Competition Law and Search Prominence Market Power

Introduction

Search prominence refers to the competitive advantage obtained when a search engine, digital platform, marketplace, app store, or other intermediary gives a particular result, product, service, application, or advertisement a more visible, higher, earlier, or more attractive position than competing results.

Search prominence can be commercially significant because users often concentrate on the first few results. Consequently, a dominant search platform may be able to influence traffic, consumer attention, clicks, conversions, advertising revenue, and ultimately market access by controlling ranking and display.

The central competition-law question is not simply whether a platform gives prominence to its own services. A platform ordinarily has legitimate reasons to design its search results. The question is whether, in the circumstances of the particular market, the prominence practice constitutes exclusionary conduct that departs from competition on the merits and is capable of harming competition.

This issue is particularly important under:

• Article 102 TFEU in the European Union;
• Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 in India;
• Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States;
• newer digital-market regimes addressing self-preferencing, ranking transparency and platform neutrality.

1. Meaning of Search Prominence

Search prominence may arise through:

1. Higher ranking – placing a result above competing results.
2. Rich-result treatment – displaying one's own service in a visually superior box or panel.
3. Default placement – making a service the default search provider.
4. Pre-installation – placing a search application prominently on devices.
5. Featured snippets or answer boxes – presenting platform-owned information before rival links.
6. Universal search – integrating a platform's own vertical service into general search results.
7. Sponsored prominence – giving paid results greater visibility.
8. Algorithmic demotion – lowering competing services through ranking algorithms.
9. Personalised prominence – using data to favour particular results for individual users.
10. Interface prominence – positioning a service in a location that attracts substantially more user attention.

Thus, search prominence can be understood as a non-price competitive parameter.

2. Why Prominence Creates Market Power

Search markets possess several characteristics that can make prominence particularly important.

A. User attention is scarce

Users normally do not inspect every search result. A result appearing first can receive substantially greater attention than one appearing several pages later.

B. Network effects

More users generate more search queries and data. More data can improve search quality, which may attract additional users.

This can create a feedback loop:

More users → more queries → more data → improved search → more users

C. Default effects

Users frequently continue using the search engine already installed or selected as the default.

D. Switching costs

Although switching search engines may technically be easy, behavioural inertia can make actual switching limited.

E. Data advantages

A dominant search engine can potentially use large volumes of query, click and behavioural data to improve ranking and advertising.

F. Traffic dependency

Vertical search providers, comparison services, publishers and other websites may depend heavily on traffic generated by general search engines.

Consequently, ranking decisions can affect downstream competition even when the search service itself is offered without monetary payment.

3. Competition-Law Framework

A. Establishing dominance

Before treating prominence as an abuse of dominance, competition authorities generally need to establish substantial market power or dominance.

Relevant factors may include:

• market share;
• barriers to entry;
• network effects;
• economies of scale;
• access to data;
• brand reputation;
• switching behaviour;
• default positions;
• user multi-homing;
• technological advantages.

In the Google Shopping litigation, the European Commission relied, among other things, on Google's very high and stable shares in general search, barriers to entry and limited multi-homing.

4. Search Prominence as Self-Preferencing

The most important theory is self-preferencing.

Self-preferencing occurs when a platform gives preferential treatment to its own downstream product or service.

For example:

General search engine → comparison-shopping service → competing comparison-shopping services

If the general search engine gives its own comparison service a prominent box at the top while competing services receive ordinary blue links subject to demotion algorithms, the platform can potentially leverage its upstream dominance into the downstream market.

This was the central issue in the Google Shopping litigation.

5. Search Prominence Versus Competition on the Merits

Not every ranking decision is unlawful.

A search engine must ordinarily be able to:

• improve relevance;
• eliminate spam;
• respond to user preferences;
• introduce new features;
• display direct answers;
• personalise results;
• improve user experience.

The difficult question is whether preferential treatment represents legitimate product improvement or exclusionary conduct.

The EU Google Shopping litigation is particularly significant because the Court examined whether Google's conduct departed from competition on the merits and whether it was capable of producing exclusionary effects.

