Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) Platform Dominance Risks: Detailed Explanation With at Least 6 Case Laws

1. Introduction

Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) refers to the integration of multiple transport services into a single digital platform through which users can plan, book, pay for, and manage journeys. A MaaS platform may combine public transport, taxis, ride-hailing, car-sharing, bike-sharing, e-scooters, parking, and other mobility services.

Examples of the MaaS model include journey-planning applications, integrated ticketing platforms, ride-hailing applications, and multimodal transport aggregators.

The central competition-law concern is that a MaaS platform may evolve from a convenient intermediary into a digital gatekeeper controlling access to transport demand, mobility data, payment systems, and transport operators.

A dominant platform may use its position to disadvantage competing mobility providers, impose restrictive contractual conditions, favour affiliated services, or make transport operators dependent on its booking infrastructure.

MaaS dominance must not be presumed merely because a platform is popular or offers many transport services. Competition authorities must examine the relevant market, market power, entry barriers, network effects, and the platform's actual conduct.

2. Meaning and structure of MaaS dominance

Layer 1 — Transport infrastructure

Public transport networks, roads, charging stations, parking facilities, and shared-mobility infrastructure.

Layer 2 — Mobility service providers

Taxi operators, ride-hailing companies, bus and rail operators, car-sharing firms, and micromobility providers.

Layer 3 — MaaS aggregation platform

Journey planning, search rankings, ticketing, booking, payments, subscriptions, and user profiles.

Layer 4 — Travellers and mobility demand

Users whose preferences, travel histories, payments, and bookings generate valuable data and commercial opportunities.

Dominance risks arise when the MaaS platform controls a commercially important connection between transport providers and travellers. Its position may be reinforced by network effects: more participating operators attract more users, and more users make participation increasingly necessary for operators.

3. Relevant legal framework

A. European Union

Article 102 TFEU: Prohibits the abuse of a dominant position affecting trade between EU Member States.

Article 101 TFEU: Addresses anticompetitive agreements, including certain exclusivity arrangements and restrictions on independent pricing.

Digital Markets Act (DMA): May impose additional obligations where a service falls within a designated core platform service and the relevant gatekeeper requirements are met. A MaaS platform is not automatically covered merely because it aggregates transport.

EU merger control: May apply to acquisitions that eliminate emerging mobility competitors or consolidate control over strategically important data and services.

B. United Kingdom

Competition Act 1998, Chapter I: Prohibits agreements that prevent, restrict, or distort competition.

Competition Act 1998, Chapter II: Prohibits abuse of a dominant position.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024: Provides a framework for designated firms with strategic market status in respect of qualifying digital activities. Designation and the statutory criteria must be satisfied.

Enterprise Act 2002: Provides merger-control powers relevant to acquisitions in mobility markets.

C. India

Competition Act 2002, Section 3: Prohibits anticompetitive agreements.

Section 4: Prohibits abuse of dominant position.

Sections 5 and 6: Govern combinations and their regulation, subject to the applicable thresholds and statutory rules.

Section 19(4): Lists factors relevant to assessing dominance, including market share, resources, entry barriers, dependence of consumers, and market structure.

In India, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) may examine whether a mobility aggregator has the ability to operate independently of competitive constraints, whether it forecloses rivals, and whether its commercial practices harm competition.

4. Principal competition risks in MaaS platforms

4.1. Market definition and multi-sided market power

A MaaS platform may operate across several related markets:

Mobility aggregation and journey planning.

Online taxi or ride-hailing intermediation.

Digital ticketing and transport payments.

Mobility data analytics and advertising.

Subscription-based multimodal travel services.

The relevant market depends on substitutability. A public transport journey-planning application may not compete in the same market as a ride-hailing application for every purpose, even if both appear within a MaaS interface.

Authorities should examine direct and indirect network effects, switching costs, multi-homing, geographic coverage, and the degree to which transport operators depend on the platform.

4.2. Self-preferencing and discriminatory ranking

A MaaS platform that also operates its own taxi, car-sharing, or scooter service may rank its affiliated services above competing operators.

Potentially problematic practices include:

Giving affiliated operators preferential placement in search results.

Suppressing rival services from recommended journeys.

Displaying competitors' prices or waiting times less prominently.

