1. Introduction

The green transition refers to the transformation of economies from carbon-intensive production and consumption toward low-carbon, circular, renewable, energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable economic systems. This transformation frequently requires cooperation among competitors because decarbonisation may involve substantial investment, common infrastructure, technical standards, research and development, supply-chain coordination, recycling systems and joint procurement.

Examples include:

competitors jointly developing hydrogen infrastructure;

automobile manufacturers cooperating on charging infrastructure;

companies creating common battery-recycling systems;

producers establishing common carbon-accounting standards;

competitors sharing technology necessary for renewable-energy deployment;

industry-wide agreements to phase out environmentally harmful inputs;

joint purchasing of renewable electricity;

cooperation concerning sustainable packaging or circular-economy systems.

Such cooperation creates a competition-law tension. Cooperation may generate environmental benefits that an individual undertaking cannot efficiently achieve alone, but the same cooperation can also facilitate price fixing, market allocation, output restriction, exclusion of rivals or exchange of competitively sensitive information.

Therefore, green cooperation cannot automatically be regarded as lawful merely because it has an environmental objective. Competition authorities must examine both the competitive restrictions and the verifiable sustainability benefits.

2. Meaning of Green Transition Cooperation Frameworks

A green transition cooperation framework is an organised arrangement through which independent undertakings cooperate to achieve environmental or climate-related objectives while remaining competitors in one or more markets.

The framework may involve:

Research and development cooperation

Technology-sharing arrangements

Common environmental standards

Joint purchasing

Shared infrastructure

Recycling and waste-management systems

Carbon-reduction commitments

Renewable-energy procurement

Sustainable supply-chain programmes

Common product-design requirements

Green certification systems

Industry-wide phase-out agreements

Competition law therefore asks a fundamental question:

Does cooperation necessary for the green transition preserve or enhance competition while producing genuine environmental benefits, or does the environmental justification conceal an anticompetitive agreement?

3. Why Competition Law Is Relevant

Green transition agreements can affect competition in several ways.

A. Competitor collaboration

Competitors may jointly determine:

prices;

production volumes;

investment;

product specifications;

suppliers;

customers;

geographic markets.

If the environmental project becomes a mechanism for coordinating these competitive variables, Article 101 TFEU or Section 3 of the Indian Competition Act may become relevant.

B. Exchange of information

Green projects frequently require companies to exchange information about:

emissions;

production;

energy consumption;

technology;

costs;

investment plans;

supply forecasts.

Exchanges involving commercially sensitive information can reduce strategic uncertainty between competitors.

C. Standardisation

Environmental standards can generate efficiency but may also exclude alternative technologies.

For example, an industry association might establish a mandatory technical standard that effectively prevents a competing technology from entering the market.

D. Joint purchasing

Competitors may jointly purchase:

renewable electricity;

recycled materials;

hydrogen;

sustainable raw materials;

carbon-removal services.

Joint purchasing may generate economies of scale but can also create buyer power or facilitate coordination.

E. Market exclusion

Large firms may establish green infrastructure that smaller competitors cannot access.

This creates potential concerns involving:

essential infrastructure;

interoperability;

access discrimination;

foreclosure;

exclusive dealing;

network effects.

4. Green Cooperation and Section 3 of the Indian Competition Act

Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits agreements that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC).

Section 3(1) establishes the general prohibition, while Section 3(3) addresses agreements among enterprises engaged in similar or identical trade that may involve:

price fixing;

limiting production or supply;

market allocation;

bid rigging or collusive bidding.

A green agreement between competitors must therefore be carefully structured.

Example

Suppose five competing cement manufacturers agree to reduce carbon emissions.

The environmental objective may be legitimate.

However, if the agreement simultaneously provides that:

each manufacturer will increase prices by 15% and maintain identical output levels,

the environmental objective does not automatically immunise the price coordination.

The competition authority would need to examine the actual competitive effects and structure of the arrangement.

5. Environmental Benefits and Competitive Harm

The central analytical difficulty is that green cooperation may produce both:

Positive effects

reduced carbon emissions;

cleaner production;

technological innovation;

lower environmental damage;

economies of scale;

improved recycling;

faster deployment of renewable technologies;

increased consumer choice in sustainable products.

Negative effects

higher prices;

reduced output;

exclusion of competitors;

reduced innovation;

market sharing;

information exchange;

cartelisation;

increased concentration.

Competition law therefore requires an assessment of the net competitive and efficiency consequences of the cooperation.

6. Sustainability Agreements Under European Competition Law

European competition law provides an especially important framework because Article 101 TFEU applies to agreements between undertakings that restrict competition.

Historically, sustainability agreements created uncertainty because environmental benefits do not necessarily accrue only to the consumers purchasing the relevant product.

Modern competition analysis increasingly recognises that sustainability objectives can form part of the assessment of cooperation, provided that the arrangement is genuine, proportionate and produces demonstrable benefits.

Important considerations include:

the nature of the restriction;

market power of the participants;

necessity of cooperation;

availability of less restrictive alternatives;

environmental benefits;

consumer benefits;

magnitude and verifiability of the benefits;

duration of the arrangement;

access for non-participating competitors.

7. Greenwashing and Competition Law

Competition law must also distinguish genuine sustainability cooperation from greenwashing.