6. The Importance of Algorithmic Neutrality

Competition law does not necessarily require complete algorithmic neutrality.

An algorithm may legitimately rank:

• more relevant results;
• higher-quality content;
• geographically appropriate results;
• safer websites;
• authoritative sources.

However, concerns arise where an allegedly neutral ranking system treats the platform's own service differently from rivals.

For example:

The combination can become competitively significant.

7. Causal Link and Competitive Effects

A competition authority generally needs more than proof that rivals received less traffic.

It may investigate:

• whether prominence diverted traffic;
• whether traffic was important for rival viability;
• whether rivals could obtain equivalent visibility elsewhere;
• whether users were likely to substitute;
• whether entry was impaired;
• whether innovation was reduced;
• whether rivals were foreclosed;
• whether consumers lost meaningful choice.

The Google Shopping judgment specifically addressed the importance of establishing a causal connection between the allegedly abusive conduct and its potential exclusionary effects.

8. Search Prominence and the Essential-Facilities Doctrine

A significant legal issue is whether a search engine must provide equal access to its ranking or traffic.

Traditional refusal-to-deal jurisprudence, particularly Bronner, imposes demanding conditions before a dominant undertaking can be compelled to provide access to an infrastructure.

The Google Shopping litigation clarified that a self-preferencing case does not necessarily have to satisfy exactly the same conditions as a conventional refusal-to-supply case.

The Court distinguished between:

• simply refusing access to an independently operated facility; and
• using dominance in one market to favour one's own downstream service through discriminatory ranking and display. 

This distinction is highly important for digital markets.

9. Search Prominence and Defaults

Defaults can reinforce prominence.

For example:

Android device → Google Search widget → Google Search → search advertising

If competing search services must be actively selected while Google's service is already visible and operational, the default can influence consumer behaviour.

This creates a relationship between:

default status + prominence + user inertia + network effects

and may strengthen market power.

10. Search Prominence and Pre-Installation

Pre-installation can have effects similar to ranking prominence.

The Competition Commission of India found in its Android decision that Google's agreements concerning Android devices ensured prominent placement of Google's search entry points, including the search application, widget and Chrome browser. The CCI considered this significant in strengthening Google's competitive position in general search.

Thus, prominence can exist before the user even performs a search.

11. Search Prominence and Data Advantages

Preferential prominence can produce additional data.

The cycle may be:

Higher ranking → more clicks → more user data → better service → more users → more queries → stronger ranking advantage

This is sometimes described as a data-feedback loop.

Competition authorities may therefore examine not merely immediate traffic diversion but also longer-term effects on:

• innovation;
• quality;
• data accumulation;
• entry;
• advertising markets;
• downstream services.

12. Search Advertising and Prominence

Prominence also matters in search advertising.

A platform may operate:

1. general search;
2. search advertising;
3. advertising intermediation;
4. publisher-facing advertising technology.

Control over search-user attention can therefore provide leverage into advertising markets.

The EU has separately examined Google's conduct in search advertising intermediation under Article 102 TFEU, including contractual restrictions affecting competition.

13. At Least 6 Important Case Laws

Case 1: Google Search (Shopping) — European Commission, General Court and CJEU

Cases:
AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping); T-612/17; C-48/22 P

This is the leading case on search prominence and self-preferencing.

Google displayed its own comparison-shopping results prominently and in a visually enhanced format while competing comparison-shopping services appeared as ordinary generic search results and could be demoted by Google's algorithms.

The General Court substantially upheld the Commission's findings, and in C-48/22 P (2024) the Court of Justice dismissed Google's appeal and confirmed the infringement.

The Court's analysis addressed:

• dominant position;
• self-preferencing;
• competition on the merits;
• exclusionary effects;
• causal connection;
• counterfactual analysis;
• the relationship with the essential-facilities doctrine.

The case demonstrates that prominence and ranking can themselves become the mechanism through which dominance is leveraged into a neighbouring market.