Applying different booking fees or commission rates without objective justification.

Using default settings to direct travellers toward affiliated services.

Self-preferencing is not automatically unlawful. The legal assessment depends on dominance, the nature of the conduct, competitive effects, objective justifications, and the applicable jurisdiction.

4.3. Exclusive dealing and operator dependency

A platform may require taxi fleets, transport companies, or shared-mobility providers to offer services exclusively through its application.

Such arrangements may reduce the ability of rival aggregators to attract a sufficient number of operators. They may also limit consumer choice and make entry more difficult.

The risk increases where a platform controls a large proportion of bookings or where operators cannot economically afford to leave the platform.

4.4. Predatory pricing and targeted subsidies

MaaS platforms may offer below-cost rides, heavily subsidised subscriptions, free transfers, or temporary booking-fee waivers to attract users.

These practices can benefit consumers and stimulate competition. They become a potential exclusionary concern where a dominant firm sacrifices profits to eliminate competitors, followed by a realistic prospect of recouping losses or otherwise strengthening its market power.

Authorities must distinguish legitimate introductory promotions and efficiency-driven pricing from unlawful exclusionary strategies.

4.5. Data concentration and informational advantages

MaaS platforms can collect detailed information about:

Journey origins and destinations.

Travel frequency and route preferences.

Booking conversion rates and cancellation behaviour.

Peak demand and operator availability.

Fare sensitivity and subscription usage.

Combining this information with control over bookings can create an informational advantage. A vertically integrated platform could use third-party operator data to compete against those same operators or develop targeted offers that rivals cannot replicate.

Data collection also raises privacy and data-protection concerns, but a privacy breach is not automatically an antitrust infringement. Competition law and data-protection law may apply concurrently where their respective legal requirements are satisfied.

4.6. Interoperability restrictions and technical foreclosure

A dominant MaaS provider may restrict access to booking APIs, real-time vehicle availability, ticket-validation systems, or payment interfaces.

If technically and commercially important interfaces are unavailable to competing platforms, entry may become difficult or uneconomic.

Competition authorities should distinguish legitimate security, safety, capacity, and system-integrity requirements from restrictions designed to protect a dominant platform from competition.

4.7. Bundling, tying, and subscription lock-in

A platform might bundle public transport tickets, taxi credits, parking discounts, and shared-mobility subscriptions into one package.

Bundling can improve convenience and reduce transaction costs. It becomes problematic where a dominant firm uses control over an indispensable service or customer relationship to foreclose rivals in adjacent mobility markets.

Auto-renewal, difficult cancellation, non-portable travel credits, and restrictions on switching providers may compound these risks.

4.8. Acquisitions and nascent competitor elimination

A major MaaS platform may acquire a small journey-planning application, a ticketing provider, a micromobility operator, or a specialist mobility-data company.

Although the target's current revenue may be modest, it may possess strategically important technology, a growing user base, or the potential to become an independent competitor.

Merger review should therefore consider future competition, data concentration, control over interfaces, and the loss of independent innovation—not just present market shares.

5. Key case laws: at least eight relevant authorities

The following cases address MaaS directly in some instances and, in others, provide closely relevant principles from digital platforms, transport intermediation, pricing, exclusivity, and access to infrastructure. The distinction matters: not every case is a direct ruling on MaaS dominance.

Case 1. Google Shopping v European Commission (General Court, 2021; CJEU appeal, 2024)

Legal principle: Dominant platforms may abuse their position by favouring their own services in ways capable of disadvantaging competing intermediaries.

The EU courts examined Google's treatment of its comparison-shopping service relative to competing comparison-shopping services. The General Court upheld the Commission's decision in 2021, and the Court of Justice dismissed Google's appeal in September 2024.

Application to MaaS: A dominant mobility aggregator could face scrutiny if its ranking algorithm systematically favours its own taxi, scooter, or car-sharing services while disadvantaging competing transport operators.

Limitation: The case does not establish that every form of self-preferencing is unlawful. The competitive context and effects remain important.

Case 2. United Brands Company v Commission (Case 27/76, 1978)

Legal principle: Dominance concerns the ability to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers, and ultimately consumers.

The Court of Justice examined United Brands' market position and exclusionary conduct in the banana market.

