Competition Law and Future Institutional Responses to Ecosystem Dominance

Introduction

Ecosystem dominance refers to a situation in which an undertaking does not merely possess market power in one relevant market, but controls or strongly influences a network of interconnected products, services, data, infrastructure, operating systems, platforms, distribution channels, and complementary markets.

Traditional competition law generally asks:

1. What is the relevant market?
2. Does the undertaking possess a dominant position?
3. What conduct constitutes abuse?
4. What are the effects on competition?

Digital and technology ecosystems make these questions more difficult because competitive power may arise from interconnection between several markets rather than from dominance in a single market.

For example, an undertaking may simultaneously operate:

• an operating system;
• an app store;
• a search engine;
• an advertising network;
• a cloud platform;
• a payment system;
• an AI assistant;
• a hardware ecosystem; and
• a large data infrastructure.

The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA) demonstrates the movement toward an institutional model specifically addressing ecosystem power. The Commission currently identifies gatekeepers and regulates designated core platform services, while its 2026 review has identified cloud computing and AI as important areas for future competition oversight.

I. Meaning of Ecosystem Dominance

Ecosystem dominance differs from conventional single-market dominance in several respects.

1. Multi-market power

A firm may have significant power in several interconnected markets even where no individual market completely explains its economic influence.

2. Network effects

The value of the ecosystem can increase as more:

• users join;
• developers participate;
• advertisers invest;
• merchants sell;
• data is generated; and
• complementary services become available.

This can create substantial entry barriers.

3. Data advantages

An ecosystem can generate information across several services. Data collected from search, payments, advertising, commerce, mobility or communications can potentially strengthen another service.

4. Switching costs

Users may find it costly to leave an ecosystem because they would lose:

• applications;
• purchased content;
• accumulated data;
• social connections;
• business relationships;
• subscriptions; or
• device compatibility.

5. Self-preferencing

An ecosystem operator may have the ability to give preferential treatment to its own downstream services.

6. Vertical and conglomerate leverage

Power acquired in one layer may be used to strengthen another layer—for example, an operating-system provider favouring its own applications or a marketplace favouring its own retail operations.

II. Why Traditional Competition Institutions May Become Inadequate

A. Market definition problems

Traditional competition analysis often begins with a clearly defined relevant market.

Ecosystems can involve:

one technological architecture → multiple connected markets → multiple groups of users → multiple sources of competitive constraint.

Consequently, analysing each market independently may overlook the cumulative competitive significance of the ecosystem.

B. Speed of technological change

Competition investigations can take years, whereas:

• AI markets can evolve within months;
• platforms can change algorithms immediately;
• new APIs can alter market access rapidly;
• interoperability standards can change quickly.

Future competition institutions therefore require continuous monitoring, rather than relying exclusively upon retrospective investigations.

C. Zero-price services

Many ecosystem services are offered at zero monetary prices.

Competition authorities therefore increasingly need to examine:

• quality;
• privacy;
• innovation;
• access;
• data;
• interoperability;
• user choice; and
• switching costs.

III. Existing Case Law Demonstrating Ecosystem Problems

1. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001)

The Microsoft litigation remains foundational for understanding ecosystem power.

Microsoft possessed substantial power through the Windows operating-system ecosystem and was accused of using that position to disadvantage competing browsers and technologies.

Institutional significance

The case demonstrated that competition authorities must examine how power in one technological layer can affect competition in adjacent layers.

Future lesson

Competition institutions should monitor:

• operating systems;
• APIs;
• default settings;
• technical restrictions;
• interoperability; and
• distribution arrangements.

IV. European Commission — Google Shopping

2. Google Search (Shopping) / Google Shopping

The European Commission found Google liable for favouring its own comparison-shopping service in search results.

The case is significant because the search engine could simultaneously function as:

1. infrastructure;
2. information gateway;
3. advertising platform; and
4. distributor of downstream services.

The institutional problem was therefore not simply "large market share." It concerned the ability of a platform to control access to users and favour its own downstream service.

Future institutional response

Authorities may need specialised units capable of analysing:

• ranking algorithms;
• search neutrality;
• self-preferencing;
• traffic allocation;
• data advantages; and
• platform interfaces.