Case 2: Matrimony.com Ltd. v Google LLC & Others — CCI

Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012

The Competition Commission of India examined Google's conduct in general web search and search advertising.

The allegations concerned, among other things, the design and presentation of search results.

CCI recognised that the Search Engine Results Page (SERP) is an important dimension of competition and that Google, because of its position as a major gateway to the internet, had special competitive responsibilities.

The case is important because it demonstrates the Indian competition-law approach to:

• search bias;
• search-result presentation;
• preferential positioning;
• digital-platform dominance;
• search advertising.

CCI ultimately found abuse concerning certain practices and imposed a monetary penalty.

Case 3: Umar Javeed & Others v Google LLC — CCI Android Decision

Case No. 39 of 2018

The CCI's Android decision examined Google's agreements with device manufacturers.

The Commission considered the significance of:

• Google Search;
• Search widget;
• Search application;
• Chrome;
• mandatory pre-installation;
• prominent placement;
• revenue-sharing arrangements.

The CCI concluded that these arrangements strengthened Google's position in general search and could disadvantage competing search services.

The decision is particularly useful for understanding prominence outside the traditional search-results page.

Case 4: Google Android — European Commission / CJEU

Case AT.40099; T-604/18; C-738/22 P

The Android case concerned Google's contractual arrangements relating to Android, including search-related exclusivity and pre-installation.

In C-738/22 P, decided on 2 July 2026, the Court of Justice addressed the Android practices concerning online general search, Android operating systems and app stores. The Court upheld Google's fine of approximately €4.1 billion.

Although this is not a pure ranking case, it is highly relevant to search prominence because pre-installation, default positioning and exclusivity can influence the visibility and accessibility of competing search services.

Case 5: Google Search Advertising — T-334/19

Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. v European Commission, Case T-334/19

This case concerned Google's position in the market for online search advertising intermediation.

The General Court examined contractual restrictions imposed through agreements relating to search advertising.

It illustrates the broader principle that search power can extend beyond organic search results into the advertising ecosystem.

The case is relevant to search prominence because advertising placement, search visibility and access to search users can operate as interconnected competitive advantages.

Case 6: Google Search Bias Investigation — FTC

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission investigated Google's search practices concerning allegations that Google manipulated its algorithms to disadvantage competing vertical-search websites.

The FTC considered whether Google's changes:

• were intended to exclude competitors; or
• constituted legitimate improvements to search quality.

The FTC ultimately concluded that the evidence generally supported the latter explanation for the practices investigated, while recognising that Google's prominent display of its own vertical content could push competing results lower on the page.

This is important because it demonstrates the distinction between competitive product improvement and unlawful search manipulation.

14. Indian Competition-Law Position

Under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, a dominant enterprise cannot abuse its dominant position.

Search prominence can potentially implicate:

Section 4(2)(a)

Unfair or discriminatory conditions.

Section 4(2)(b)

Limiting or restricting:

• technical development;
• production;
• markets.

Section 4(2)(c)

Denial of market access.

Section 4(2)(e)

Using dominance in one relevant market to enter into or protect another relevant market.

This makes leveraging through search prominence particularly important.

The CCI's Android decision expressly examined how Google's arrangements could protect its position in general search and affect market access for competing search applications.

15. Factors Authorities Should Examine

A comprehensive search-prominence investigation should consider:

1. Market position

Is the platform dominant?

2. Nature of prominence

Is the platform's service merely ranked highly because of relevance, or given special treatment?

3. Algorithmic asymmetry

Are the platform's own results exempt from demotion algorithms applicable to rivals?

4. Visual differentiation

Does the platform's result receive richer formatting?

5. Traffic effects

How much traffic is diverted?

6. Rival dependence

How dependent are competitors on search-generated traffic?

7. User behaviour

Do users primarily select the first few results?

8. Entry barriers

Can new competitors realistically obtain comparable visibility?

9. Data effects

Does increased prominence produce additional data advantages?

10. Justification

Does the platform have legitimate quality, relevance or security reasons?