Application to MaaS: A platform's market share should not be considered in isolation. Authorities should also assess operator dependence, the availability of alternatives, entry barriers, user switching, and the ability of transport providers to reach customers independently.

Limitation: This was not a digital-platform case; it supplies foundational dominance principles.

Case 3. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint (Case C-7/97, 1998)

Legal principle: A dominant firm's refusal to provide access to its infrastructure is subject to a demanding legal test in the circumstances covered by the essential-facilities doctrine.

The Court considered whether a newspaper publisher could be required to grant a rival access to its home-delivery system.

Application to MaaS: A claim that a dominant platform must open its booking API, ticketing infrastructure, or mobility database requires careful analysis. It is not enough that access would be convenient or commercially advantageous. The legal criteria for compelled access must be met.

Limitation: The case does not create a general obligation for all MaaS providers to share data or interfaces.

Case 4. Slovak Telekom v European Commission (Case C-165/19 P, 2021)

Legal principle: The strict Bronner conditions do not automatically apply to every form of exclusionary conduct involving access to infrastructure, particularly where the dominant firm is already subject to an access obligation.

The case concerned telecommunications infrastructure and access conditions.

Application to MaaS: Authorities should distinguish a genuine refusal to provide access from discriminatory access terms, technical restrictions, or the implementation of an existing access obligation in a manner that disadvantages rivals.

Limitation: The legal outcome depends on the precise conduct and regulatory context.

Case 5. Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL (Case C-434/15, 2017)

Legal principle: Uber's intermediation service, in the circumstances examined by the Court, was classified as a service in the field of transport rather than merely an information-society service.

The Court considered the relationship between the digital intermediary and the underlying transport service, including Uber's influence over the conditions under which drivers provided rides.

Application to MaaS: A platform cannot necessarily be analysed as a neutral software intermediary when it substantially organises, controls, or determines the conditions of transport provision. Its operational role may affect the regulatory framework applicable to its services.

Competition significance: The degree of control exercised over operators can be relevant when identifying the platform's actual function, although regulatory classification does not itself prove dominance or abuse.

Case 6. MOTOE v Elliniko Dimosio (Case C-49/07, 2008)

Legal principle: An entity may be an undertaking when it engages in economic activity, even where it also performs certain regulatory or public-interest functions. Conflicts can arise when an organisation involved in economic activity exercises influence over authorisation for competing activities.

The case concerned a Greek motorcycle organisation involved in organising events and the authorisation of events conducted by others.

Application to MaaS: A transport authority or public-private mobility platform may occupy a sensitive position if it both operates mobility services and controls access to the booking, ticketing, or authorisation system used by competing operators.

Limitation: The case does not prohibit every combination of platform operation and public functions; the applicable legal obligations and institutional structure matter.

Case 7. Booking.com hotel online-platform litigation, including Case C-264/23 (CJEU, 2024)

Legal principle: Platform parity clauses must be assessed under competition law rather than assumed to be automatically necessary or harmless.

The Court of Justice considered whether hotel price-parity clauses imposed by Booking.com could qualify as ancillary restrictions under EU competition law. The Court's 2024 judgment addressed the legal framework for that assessment.

Application to MaaS: Similar concerns can arise if a mobility aggregator prohibits taxi firms or transport operators from offering lower prices through rival applications or their own websites.

Such restrictions may reduce price competition between platforms and weaken operators' incentives to support alternative booking channels.

Limitation: Hotel-booking parity clauses and MaaS contractual arrangements are not identical; the effects and commercial justification must be assessed in context.

Case 8. European Superleague Company SL v FIFA and UEFA (Case C-333/21, CJEU, 2023)

Legal principle: Where an organisation combines economic activity with powers to authorise or regulate competing activity, rules governing access to the market must be supported by appropriate substantive criteria and procedural safeguards.

The Court examined the compatibility of FIFA and UEFA authorisation and sanctioning rules with EU competition law and free-movement principles.

Application to MaaS: The reasoning is relevant by analogy where a platform or transport ecosystem controls access to essential booking channels, imposes participation requirements, or sets rules that determine which mobility operators can reach users.

A dominant platform should not be able to use discretionary participation rules to exclude rivals without appropriate justification.

Limitation: The judgment arose in professional football governance, not transport aggregation, and its application to MaaS must be made cautiously.