V. Google Android

3. Google Android

The Android case concerned Google's conduct involving the Android operating-system ecosystem and related applications and services.

The broader competition issue illustrates how control over an operating system can influence:

• app distribution;
• search;
• browsers;
• default applications;
• device manufacturers; and
• downstream services.

Institutional significance

The case supports the development of ecosystem-level enforcement, because an operating system can function as a gateway through which several markets are accessed.

The European Commission subsequently incorporated specific obligations concerning gatekeepers and core platform services into the DMA framework.

VI. Apple App Store / Anti-Steering

4. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.

The Apple litigation illustrated competition issues arising from control over an app-store ecosystem.

The relevant economic relationships include:

Apple device → iOS → App Store → developers → consumers → payments

The platform operator therefore controls multiple important layers of distribution.

Institutional lesson

Future competition authorities may need to distinguish between:

• dominance over a particular product;
• control over distribution infrastructure; and
• control over the rules governing participation in the ecosystem.

The EU's DMA subsequently created ex ante obligations concerning gatekeepers, including obligations relating to steering and access. In 2025, the European Commission found Apple in breach of its DMA anti-steering obligation and imposed a €500 million fine.

VII. Amazon Marketplace

5. FTC v. Amazon

In 2023, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and 17 states sued Amazon, alleging that Amazon used interconnected practices to maintain monopoly power in online retail. The complaint concerns Amazon's relationships with consumers, sellers, competing retailers and its own marketplace infrastructure.

Ecosystem significance

Amazon illustrates an ecosystem combining:

• marketplace services;
• logistics;
• fulfilment;
• advertising;
• payments;
• seller services;
• consumer data; and
• retail operations.

The institutional challenge is determining whether conduct in one component reinforces power elsewhere.

Future response

Authorities may therefore need cross-market conduct analysis, rather than investigating every practice in isolation.

VIII. Meta / Data and Platform Ecosystems

6. Bundeskartellamt v. Facebook

The German Facebook proceeding concerning the combination of user data from different services demonstrated the competition significance of data accumulation.

The case is important because ecosystem power can arise not merely from price or market share but from the ability to combine information obtained through multiple services.

Institutional lesson

Future competition authorities may need institutional expertise combining:

• competition law;
• data governance;
• privacy;
• consumer protection;
• algorithmic auditing.

The boundaries between these regulatory fields are increasingly interconnected.

IX. Google Search and AI Ecosystem — Emerging Institutional Model

The next stage of ecosystem regulation increasingly concerns AI + operating systems + search + data + cloud.

In July 2026, the European Commission issued binding specification measures concerning Google's Android interoperability and access to Google Search data. The measures are intended to facilitate interoperability for competing AI services and access to search data for competing search engines.

This represents a significant institutional evolution.

Instead of merely asking:

"Has the undertaking abused its dominance?"

the regulator can increasingly ask:

"What technical conditions are necessary to keep an ecosystem contestable?"

X. Seven Major Future Institutional Responses

1. Ecosystem Competition Units

Competition authorities may establish specialised Ecosystem Competition Units.

Such units could contain:

• economists;
• competition lawyers;
• software engineers;
• data scientists;
• AI specialists;
• cybersecurity experts;
• behavioural economists; and
• sector specialists.

Their purpose would be to analyse ecosystem interactions continuously.

2. Continuous Market Monitoring

Traditional enforcement is predominantly reactive.

Future institutions may employ:

Market monitoring → risk detection → investigation → interim intervention → continuing supervision

Authorities could monitor:

• market shares;
• API access;
• switching rates;
• interoperability;
• defaults;
• ranking changes;
• acquisitions;
• developer dependence;
• cloud migration costs;
• data concentration.

The DMA already represents movement toward continuing regulatory supervision rather than relying solely upon conventional infringement proceedings. The Commission describes regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers and third parties as a central component of DMA implementation.

3. Ex Ante Ecosystem Regulation

Traditional antitrust usually intervenes after conduct has occurred.

Future regulation may establish rules before competitive harm becomes entrenched.

