips;
• cloud;
• training data

may produce new forms of market power.

2. Digital infrastructure bottlenecks

Cloud, operating systems and app stores may become strategic gateways.

3. Data concentration

Large datasets can strengthen incumbency.

4. Algorithmic coordination

Automated pricing can facilitate coordination.

5. Ecosystem foreclosure

A dominant ecosystem can disadvantage competing services across several layers.

6. Acquisitions of emerging competitors

Digital incumbents may acquire potential future rivals.

7. Interoperability barriers

Technical restrictions can make switching difficult.

8. Platform dependency

Businesses may become economically dependent on a single platform.

32. Future Legal Principles

A mature digital competition architecture may develop around the following principles:

Principle 1 — Contestability

Markets should remain open to new entrants.

Principle 2 — Fair access

Important digital gateways should not arbitrarily exclude competitors.

Principle 3 — Interoperability

Technical compatibility should be promoted where necessary to prevent ecosystem lock-in.

Principle 4 — Data mobility

Consumers and businesses should be able to move relevant data.

Principle 5 — Non-discrimination

Gatekeepers should not improperly favour their own downstream services.

Principle 6 — Transparency

Important platform rules should be sufficiently understandable to market participants.

Principle 7 — Accountability

Digital decision-making should remain attributable to identifiable economic actors.

Principle 8 — Innovation

Competition policy should protect dynamic competition rather than merely current prices.

33. Relationship Between Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Regulation

The future architecture will probably not replace traditional competition law.

Instead:

Ex-ante regulation

↓

Prevents certain conduct before harm becomes entrenched

+

Ex-post competition law

↓

Investigates specific anticompetitive conduct

+

Merger control

↓

Prevents harmful concentration

+

Consumer/data regulation

↓

Protects complementary competitive parameters

This creates a layered digital competition architecture.

34. Six+ Case-Law Synthesis

The Google Shopping and Microsoft judgments provide particularly important foundations for understanding digital platform power. The more recent Apple, Amazon and Meta proceedings demonstrate how these principles are being translated into modern platform regulation and enforcement.

35. Conclusion

Future digital competition architecture will move from a narrow model of “antitrust enforcement against individual firms” toward a broader model of governing digital ecosystems.

The central regulatory questions will increasingly concern:

• who controls digital gateways;
• who controls data;
• who determines rankings;
• who controls interoperability;
• who establishes platform rules;
• who controls AI infrastructure;
• who can acquire emerging competitors;
• who determines the conditions under which businesses reach consumers.

The development of the DMA, together with cases involving Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon and Meta, demonstrates this transition. The EU currently has 23 designated core platform services across its designated gatekeepers, showing how competition regulation is increasingly organized around platform ecosystems rather than only conventional product markets.

The central concept for the future is therefore contestable digital architecture: digital markets should remain sufficiently open for competitors to enter, users to switch, businesses to innovate, and alternative technological ecosystems to develop. This requires competition law to evolve from regulating only market conduct toward also understanding and, where legally justified, regulating the architecture through which digital competition takes place.