11. Counterfactual

What would happen without the allegedly preferential treatment?

12. Competitive process

Is the practice harming competition itself or merely harming individual competitors?

16. Legitimate Search Ranking Versus Potentially Problematic Prominence

The key distinction is not simply "ranking versus no ranking." It is whether the dominant undertaking's ranking mechanism is being used in a manner that can distort the competitive process.

17. Economic Effects of Search Prominence

Search prominence can affect competition through several channels:

A. Foreclosure

Rivals receive insufficient traffic to compete effectively.

B. Raising rivals' costs

Competitors may need to spend substantially more on advertising or alternative distribution.

C. Reduced innovation

Potential entrants may conclude that obtaining visibility is commercially unrealistic.

D. Reduced consumer choice

Users may encounter fewer competing services.

E. Quality effects

Reduced competitive pressure may affect service quality, privacy or innovation.

F. Advertising effects

Greater search traffic can strengthen the platform's advertising position.

G. Data accumulation

More traffic can generate more behavioural data.

18. Counterfactual Analysis

An important modern competition-law technique is to ask:

What would the market look like if the alleged prominence practice did not occur?

Possible counterfactuals include:

Scenario A: Google's own service receives the same ranking treatment as rivals.

Scenario B: Rivals can obtain equivalent rich-result treatment.

Scenario C: Search results are determined solely by the general ranking algorithm.

Scenario D: Users are presented with a genuine choice of search providers.

The CJEU's Google Shopping judgment specifically addressed questions concerning counterfactual analysis and the demonstration of potential exclusionary effects.

19. Remedies

Where unlawful search prominence is established, possible remedies may include:

Structural remedies

• separation of search and downstream services;
• divestiture in exceptional cases.

Behavioural remedies

• equal treatment of comparable results;
• transparent ranking criteria;
• non-discriminatory access;
• prohibition of discriminatory demotion.

Interface remedies

• choice screens;
• removal of mandatory defaults;
• user-selectable search providers.

Algorithmic remedies

• independent monitoring;
• audit mechanisms;
• restrictions on discriminatory ranking.

Data remedies

• data portability;
• interoperability;
• limits on combining datasets.

The appropriate remedy depends on the specific theory of harm and the jurisdiction.

20. Relationship with the Digital Markets Act

The EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA) moves beyond traditional Article 102 enforcement by imposing specific obligations on designated gatekeepers.

Self-preferencing is particularly important because ranking and display decisions can affect competition between a gatekeeper's own services and third-party businesses.

Thus, modern regulation increasingly moves from:

ex post abuse-of-dominance analysis

towards:

ex ante obligations concerning platform conduct.

21. Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Case Law

The case law supports several important principles:

1. Search ranking can be a competition parameter.
2. Prominence can confer substantial commercial advantages.
3. Self-preferencing by a dominant platform can raise Article 102 concerns.
4. Not every self-preferencing practice is automatically unlawful.
5. Legitimate product improvement remains relevant.
6. The competitive effects of ranking and display must be examined.
7. Traffic diversion can be evidence of exclusionary effects.
8. Defaults and pre-installation can reinforce search prominence.
9. Algorithmic discrimination can be competitively significant.
10. Search dominance can be leveraged into specialised search or adjacent markets.
11. The essential-facilities doctrine does not necessarily provide the sole framework for analysing self-preferencing.
12. Counterfactual and causal analysis can be important in demonstrating competitive harm.

Conclusion

Search prominence market power represents an important form of digital competition concern because control over visibility can be economically equivalent to control over access to consumers.

The central issue is not whether a search engine is allowed to rank its own services. It is whether a dominant search platform uses its control over an important gateway to systematically favour its own services, disadvantage rivals, and thereby impair the competitive process.

The strongest authorities are Google Shopping (T-612/17; C-48/22 P), Matrimony.com v Google, and the Google Android decisions. Google Shopping is particularly significant because the CJEU's 2024 judgment directly addressed self-preferencing, prominence, competition on the merits, causal connection and potential exclusionary effects.