Criminal Liability For Spreading Extremist Propaganda

01 Nov 2025 --
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1. Concept of Criminal Liability for Spreading Extremist Propaganda

Definition

Extremist propaganda refers to the dissemination of messages—whether through speech, publication, digital media, or social platforms—that incite violence, hatred, or hostility against a group, religion, or state, or that encourage participation in extremist or terrorist activities.

Criminal liability attaches when:

The accused intentionally disseminates such material,

The content is likely to incite violence or terrorism,

And there is mens rea (criminal intent or recklessness).

Legal Basis

The laws differ across countries, but most share common principles:

India:

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 — Sections 13, 16–18 (Punishment for unlawful/terrorist activities and conspiracy).

Indian Penal Code (IPC) — Sections 153A (promoting enmity), 295A (hurting religious sentiments), 505(1) (statements conducing to public mischief).

Information Technology Act, 2000 — Section 67 (transmitting obscene or inflammatory material online).

United Kingdom:

Terrorism Act 2006 — Sections 1–2 (encouragement of terrorism, dissemination of terrorist publications).

United States:

First Amendment protects speech, but exceptions exist under Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) — incitement to imminent lawless action is not protected.

2. Detailed Case Laws

Case 1: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) – Supreme Court of India

Facts:
Section 66A of the IT Act criminalized sending “offensive” messages through communication services. It was challenged as vague and violative of free speech.

Issue:
Whether criminalizing online communication that could be construed as offensive violates Article 19(1)(a) (Freedom of Speech).

Held:
The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A as unconstitutional. However, it upheld criminal liability for hate speech and extremist content under narrowly defined provisions like IPC Sections 153A and 295A.

Principle:

Advocacy is protected, but incitement to violence or hatred is not.

The State can penalize extremist propaganda if it has a proximate connection to public disorder or terrorism.

Case 2: Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam (2011) – Supreme Court of India

Facts:
The accused, a member of ULFA (a banned organization), was convicted for being associated with the group under UAPA.

Issue:
Can mere membership in a banned organization be punished?

Held:
No — mere membership without involvement in violence or incitement cannot attract criminal liability.

Principle:
There must be active participation or incitement. Passive belief or sympathy does not constitute spreading extremist propaganda.
This case limits liability to active encouragement or advocacy.

Case 3: R. v. Choudary & Rahman (2016, UK Court of Appeal)

Facts:
Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman were charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 2006 for inviting support for ISIS through social media and speeches.

Issue:
Whether publicly declaring allegiance and encouraging others to support ISIS amounts to criminal liability.

Held:
Yes. Both were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

Principle:

“Encouragement” includes indirect statements that glorify terrorist acts or justify violence.

Intention and context are key: glorification of terrorism = active encouragement.

Significance:
This case clarified that extremist propaganda online can constitute a terrorist encouragement offence even without direct calls to violence.

Case 4: Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969, U.S. Supreme Court)

Facts:
A Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted under Ohio law for advocating violence during a rally.

Issue:
Whether advocacy of violence constitutes incitement punishable under criminal law.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that only speech “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and likely to produce such action may be restricted.

Principle:
The Brandenburg Test:

The speech must intend to incite violence, and

The violence must be imminent and likely.

Relevance:
Although this case protected free speech, it set a clear boundary: extremist propaganda is criminal if it crosses into imminent incitement or recruitment for violent acts.

Case 5: State of Kerala v. Aboobacker (2019, Kerala High Court)

Facts:
The accused was charged under the UAPA for distributing pamphlets supporting ISIS ideology and recruitment.

Issue:
Whether possession and distribution of extremist materials constitute terrorism-related offences.

Held:
Yes. The High Court ruled that propagating or distributing material that encourages joining or supporting a terrorist group amounts to direct involvement in unlawful activity.

Principle:

Dissemination of extremist content = active participation in unlawful activity.

Intent to radicalize or recruit converts propaganda into a punishable act.

3. Key Legal Principles Derived

Principle	Explanation
Mens rea	The accused must have intended to incite or encourage extremist or terrorist acts.
Proximity test	There must be a close connection between the speech and possible unlawful action.
Active participation	Passive membership or belief does not attract liability unless coupled with action or dissemination.
Public interest balance	Courts weigh free speech rights against state security.
Medium of communication	Online and digital propaganda are treated with equal seriousness under cyber and terrorism laws.

4. Summary

Criminal liability for spreading extremist propaganda depends on intent, content, and impact:

If the propaganda glorifies, incites, or recruits, it becomes a criminal offence.

If it merely criticizes or advocates ideologically without promoting violence, it may be protected speech.

The modern trend (especially post-2010) is toward stricter enforcement against extremist digital propaganda under anti-terrorism laws, balanced carefully with constitutional free speech protections.