1. Introduction

Nutrition supply chain concentration refers to a situation in which a relatively small number of undertakings control a substantial portion of the supply chain for food, dairy, agricultural products, nutritional products or related inputs.

The concentration may occur through:

• mergers and acquisitions;
• vertical integration;
• joint ventures;
• exclusive supply arrangements;
• purchasing alliances;
• control over processing capacity;
• control over distribution and logistics;
• control over important retail channels;
• ownership of agricultural cooperatives;
• acquisition of suppliers or customers; and
• coordinated conduct among major purchasers or suppliers.

In Denmark, this is particularly important because parts of the food chain have historically involved strong producer cooperatives, substantial food processors and concentrated grocery distribution. Danish competition authorities therefore examine both horizontal concentration and vertical effects.

2. Relevant Legal Framework

A. Danish Competition Act

The principal Danish framework is the Danish Competition Act, particularly:

• prohibition of anti-competitive agreements;
• prohibition of abuse of a dominant position; and
• merger control.

The merger provisions allow the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority and Competition Council to examine whether a concentration significantly impedes effective competition.

B. EU Competition Law

Where the transaction or conduct has an EU dimension, the principal provisions are:

Article 101 TFEU

Article 101 addresses agreements, decisions and concerted practices that restrict competition, including:

• price fixing;
• market sharing;
• output restrictions;
• customer allocation;
• strategic information exchange; and
• certain purchasing coordination.

Article 102 TFEU

Article 102 prohibits abuse of a dominant position, potentially covering:

• exclusionary conduct;
• discriminatory access;
• unfair purchasing conditions;
• tying;
• exclusive purchasing;
• refusal to supply; and
• margin or price-related abuses.

EU Merger Regulation

The EU Merger Regulation applies to concentrations meeting the relevant EU turnover thresholds.

3. What Constitutes Supply Chain Concentration?

A nutrition supply chain can be divided into several stages:

Farmers / producers → processors → manufacturers → wholesalers → logistics → retailers → consumers

Concentration can arise at any stage.

For example:

Several dairy processors → one dominant processor → strong negotiating position against farmers and retailers → reduced alternative supply channels.

Similarly:

Few supermarket groups → concentrated purchasing → strong buyer power over food manufacturers → potential monopsony/oligopsony concerns.

Therefore, competition authorities examine both sides of the market.

4. Horizontal Concentration

Horizontal concentration occurs when competitors operating at the same level of the supply chain combine.

Examples include:

• two dairy producers merging;
• two meat processors merging;
• two grocery chains merging;
• two food wholesalers combining.

Potential consequences include:

1. reduction in the number of competitors;
2. increased market share;
3. increased unilateral market power;
4. increased bargaining power;
5. greater risk of coordinated effects;
6. reduction in product variety;
7. increased barriers to entry.

5. Vertical Concentration

Vertical concentration occurs when an undertaking acquires a business operating at another stage of the supply chain.

For example:

Dairy producer → acquires distributor → acquires retail network.

The principal concern is foreclosure.

A vertically integrated undertaking might theoretically:

• restrict competitors' access to inputs;
• refuse access to distribution;
• increase rivals' input costs;
• discriminate against competing retailers;
• reserve scarce processing capacity;
• use confidential information obtained from downstream customers.

Vertical integration is not automatically unlawful. Authorities normally examine whether the undertaking has the ability and incentive to foreclose rivals and whether foreclosure is likely to harm competition.

6. Purchasing-Side Concentration

Nutrition supply chains also raise buyer-power concerns.

Large retailers or processors may collectively account for a substantial percentage of purchases from:

• farmers;
• food manufacturers;
• nutrition suppliers;
• packaging suppliers;
• logistics companies.

This can create monopsony or oligopsony power.

Possible consequences include:

• pressure on supplier prices;
• discriminatory purchasing conditions;
• excessive contractual obligations;
• delayed payments;
• exclusive supply requirements;
• restrictions on dealing with competing purchasers.

However, strong bargaining power alone does not necessarily establish an infringement.

7. Essential Input and Processing Capacity

Concentration becomes particularly significant where a business controls an input that competitors cannot readily replace.

