1. Introduction

Competition Law in Yoga Platform Ranking Discrimination in Morocco concerns the use of discriminatory algorithms, preferential search rankings, unfair visibility rules and exclusionary platform practices by digital businesses operating yoga-related services.

Online yoga platforms connect several categories of market participants:

Yoga instructors and independent trainers.

Yoga studios and fitness centres.

Online yoga course providers.

Meditation and wellness service providers.

Consumers searching for yoga classes.

Subscription-based fitness applications.

Digital marketplaces offering yoga programmes.

These platforms may determine which instructors appear first in search results, which studios receive recommendations, which courses receive promotional visibility and which service providers are excluded from important customer searches.

Competition problems arise when a platform uses its ranking system to favour its own yoga services, discriminate against competing instructors, manipulate search visibility or impose unfair commercial conditions on independent providers.

For example, imagine a Moroccan digital platform that lists 500 yoga instructors but systematically places its affiliated yoga studios at the top of search results while pushing independent instructors to the bottom.

If the platform has significant market power and the conduct satisfies the relevant legal requirements, this may raise concerns under Moroccan competition law.

The principal legal framework is:

Law No. 104-12 on Freedom of Prices and Competition.

Law No. 20-13 concerning the Competition Council.

Law No. 09-08 concerning the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.

Applicable Moroccan consumer-protection and electronic-commerce legislation.

The central competition-law questions concern abuse of dominance, discriminatory treatment, exclusionary ranking practices, transparency and the competitive effects of algorithmic decision-making.

2. Meaning of yoga platform ranking discrimination

Yoga platform ranking discrimination occurs when a digital platform treats competing yoga instructors, studios or course providers differently through its search-ranking, recommendation or visibility systems.

It may involve:

A. Self-preferencing

The platform gives its own yoga studios or subscription programmes preferential placement over independent competing providers.

B. Algorithmic demotion

Independent yoga instructors are deliberately assigned lower rankings without objective commercial justification.

C. Paid ranking discrimination

Providers who pay additional commissions or advertising fees receive preferential visibility, while non-paying competitors are disadvantaged.

Paid placement is not automatically unlawful, particularly when clearly disclosed and objectively structured.

D. Selective recommendation

The platform recommends affiliated yoga instructors more frequently than equally relevant independent providers.

E. Discriminatory access conditions

Certain instructors receive access to important platform features, customer analytics, booking tools or promotional opportunities while competing instructors face unjustified restrictions.

F. Manipulation of consumer reviews

A platform selectively displays favourable reviews for affiliated studios while suppressing or concealing comparable reviews of independent competitors.

3. Applicable Moroccan competition-law provisions

A. Article 6 of Law No. 104-12: Anticompetitive agreements

Article 6 prohibits agreements, express or tacit, and concerted practices that have the object or potential effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition.

In the yoga platform market, possible examples include:

Competing yoga platforms agreeing not to list one another's instructors.

Platforms coordinating commissions charged to yoga studios.

Agreements restricting instructors from offering services through competing platforms.

Competitors agreeing to divide geographical markets.

Agreements to exclude independent yoga providers from digital distribution channels.

An important distinction is that unilateral algorithmic ranking decisions do not automatically constitute an Article 6 agreement. Article 6 requires evidence of the relevant agreement or concerted practice.

B. Article 7: Abuse of dominant position

Article 7 is particularly important where a yoga platform possesses a dominant market position.

Potentially abusive conduct may include:

Unjustified discriminatory ranking.

Exclusionary restrictions on competing yoga providers.

Unfair commercial conditions.

Restricting market access through control of an important digital marketplace.

Exploitative or exclusionary conduct involving dependent commercial partners.

Dominance alone is not unlawful. The issue is whether the platform abuses its market position through conduct covered by the legislation.

C. Article 8: Abuse of economic dependence

Article 8 is relevant where a yoga instructor or independent studio depends economically on a particular platform and lacks a satisfactory alternative commercial channel.

For example, a small yoga studio may obtain most of its bookings through one major digital marketplace.

If the platform uses that dependence to impose unjustified discriminatory conditions, the circumstances may warrant examination under Article 8.

Economic dependence must be established on the facts; merely using a popular platform does not automatically establish a violation.

D. Article 9: Below-cost pricing and exclusionary conduct

Article 9 may become relevant where a platform uses pricing strategies involving below-cost selling to eliminate competing businesses, subject to the statutory conditions.

For example, a dominant platform might subsidize its own yoga programmes at exclusionary prices while imposing significantly higher commissions on independent instructors.

The relevant legal assessment requires evidence of the pricing conduct, market position and statutory requirements.

E. Law No. 20-13: Competition Council

The Competition Council is responsible for enforcing competition legislation and examining conduct that may restrict competition.

In a yoga platform investigation, the Council may need to examine:

Ranking algorithms.

Platform market shares.

Search visibility.

Commission structures.

Platform ownership.

Agreements with instructors.

Data access.

Customer acquisition and switching costs.

4. Six important case laws and judicial precedents

The following European Union and comparative competition-law judgments provide useful principles for analysing algorithmic ranking discrimination. They are not Moroccan judgments and do not automatically determine the outcome under Moroccan law.