Case 9. CCI proceedings concerning Ola and Uber (India, including CCI Case No. 6 of 2015)

Legal principle: Large ride-hailing platforms and their pricing practices must be assessed under the statutory tests for dominance and abuse; aggressive discounting alone does not establish an infringement.

In proceedings involving allegations of predatory pricing by Ola, the CCI examined the relevant market and whether the statutory requirements for establishing dominance and abuse were satisfied. The early Indian ride-hailing decisions illustrate the importance of market definition and evidence rather than treating substantial discounts as conclusive proof of predation.

Application to MaaS: A MaaS platform offering subsidised multimodal subscriptions, free transfers, or discounted rides should be assessed using evidence of market power, costs, competitive effects, and the commercial rationale for its pricing.

Limitation: These proceedings pre-date some contemporary MaaS models and do not establish a universal rule for all mobility aggregators. Each allegation must be evaluated under the applicable statutory framework and the specific record.

Case 10. France Télécom SA v Commission (Case C-202/07 P, 2009)

Legal principle: Predatory pricing can constitute an abuse of dominance, and a dominant undertaking's exclusionary pricing must be assessed under the applicable legal and economic tests.

The litigation concerned pricing conduct in the French internet-access market.

Application to MaaS: A dominant platform's sustained below-cost offers could be investigated where evidence suggests that the strategy is capable of excluding equally efficient competitors. Authorities should examine cost measures, duration, market structure, and the possibility of recoupment where relevant to the governing legal test.

Limitation: Predatory-pricing tests differ across jurisdictions. Recoupment is not a universal prerequisite under every applicable legal framework.

6. Application under Indian competition law

The Competition Act 2002 provides a useful framework for analysing MaaS dominance risks in India.

Illustrative hypothetical

Suppose a MaaS platform controls a substantial share of multimodal bookings in a metropolitan area. It also owns a ride-hailing service.

The platform introduces three measures:

Its own ride-hailing service appears first in search results, regardless of whether rival services provide a better match.

Participating taxi operators must not offer lower fares through competing applications.

Rival mobility platforms are denied access to essential real-time availability data, despite the platform providing that data to its own service.

The CCI could investigate whether the conduct constitutes self-preferencing, restrictive dealing, denial of market access, or leveraging of dominance. However, it would need evidence establishing the relevant market, dominance, the specific conduct, and the applicable legal elements. The facts would also determine whether access restrictions have legitimate technical or commercial justifications.

7. Remedies and regulatory safeguards

Non-discriminatory ranking

Require transparent, objective ranking criteria where a dominant platform's ranking practices unlawfully disadvantage competing providers. This need not mean identical rankings for every service.

Proportionate interoperability

Facilitate access to necessary interfaces, ticketing systems, and real-time availability data where legally justified, with safeguards for security, privacy, and system integrity.

Restrictions on exclusionary contracts

Examine exclusivity and parity clauses, limiting or prohibiting them where they produce unlawful foreclosure rather than legitimate efficiencies.

Data governance

Establish appropriate limits on the use of commercially sensitive operator data, supported by access controls, purpose limitation, and auditable data-handling procedures.

Merger scrutiny and monitoring

Assess acquisitions involving mobility data, ticketing infrastructure, and emerging transport platforms, and monitor compliance with any legally imposed remedies.

Remedies should be proportionate to the identified harm. Compulsory data sharing, structural separation, or restrictions on vertical integration should not be imposed automatically simply because a platform is large.

8. Conclusion

Mobility-as-a-Service platforms can improve transport efficiency through integrated journey planning, simplified payments, multimodal subscriptions, and better coordination between public and private transport providers. Their benefits, however, can coexist with substantial competition risks.

The principal concern is the possibility that a platform will use its position as an intermediary to control access to travellers, transport operators, mobility data, and digital infrastructure. Self-preferencing, exclusionary contracts, discriminatory access, anticompetitive pricing, and strategic acquisitions may reinforce that position.

The cases discussed above provide complementary principles on dominance, platform discrimination, infrastructure access, transport intermediation, market-access restrictions, parity clauses, and predatory pricing. They must be applied with attention to their actual holdings and the differences between their factual settings and modern MaaS systems.