Examples include:

• slaughtering capacity;
• dairy-processing facilities;
• cold-storage infrastructure;
• specialised nutritional ingredients;
• animal-feed ingredients;
• pharmaceutical-grade nutritional inputs;
• food-testing facilities;
• distribution centres.

If alternative suppliers or facilities are unavailable, access restrictions may create serious foreclosure concerns.

8. Case Law and Important Decisions

Case 1 — Danish Crown / Tican

European Commission Case COMP/M.7565

This is one of the most directly relevant Danish food-supply-chain concentration cases.

Danish Crown proposed acquiring Tican, another major Danish cooperative pig slaughterhouse. Tican was vertically integrated into pig slaughtering and meat processing, while its farmer members supplied pigs and sows.

The European Commission referred part of the transaction to Denmark for examination by the Danish competition authority.

Importance

The case demonstrates that authorities may examine concentration at several interconnected levels:

• livestock production;
• slaughtering;
• meat processing;
• farmer membership;
• supply of raw materials.

It also illustrates the importance of cooperative ownership structures in assessing concentration.

Principle

A transaction involving food-processing cooperatives must be examined not merely by looking at final consumer sales but also by considering the structure of upstream supply.

Case 2 — SuperGros / Chr. Kjærgaard

Danish Competition Authority, 2004

SuperGros acquired the activities of Chr. Kjærgaard, with both businesses operating as grocery wholesalers.

SuperGros supplied grocery chains including SuperBest, Spar, Prima and Rema 1000, while Chr. Kjærgaard supplied other grocery chains.

The Danish authority considered the transaction under the Danish merger-control provisions and approved it.

Importantly, even under a relatively narrow market definition focusing on open grocery chains, SuperGros would have approximately a 45% share.

The authority nevertheless considered that SuperGros would remain constrained because retail price competition would affect wholesale pricing.

Importance

This decision demonstrates that market share alone does not determine competitive harm.

Authorities also examine:

• downstream competitive constraints;
• buyer behaviour;
• customer switching;
• vertical relationships;
• ability to act independently.

Principle

A high market share in food distribution does not automatically establish dominance or a substantial impediment to effective competition.

Case 3 — SuperGros / Sam-Gros Logistics Function

Danish Competition Authority, 2004

SuperGros acquired the logistics function of Sam-Gros, another grocery wholesaler.

The authority approved the transaction after considering the structure of the Danish grocery wholesale market.

The authority again considered a relatively narrow open-chain market and identified approximately a 45% share after the transaction.

Nevertheless, the competitive relationship between wholesalers and retailers remained an important constraint.

Importance for nutrition supply chains

This decision is particularly useful when analysing logistics concentration.

Food and nutrition products frequently depend upon:

• refrigerated transport;
• distribution centres;
• warehousing;
• delivery networks;
• inventory systems.

A concentration involving logistics assets can therefore have competitive consequences even where the merging businesses do not manufacture the products themselves.

Case 4 — Danish Crown / GØL

Danish Competition Authority, 2002

Danish Crown, through Tulip Food Company, acquired GØL, a producer of processed meat products including salami, pepperoni, pâté and hotdog products.

The Danish authority concluded that notification under the then-applicable merger thresholds was not required because GØL did not satisfy the relevant Danish turnover threshold.

Importance

The case illustrates an important distinction:

Economic concentration ≠ automatically notifiable concentration.

A transaction can potentially increase concentration in a food market but remain outside merger notification requirements because statutory jurisdictional thresholds are not satisfied.

Principle

Merger-control jurisdiction must be established before substantive merger assessment is undertaken.

Case 5 — Danish Crown / Tican

The Danish Crown/Tican transaction is also significant for understanding vertical and cooperative concentration.

Tican was the second-largest and only other cooperative pig slaughterhouse in Denmark at the relevant time. The transaction would bring Tican's farmer members into Danish Crown's cooperative structure.

The transaction therefore potentially affected:

• farmers;
• slaughterhouses;
• meat processing;
• livestock procurement;
• downstream meat markets.

Competition lesson

In agricultural and nutrition supply chains, the competitive analysis may need to consider supplier-side competition and buyer-side competition simultaneously.

A merger between processors may affect farmers even when the immediate transaction is between processing companies.