Case 1. Google Shopping v European Commission — Case C-48/22 P (2024)

Facts: Google gave prominent placement to its own comparison-shopping service in general search results while competing comparison-shopping services were disadvantaged.

Legal issue: Whether a dominant digital platform could abuse its market position by favouring its own service in search rankings.

Judgment: The Court of Justice dismissed Google's appeal and upheld the Commission's finding of abuse of dominance.

Legal principle: A dominant platform's self-preferencing conduct can constitute an abuse where the conduct departs from competition on the merits and produces exclusionary effects in the circumstances of the case.

Application to Morocco: A dominant Moroccan yoga marketplace that systematically places its own yoga classes above independent instructors may face scrutiny under Article 7 of Law No. 104-12.

Case 2. Google Android v European Commission — Case T-604/18 (2022)

Facts: The European Commission investigated Google's contractual arrangements concerning Android mobile devices, including restrictions affecting competing search and browser services.

Legal issue: Whether contractual restrictions imposed by a dominant technology business could protect its own services and restrict competing providers.

Judgment: The General Court largely upheld the Commission's infringement findings, while adjusting the amount of the fine.

Legal principle: A dominant technology platform cannot automatically justify exclusionary restrictions merely by describing them as part of its commercial ecosystem.

Application to Morocco: A yoga platform may raise competition concerns if it requires instructors to use its exclusive booking or payment system and prevents them from accessing competing platforms without objective justification.

Case 3. MEO v Autoridade da Concorrência — Case C-525/16 (2018)

Facts: A Portuguese collective management organization charged different copyright licensing rates to competing television operators.

Legal issue: Whether applying different commercial conditions to equivalent transactions necessarily constituted abusive discrimination.

Judgment: The Court explained that discriminatory conditions must be assessed in terms of their actual or potential competitive disadvantage. Different treatment alone is not sufficient.

Legal principle: The analysis must examine whether the discrimination is capable of distorting competition between trading partners.

Application to Morocco: A yoga platform charging different commissions to different instructors does not automatically violate competition law. It becomes more concerning where the differences disadvantage competing providers and cannot be objectively justified.

Case 4. Post Danmark v Konkurrencerådet — Case C-209/10 (2012)

Facts: A dominant postal operator offered selective discounts to certain customers in a market where it competed with other postal service providers.

Legal issue: Whether selective pricing by a dominant undertaking could constitute an abuse of dominance.

Judgment: The Court emphasized that exclusionary effects and the competitive circumstances must be assessed rather than treating every price difference as unlawful.

Legal principle: Competition law protects the competitive process, not individual competitors from every disadvantage.

Application to Morocco: A yoga platform offering promotional discounts to selected studios is not necessarily acting unlawfully. However, selective discounts designed to exclude competing instructors may require examination.

Case 5. United Brands v Commission — Case 27/76 (1978)

Facts: United Brands operated a major banana distribution business and imposed commercial conditions on its distributors.

Legal issue: Whether a dominant undertaking's discriminatory commercial conditions and restrictions could amount to an abuse of dominance.

Judgment: The Court examined the undertaking's market power, commercial conduct and treatment of trading partners. It established important principles concerning abuse of dominance and discriminatory trading conditions.

Legal principle: Dominant businesses have a special responsibility not to impair effective competition through abusive commercial practices.

Application to Morocco: A dominant yoga platform that imposes unjustifiably different access conditions on competing instructors may face scrutiny under Article 7.

Case 6. Slovak Telekom v European Commission — Case C-165/19 P (2021)

Facts: Slovak Telekom, a telecommunications operator with significant market power, restricted access to its local network infrastructure for competing operators.

Legal issue: Whether a dominant undertaking's refusal or restriction of infrastructure access could constitute an abuse.

Judgment: The Court of Justice upheld the relevant findings of abuse concerning the company's restrictive access arrangements.

Legal principle: Control over an important infrastructure facility may give rise to competition concerns when access restrictions disadvantage competing businesses.

Application to Morocco: If a yoga platform controls an important booking and discovery infrastructure, it should not use that control to unjustifiably exclude competing instructors from access to commercially significant platform functions.

5. Application of ranking discrimination to Moroccan yoga platforms

The following hypothetical examples demonstrate how Moroccan competition law could apply.

Example 1: Self-preferencing

Suppose a Moroccan yoga application operates its own online yoga academy and also provides a marketplace for independent yoga instructors.

The platform's algorithm gives its own academy 90% of the first-page visibility.

Independent instructors receive very little visibility despite offering comparable services.

The Competition Council could investigate:

Whether the platform is dominant.

Whether its ranking system favours affiliated services.

Whether the ranking criteria are objectively justified.

Whether competing instructors lose access to customers.

Whether consumers face reduced choice.

Example 2: Discriminatory commissions

Suppose the platform charges:

Affiliated yoga studios: 10% commission.

Independent studios: 30% commission.

If these differences lack objective justification and place competing businesses at a competitive disadvantage, Article 7 may become relevant.

