Primary Ticket Platform Exclusivity

1. Meaning

Primary ticket platform exclusivity occurs when an event organiser, venue, sports league, promoter, artist, theatre, or ticket issuer requires tickets for an event to be sold primarily or exclusively through one designated ticketing platform.

Examples include:

  • a stadium requiring all primary tickets to be sold through Platform A;
  • an artist granting Platform A exclusive online ticketing rights;
  • a sports league requiring clubs to use one ticketing platform;
  • a venue prohibiting competing ticket platforms from selling primary tickets;
  • a platform obtaining exclusive rights through long-term contracts;
  • an organiser giving one platform exclusive access to ticket inventory, customer data, or presale allocations.

The competition issue is not simply that exclusivity exists. The important questions are whether the platform possesses market power, how much ticket inventory is foreclosed, whether rival platforms can obtain access to important events, and whether consumers are harmed through higher fees, reduced choice, lower quality, or reduced innovation.

2. Primary vs Secondary Ticket Markets

The distinction between primary and secondary ticketing is fundamental.

Primary ticket market

Tickets are first issued by:

  • artists;
  • sports clubs;
  • leagues;
  • promoters;
  • theatres;
  • venues; or
  • authorised ticketing agents.

Secondary ticket market

Already-issued tickets are subsequently resold.

Primary-platform exclusivity concerns the initial distribution channel.

A dominant primary ticket platform may therefore occupy an important position between:

Event organiser → ticket platform → consumer

If competing platforms cannot obtain primary inventory, they may find it difficult to attract customers and develop scale.

3. Forms of Primary Ticket Platform Exclusivity

A. Complete exclusivity

The organiser agrees that every primary ticket must be sold through Platform A.

B. Partial exclusivity

Only certain ticket categories, such as VIP or premium tickets, are reserved for Platform A.

C. Presale exclusivity

Platform A receives exclusive presale rights.

D. Venue exclusivity

A venue requires every event held at the venue to use Platform A.

E. League-wide exclusivity

A sports league requires all participating clubs to use one platform.

F. Conditional exclusivity

The platform provides lower fees, marketing assistance or technology only if the organiser does not use rival platforms.

G. De facto exclusivity

The contract does not expressly prohibit competitors, but technical integration, data restrictions, fees, or inventory allocation make competing platforms commercially ineffective.

4. Why Exclusivity Can Create Competition Concerns

Ticketing platforms can benefit from significant network effects.

More events attract more consumers.

More consumers attract more event organisers.

More events then make the platform even more attractive to consumers.

This can create a feedback loop:

More events → more consumers → greater platform value → more organisers → even more events.

An exclusive contract with a major stadium, sports league, or entertainment promoter can therefore have effects extending beyond one event.

5. Exclusive Access to Ticket Inventory

Ticket inventory is often the most important competitive input.

Suppose Platform A receives exclusive rights to sell tickets for:

  • 80% of major concerts;
  • the largest sports venues; and
  • the most commercially significant festivals.

Platform B may technically remain in the market but cannot obtain comparable inventory.

Platform B consequently has difficulty attracting consumers.

This is a classic potential input foreclosure theory.

6. Exclusive Ticketing and Abuse of Dominance

Where the ticket platform is dominant, exclusivity may potentially raise abuse-of-dominance concerns.

Potential theories include:

  • exclusive dealing;
  • refusal to supply;
  • discriminatory access;
  • tying;
  • loyalty-inducing rebates;
  • self-preferencing;
  • excessive contractual duration;
  • denial of interoperability; and
  • leveraging market power.

The analysis depends heavily on the relevant jurisdiction and statutory framework.

7. Six Important Case Laws

1. CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA / FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH

European Commission, 2017

This is one of the most directly relevant European ticketing cases.

CTS Eventim, a major ticketing company, entered into agreements with organisers that contained exclusivity provisions requiring or encouraging organisers to use CTS Eventim's ticketing services.