Case 6 — Salling Group / Coop Danmark

Danish Competition Council, 2025

Salling Group acquired 33 grocery stores from Coop Danmark.

The Danish authority examined five local areas in greater detail and identified potential competition concerns in Taastrup and Slagelse. The parties subsequently removed the two potentially problematic stores from the transaction.

The remaining acquisition of 33 stores was approved without conditions.

Importance

This is a particularly useful example of local-market concentration.

Even where a transaction does not create a problematic national market position, concentration can be significant in individual local markets.

Principle

Competition analysis in nutrition and grocery supply chains may need to be conducted at:

• national level;
• regional level; and
• local retail level.

A transaction may therefore be acceptable overall while particular local overlaps raise concerns.

Case 7 — Arla / Them Andelsmejeri

Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, 2026

Arla proposed acquiring Them Andelsmejeri.

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority expressed concerns that the transaction could harm competition in several dairy markets, including markets involving firm and hard cheese and Danbo-type cheeses.

Arla subsequently withdrew the transaction, after which the authority discontinued its examination.

Importance

This is a very current illustration of concentration in a nutrition and dairy supply chain.

The authority's concerns involved:

• horizontal overlap;
• concentration in cheese markets;
• product-specific market definition;
• potential effects on prices;
• the importance of particular cheese categories.

Principle

Food-market merger analysis may require narrow product-market segmentation rather than treating all food or all dairy products as one market.

Case 8 — Himmerlands Food Group / Tican Fresh Meat

Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, 2026

Himmerlands Food Group and Tican Fresh Meat established the jointly controlled company Moert A/S.

The Danish authority treated the transaction as a concentration involving a full-function joint venture and approved it under simplified merger procedures.

Importance

Joint ventures can produce concentration even when there is no conventional acquisition of one company by another.

The authority must therefore consider:

• control;
• functionality of the joint venture;
• market overlaps;
• horizontal relationships;
• vertical relationships.

Case 9 — Dole Food / European Commission

CJEU, Case C-286/13 P

This case concerned the European banana market rather than Denmark specifically.

Dole challenged the Commission's findings concerning coordination and information exchange among banana suppliers. The Court dealt with the competitive significance of exchanges of information relating to price-related parameters.

Importance

Concentrated food markets create additional risks because a small number of major suppliers may possess extensive information about:

• prices;
• quantities;
• customers;
• future pricing;
• market conditions.

The Dole judgment demonstrates that information exchange between competitors can become a serious Article 101 issue where it facilitates coordination.

Principle

A concentrated food market can make information exchanges particularly significant from a competition-law perspective.

Case 10 — APVE / French Endives

CJEU, Case C-671/15

This case concerned producer organisations and associations of producer organisations in the French endive sector.

The practices included coordination concerning:

• prices;
• quantities placed on the market; and
• strategic information.

The Court explained the interaction between the Common Agricultural Policy and EU competition law, including the circumstances in which agricultural producer organisations may coordinate legitimately and when their conduct can remain subject to Article 101 TFEU.

Importance

This case is particularly relevant to nutrition supply chains because agricultural cooperatives and producer organisations can simultaneously:

• increase the bargaining power of producers; and
• create competition-law risks through collective coordination.

Principle

Agricultural-sector exemptions do not create an unlimited immunity from competition law.

9. Key Competition Concerns

A. Excessive Horizontal Concentration

Where two major nutrition suppliers merge, authorities may investigate:

• market shares;
• closeness of competition;
• capacity;
• customer switching;
• imports;
• barriers to entry;
• purchasing power;
• remaining competitors.

B. Input Foreclosure

A vertically integrated undertaking may have the ability to restrict rivals' access to important inputs.

For example:

Major processor acquires essential ingredient supplier

→ rival manufacturers depend upon the ingredient

→ access becomes more expensive or restricted

→ rival costs increase

→ competition may be weakened.

C. Customer Foreclosure

The reverse situation can occur.

A dominant retailer may acquire or enter upstream processing and consequently source internally.

This can reduce the available customer base for independent suppliers.

D. Buyer Power

Large grocery chains can possess significant negotiating power.

Potential problems may include:

• below-competitive purchasing terms;
• discriminatory treatment;
• exclusivity;
• threats of delisting;
• excessive contractual obligations.