However, differences in commission rates can be justified by genuine differences in services, costs, contractual risks or promotional arrangements.

Example 3: Algorithmic exclusion

Suppose a yoga platform secretly reduces the rankings of independent instructors who also advertise on competing applications.

If the platform has substantial market power and the practice is capable of excluding competitors, the conduct could raise concerns under Article 7.

If the restriction is imposed through an agreement between competing platforms or other businesses, Article 6 may also become relevant.

6. Algorithmic transparency and evidence

A significant difficulty in these cases is proving discrimination because ranking systems are often confidential.

The Competition Council may need to examine:

1. Ranking criteria

Relevance scores.

Instructor ratings.

Customer reviews.

Commission payments.

Advertising expenditure.

Platform ownership relationships.

2. Algorithmic changes

Investigators may compare ranking results before and after changes to the platform's algorithm.

3. Commercial records

Relevant evidence includes instructor contracts, commission schedules, advertising agreements and internal communications.

4. Ranking outcomes

Investigators may compare the visibility of independent instructors with affiliated instructors offering similar services.

5. Economic effects

The investigation should examine changes in bookings, customer acquisition, instructor revenue and market entry.

A lower ranking alone is not proof of unlawful discrimination. The evidence must establish the relevant legal elements and competitive harm.

7. Relationship with Moroccan data protection and consumer law

Competition law is not the only relevant legal framework.

A. Law No. 09-08: Personal data protection

Yoga platforms may process:

Customer identities.

Location information.

Booking histories.

Instructor profiles.

Customer reviews.

Personal preferences.

Where algorithmic ranking involves personal data, the platform must comply with applicable data-protection requirements, including the rules governing lawful processing, transparency and individuals' rights.

The National Commission for the Control of Personal Data Protection (CNDP) has an important supervisory role.

B. Law No. 31-08: Consumer protection

Consumer protection becomes relevant when a platform:

Misrepresents sponsored rankings.

Conceals material information about commercial relationships.

Uses misleading advertising.

Provides deceptive information about instructor qualifications.

Misleads consumers concerning the independence of recommendations.

A platform's ranking practices can therefore create both competition-law and consumer-protection issues.

8. Correct statutory distinction: Articles 6–9

For accurate legal research, the provisions should be distinguished as follows:

Article 8 is not the general prohibition on discriminatory ranking. Article 7 is the principal provision for analysing unilateral discriminatory conduct by a dominant platform.

9. Enforcement and possible remedies in Morocco

The Competition Council can examine alleged infringements and adopt measures under Law No. 104-12 and the applicable procedural framework.

Potential remedies include:

Termination of unlawful discriminatory ranking practices.

Removal of unjustified exclusionary contractual clauses.

Non-discriminatory access conditions for competing instructors.

Modification of abusive commission arrangements.

Appropriate compliance commitments.

Financial penalties where statutory conditions are met.

Interim protective measures where the required serious and immediate harm is demonstrated.

The objective should be to restore competitive opportunities without requiring platforms to rank every yoga instructor identically.

10. Recommendations for improving competition in Morocco

A. Fair ranking governance

Platforms should establish objective ranking criteria based on relevant factors such as:

Instructor qualifications.

Customer satisfaction.

Course relevance.

Availability.

Verified reviews.

Service quality.

B. Disclosure of sponsored rankings

Paid advertisements and sponsored placements should be distinguishable from ordinary organic recommendations.

C. Independent instructor access

Platforms should provide fair and transparent participation conditions to independent yoga instructors.

D. Algorithmic audit mechanisms

Where competition concerns arise, appropriate independent examination of ranking algorithms can help identify discriminatory outcomes.

E. Transparent commission policies

Platforms should disclose their commission structures and the objective reasons for materially different commercial terms.

F. Protection of platform competition

Instructors should generally remain free to use competing booking applications unless a restriction is legally justified.

11. Overall legal conclusion

Competition Law in Yoga Platform Ranking Discrimination in Morocco is primarily concerned with the relationship between digital platform power, algorithmic decision-making and fair access to customers.

Article 7 of Law No. 104-12 provides the principal legal foundation for examining discriminatory ranking practices by dominant platforms or businesses exploiting economic dependence.

Article 6 becomes relevant where ranking discrimination is supported by anticompetitive agreements or concerted practices.

The six comparative cases provide useful legal principles:

Google Shopping — self-preferencing.

Google Android — exclusionary contractual restrictions.

MEO — discriminatory commercial conditions.

Post Danmark — selective pricing and competitive disadvantage.

United Brands — abuse of dominance and discriminatory treatment.

Slovak Telekom — restrictive access to important infrastructure.

Final principle: A yoga platform operating in Morocco is generally free to develop its own ranking algorithm and commercial model. However, where it possesses significant market power, it must not use that position to impose unjustified discriminatory conditions or exclude competing yoga instructors in a manner prohibited by Moroccan competition law.

Research qualification: The six judgments above are comparative foreign precedents, not six Moroccan judgments concerning yoga platforms. The hypothetical examples illustrate possible applications of Moroccan law, not established findings of infringement.