Possible obligations include:

• interoperability;
• data portability;
• anti-self-preferencing;
• anti-steering restrictions;
• access to essential interfaces;
• transparency of ranking systems;
• non-discriminatory access;
• restrictions on tying;
• restrictions on discriminatory defaults.

The DMA is a major example of this institutional model.

4. Interoperability Authorities

Interoperability may become a central competition remedy.

An ecosystem may remain powerful because competitors cannot effectively communicate with its infrastructure.

Future authorities could therefore supervise:

• APIs;
• operating-system functionality;
• messaging interoperability;
• cloud portability;
• AI-agent interoperability;
• payment interfaces;
• identity systems.

The European Commission's 2026 Android proceedings illustrate this direction.

5. Data Access and Data Portability Institutions

Data may function as an essential competitive input.

Future institutions may develop specialised rules governing:

Data access

Competitors may receive access to certain categories of data under prescribed conditions.

Data portability

Users may be able to move their information between ecosystems.

Data interoperability

Different systems may be required to communicate.

FRAND-style access

Certain ecosystem data could potentially be provided on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

The EU has already pursued measures requiring Google Search data sharing with competing search engines under the DMA.

6. Merger Control Focused on Ecosystem Expansion

Traditional merger review often examines whether a transaction increases concentration in a defined market.

Future ecosystem merger review may additionally consider:

• acquisition of potential competitors;
• acquisition of complementary technologies;
• data accumulation;
• interoperability;
• ecosystem entrenchment;
• AI capabilities;
• cloud infrastructure;
• developer dependence.

This is particularly relevant where a large ecosystem acquires a small company whose present market share is insignificant but whose technology could become strategically important.

7. Regulatory Sandboxes and Technical Testing

Competition authorities could establish controlled environments in which proposed platform practices are tested before implementation.

For example:

Proposed algorithm → regulatory simulation → competition-impact assessment → limited deployment → monitoring → modification

This could be especially valuable for:

• AI ranking;
• algorithmic pricing;
• recommendation systems;
• autonomous agents;
• digital advertising;
• cloud allocation;
• app-store ranking.

XI. Future Institutional Architecture

A possible future institutional structure could be represented as follows:

                 ECOSYSTEM ECONOMY                         │        ┌────────────────┼────────────────┐        │                │                │     Platforms          Data             AI        │                │                │   Operating          Access &        Algorithms    Systems          Portability       & Agents        │                │                │        └────────────────┼────────────────┘                         │              ECOSYSTEM COMPETITION                    AUTHORITY                         │        ┌────────────────┼─────────────────┐        │                │                 │   Ex Ante Rules   Market Monitoring   Enforcement        │                │                 │ Interoperability   Data Analytics     Remedies Anti-Steering      AI Monitoring      Fines Access Rules       Merger Alerts      Structural

XII. From Competition Authority to Ecosystem Regulator

The traditional competition authority primarily investigates violations.

The future institution may perform five simultaneous functions:

This represents a movement from case-by-case antitrust toward continuous ecosystem governance.

XIII. Cloud Computing as the Next Institutional Frontier

Cloud computing illustrates why institutional design will continue evolving.

Cloud providers can become important gateways connecting:

• enterprises;
• governments;
• AI systems;
• software developers;
• databases;
• cybersecurity;
• digital infrastructure.

In June 2026, the European Commission announced its preliminary view that Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure should potentially be designated as DMA gatekeepers despite not meeting the DMA's quantitative thresholds, citing their importance as gateways, entrenched positions, switching costs and ecosystem characteristics.

This is particularly significant for future institutional design because it illustrates the potential inadequacy of purely quantitative thresholds.

XIV. AI and Ecosystem Dominance

Artificial intelligence may intensify ecosystem effects.

An AI ecosystem can combine:

Cloud + chips + foundation model + data + operating system + application store + search + personal assistant

A company controlling several of these layers could potentially obtain advantages that are difficult to capture through traditional market-definition techniques.

Future competition institutions may therefore need to examine:

1. Compute access

Whether competitors can obtain sufficient computing resources.

2. Model access

Whether foundation-model providers restrict downstream competitors.