The legal analysis must distinguish legitimate hard bargaining from conduct that unlawfully restricts competition.

10. Coordinated Effects

Concentration can facilitate coordination where:

• fewer competitors remain;
• prices are transparent;
• products are homogeneous;
• demand is predictable;
• competitors interact frequently;
• entry is difficult.

The food sector can be particularly sensitive because many products have:

• relatively stable demand;
• observable retail prices;
• repeated purchasing cycles;
• standardised products.

The Dole judgment demonstrates how information exchanges can reinforce these risks.

11. Product-Market Definition

Authorities should not automatically define the relevant market as "food."

Potential markets may instead be:

• milk;
• hard cheese;
• Danbo cheese;
• processed meat;
• pig slaughtering;
• animal feed;
• nutritional supplements;
• infant nutrition;
• specialist medical nutrition;
• grocery wholesale;
• supermarket retail.

The Arla/Them matter illustrates the importance of examining specific dairy product categories rather than relying only on an overall dairy market.

12. Geographic-Market Definition

The relevant geographic market may be:

National

For example, nationwide distribution of a packaged nutritional product.

Regional

For example, agricultural processing where transport costs matter.

Local

Particularly relevant for grocery retail.

The Salling/Coop transaction demonstrates how local geographic concentration can be decisive even where national competition remains.

13. Role of Cooperatives

Agricultural cooperatives require careful treatment.

A cooperative can:

• strengthen farmers' bargaining power;
• reduce buyer-side exploitation;
• facilitate investment in processing;
• improve distribution efficiency.

But excessive consolidation between cooperatives can also reduce the number of alternative purchasers available to farmers.

Therefore, competition analysis should consider both:

pro-competitive collective bargaining

and

possible foreclosure or monopsony effects.

The Danish Crown/Tican transaction is an important illustration of this problem.

14. Efficiencies

Not every supply-chain concentration is harmful.

A merger may generate:

• economies of scale;
• lower logistics costs;
• reduced duplication;
• better cold-chain infrastructure;
• improved food safety;
• reduced wastage;
• increased investment;
• more efficient procurement.

For example, combining distribution networks may reduce transportation costs.

Authorities therefore need to distinguish genuine, verifiable efficiencies from efficiencies that merely transfer benefits to the merged undertaking.

15. Possible Remedies

Where a concentration raises concerns, remedies may include:

Structural remedies

• divestiture of stores;
• divestiture of processing facilities;
• sale of distribution centres;
• disposal of brands;
• transfer of customer contracts.

Behavioural remedies

• non-discriminatory access;
• supply commitments;
• information barriers;
• restrictions on exclusive purchasing;
• access commitments.

The Salling/Coop transaction demonstrates how parties may modify the transaction itself by excluding problematic stores before approval.

16. Regulatory Assessment Framework

A useful examination framework is:

Step 1 — Identify the supply-chain level

Production / processing / wholesale / logistics / retail.

↓

Step 2 — Define the relevant product market

Milk / cheese / meat / nutrition product / grocery etc.

↓

Step 3 — Define geographic market

Local / regional / national / EU.

↓

Step 4 — Calculate concentration

Market shares, HHI and capacity.

↓

Step 5 — Identify horizontal effects

Loss of direct competitor?

↓

Step 6 — Identify vertical effects

Input or customer foreclosure?

↓

Step 7 — Examine buyer power

Impact on farmers and suppliers?

↓

Step 8 — Examine coordinated effects

Could concentration facilitate coordination?

↓

Step 9 — Consider efficiencies

Are efficiencies verifiable and merger-specific?

↓

Step 10 — Consider remedies

Divestiture / access / behavioural commitments.

17. Consolidated Case-Law Table

18. Conclusion

Nutrition supply chain concentration is not inherently unlawful. The central competition-law question is whether concentration creates or strengthens market power sufficiently to significantly impede effective competition, or whether associated conduct amounts to an infringement of Articles 101/102 TFEU or the corresponding Danish rules.

The Danish cases involving Danish Crown/Tican, SuperGros, Salling/Coop and Arla/Them demonstrate the importance of examining concentration at different stages of the food chain. The EU cases Dole and APVE/Endives additionally show how concentration can interact with information exchange, producer coordination and agricultural-sector rules.