The European Commission investigated whether the arrangements restricted competition in ticketing services.

CTS Eventim ultimately offered commitments concerning the duration and scope of exclusivity arrangements.

Principle

Exclusive agreements between a major ticketing platform and event organisers can raise competition concerns where they make it difficult for competing ticketing platforms to obtain access to important event inventory.

Relevance

This is directly applicable to:

  • concert tickets;
  • festival tickets;
  • sports tickets;
  • theatre tickets; and
  • venue ticketing.

It demonstrates that competition authorities may focus specifically on the foreclosure of rival ticket platforms.

8. Ticketmaster / Live Nation

United States Department of Justice

The combination of Live Nation and Ticketmaster generated significant competition concerns because the merged company combined:

  • concert promotion;
  • venue ownership/operation; and
  • ticketing services.

The concern was vertical: the company could potentially use control over concerts and venues to strengthen its ticketing business.

The DOJ's settlement imposed behavioural restrictions concerning the use of venue and promotion relationships to disadvantage competing ticketing services.

Principle

Vertical integration can create competition concerns where a business controls both:

the supply of events/venues + the ticketing distribution channel.

Application

Primary-ticket exclusivity becomes more significant where the platform is not merely a ticketing intermediary but is also connected to:

  • event promotion;
  • venues;
  • artists;
  • sports organisations; or
  • event management.

9. United States v Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc.

D.C. District Court / DOJ proceedings

The Ticketmaster-Live Nation litigation and subsequent enforcement history provide important authority on the relationship between ticketing, venues and exclusive arrangements.

The competition concerns included the possibility that a powerful ticketing company could use contractual arrangements with venues to prevent competitors from obtaining access to primary ticket inventory.

Principle

Where access to important venues is necessary to compete effectively in primary ticketing, exclusive venue arrangements can become a significant foreclosure mechanism.

Relevance

The analysis extends beyond the price charged by the ticket platform.

It considers whether competitors can obtain sufficient access to events to remain effective competitors.

10. European Commission v Apple — App Store / Platform Cases

Although not a ticketing case, European digital-platform jurisprudence concerning Apple's App Store provides useful principles concerning platform access and exclusionary restrictions.

Competition analysis in platform markets recognises that access restrictions can become important where a platform constitutes an important gateway between suppliers and consumers.

Relevance to ticketing

A dominant ticketing platform can similarly function as a gateway:

Event organiser → ticketing platform → ticket buyer.

If the platform uses contractual or technical restrictions to prevent organisers from using competing distribution channels, competition concerns may arise.

The precise legal test, however, depends on the applicable competition statute.

11. Ohio v American Express Co.

138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018), United States Supreme Court

This case concerned American Express's contractual restrictions on merchants steering customers toward alternative payment methods.

The Supreme Court treated the credit-card transaction as involving a two-sided platform connecting merchants and cardholders.

Principle

Competition analysis involving platforms may require consideration of interactions between both sides of the platform.

Relevance to ticket platforms

Ticketing platforms similarly connect:

  • event organisers; and
  • ticket purchasers.

Exclusivity can affect both sides.

For example:

Organiser exclusivity → fewer events for rival platform → fewer consumers → reduced attractiveness to other organisers.

This demonstrates why ticket-platform markets should not always be analysed as ordinary one-sided distribution markets.

12. NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma

468 U.S. 85 (1984), United States Supreme Court

The NCAA controlled television rights for college football and restricted individual universities from independently selling their television rights.

The Supreme Court found the NCAA's restrictions unlawful under the Sherman Act.

Principle

A collective organisation controlling an important distribution channel can create competition concerns when it restricts independent commercial access to that channel.

Relevance to ticketing

A sports league or association that requires all clubs to use one exclusive ticketing platform could raise analogous questions.

The analysis would consider:

  • collective control;
  • market power;
  • alternatives;
  • efficiencies;
  • foreclosure; and
  • consumer effects.

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