3. Data access

Whether incumbents possess uniquely valuable datasets.

4. Distribution

Whether AI assistants receive preferential access to operating systems.

5. Interoperability

Whether competing AI agents can interact with applications.

6. Switching

Whether consumers and businesses can move AI systems without losing accumulated data or functionality.

XV. Remedies for Ecosystem Dominance

Future remedies may extend beyond traditional fines.

A. Behavioural remedies

• prohibition of self-preferencing;
• non-discrimination;
• anti-tying rules;
• anti-steering;
• transparency obligations.

B. Access remedies

• API access;
• interoperability;
• data access;
• platform access.

C. Structural remedies

In extreme cases:

• separation of business units;
• divestiture;
• restrictions on acquisitions;
• separation between infrastructure and downstream services.

D. Technical remedies

• algorithmic audits;
• interoperability testing;
• independent monitoring;
• technical compliance officers.

XVI. Institutional Challenges

1. Regulatory overlap

Competition authorities may increasingly overlap with:

• data-protection authorities;
• telecommunications regulators;
• consumer-protection agencies;
• financial regulators;
• cybersecurity authorities.

Institutional coordination therefore becomes essential.

2. Risk of over-regulation

Intervention must not eliminate legitimate efficiencies created by integrated ecosystems.

Integration can produce:

• lower transaction costs;
• better security;
• improved products;
• innovation;
• economies of scale.

Therefore, future institutional design should distinguish between efficient integration and exclusionary ecosystem control.

3. Technical complexity

Regulators cannot effectively supervise AI and digital ecosystems without technical expertise.

Future competition authorities therefore need substantial technological capacity.

4. Global ecosystems

Digital ecosystems operate across borders.

Consequently, competition authorities may need:

• international cooperation;
• coordinated investigations;
• information-sharing mechanisms;
• compatible remedies;
• convergence of digital competition standards.

XVII. Comparative Institutional Evolution

The development can broadly be understood as:

First generation

Traditional antitrust

Market definition → dominance → abuse → remedy

Second generation

Digital competition enforcement

Platform → network effects → data → algorithmic conduct → competition effects

Third generation

Ex ante gatekeeper regulation

Gatekeeper → prohibited practices → compliance → regulatory supervision

Fourth generation

Ecosystem governance

Ecosystem → interconnected markets → technical infrastructure → continuous monitoring → interoperability → contestability

Fifth-generation possibility

AI-enabled competition governance

Autonomous systems → machine-mediated markets → real-time monitoring → automated detection → human regulatory oversight

XVIII. Important Case-Law Principles

These cases collectively show why future competition law increasingly needs to examine connections between markets rather than markets in isolation.

XIX. Future Model of Ecosystem Competition Regulation

A sophisticated future institutional framework could therefore contain:

1. Ecosystem Identification Unit
2. Digital Market Intelligence Unit
3. AI and Algorithmic Competition Unit
4. Data and Interoperability Unit
5. Merger and Ecosystem Expansion Unit
6. Technical Audit Directorate
7. International Digital Competition Network
8. Consumer and Business User Advisory Council
9. Independent Ecosystem Monitoring Trustees
10. Rapid Intervention Mechanism

Such a structure would allow regulators to respond to ecosystem risks before they become irreversible.

XX. Conclusion

The future of competition law is likely to move beyond the question of whether a firm is dominant in a particular market and increasingly examine how economic power is accumulated, transferred and reinforced across an interconnected ecosystem.

The most important institutional responses are likely to include:

• specialised ecosystem competition units;
• continuous market monitoring;
• ex ante gatekeeper regulation;
• interoperability requirements;
• data-access mechanisms;
• ecosystem-sensitive merger control;
• algorithmic auditing;
• technical supervision;
• international cooperation; and
• rapid, adaptable remedies.

The European Union's DMA provides an important contemporary example: seven gatekeepers are now covered by the framework, and the Commission is using regulatory dialogue, compliance reports, investigations and technical specification proceedings rather than relying exclusively on conventional infringement proceedings.

The emerging institutional philosophy can therefore be summarised as:

From regulating individual markets to preserving contestability across interconnected ecosystems.