A company may claim that a restrictive agreement is environmentally necessary when the real purpose is to:

raise prices;

exclude competitors;

protect incumbent technology;

prevent disruptive innovation;

divide markets.

For example, competitors could agree not to produce a cheaper low-carbon substitute while describing the arrangement as an environmental initiative.

The authority would need to examine the substance rather than the environmental label.

8. Case Law

Case 1: Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten

Case: C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten

Principle

The Court of Justice considered whether a restrictive professional rule could nevertheless be compatible with competition law because of legitimate regulatory objectives.

The Court examined the broader regulatory context and whether the restriction was inherent in the pursuit of legitimate objectives.

Relevance to green transition

The case provides an important analytical foundation for considering situations in which a restriction of competition is connected with a legitimate non-commercial objective.

Green cooperation may similarly require assessment of:

the objective pursued;

whether the restriction is genuinely connected to that objective;

whether the restriction is proportionate.

It does not, however, establish a general exemption for environmental agreements.

9. Case 2: Meca-Medina v Commission

Case: C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission

Principle

The Court rejected an overly formal approach to restrictions of competition and emphasised examination of the regulatory context and legitimate objectives.

Rules that appear restrictive must be assessed in light of their actual context and effects.

Relevance

Green transition frameworks frequently combine:

commercial competition;

technical standards;

environmental objectives;

regulatory requirements.

Meca-Medina demonstrates why competition analysis cannot always be performed by examining the restrictive element in isolation.

The environmental objective and the competitive consequences may need to be examined together.

10. Case 3: Eturas UAB v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba

Case: C-74/14

Principle

The case concerned an electronic travel-booking platform through which a common discount restriction was communicated to participating businesses.

The Court addressed the evidentiary implications of competitors receiving information capable of facilitating coordinated conduct.

Relevance to green transition cooperation

Modern green cooperation is increasingly digital.

A sustainability platform could be used to coordinate:

prices;

production;

procurement;

carbon-related investments;

output;

supply.

Therefore, a platform created for legitimate environmental cooperation could become a mechanism for unlawful coordination.

The Eturas principle is particularly relevant to digital green-transition frameworks because the technical architecture through which cooperation occurs can itself facilitate coordination.

11. Case 4: T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit

Case: C-8/08

Principle

The Court examined information exchange among competitors and held that certain exchanges capable of reducing strategic uncertainty may constitute a restriction of competition by object.

Relevance to green cooperation

Environmental cooperation may require extensive information sharing.

However, participants should distinguish:

Potentially legitimate information

aggregated emissions data;

historical environmental performance;

publicly available sustainability information.

Potentially sensitive information

future prices;

future production;

individual investment plans;

capacity decisions;

customer-specific information;

future procurement strategies.

The case therefore illustrates why environmental objectives do not automatically make information exchanges harmless.

12. Case 5: Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission — Wood Pulp

Joined Cases: 89/85 and related cases

Principle

The European Court examined parallel conduct and the distinction between independent market behaviour and concerted practices.

The case remains important for understanding when coordinated market behaviour can support an inference of unlawful concertation.

Relevance to green transition

Green-transition markets may have naturally parallel behaviour.

For example, competitors may independently:

increase renewable-energy usage;

reduce fossil-fuel consumption;

adopt similar sustainability targets;

move toward recyclable packaging.

Parallel conduct alone should not automatically be treated as collusion.

Authorities must distinguish:

independent responses to common environmental conditions

from

coordination between competitors.

This distinction is crucial because climate regulation itself may cause firms to behave similarly.

13. Case 6: Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission — Dyestuffs

Case: 48/69

Principle

The Court developed important principles concerning concerted practices and the requirement that competitors retain independent decision-making.

Relevance

Green transition agreements can create legitimate cooperation, but competitors must preserve independent commercial decision-making outside the agreed sustainability project.

For example, companies may cooperate on a common recycling standard without agreeing upon:

future prices;

customer allocation;

production quotas;

commercial strategies.

The Dyestuffs principles therefore reinforce the importance of preserving competitive independence.

14. Case 7: United States v Microsoft Corp.

Case: 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

Principle

The case concerned Microsoft's conduct involving the operating-system and browser markets.

The court considered exclusionary strategies involving a dominant technology platform and the effect of such conduct on competitors and innovation.

Relevance to green-transition ecosystems

Green markets increasingly depend upon technological platforms.

Examples include:

electric-vehicle operating systems;

charging networks;

smart grids;

battery-management systems;

hydrogen infrastructure;

energy-management software.

A dominant green technology platform could potentially use control over one layer of the ecosystem to disadvantage competitors in adjacent markets.

Thus, environmental infrastructure does not eliminate ordinary rules against exclusionary conduct.

15. Case 8: Ohio v American Express Co.

Case: 585 U.S. 529 (2018)

Principle

The Supreme Court considered competition in a two-sided transaction platform and emphasised the importance of analysing both sides of the platform when determining competitive effects.

Relevance to green-transition platforms

Many green ecosystems are also two-sided or multi-sided.

Examples include:

EV charging platforms connecting drivers and charging operators;

renewable-energy marketplaces connecting producers and purchasers;

carbon-credit platforms connecting buyers and sellers;

recycling platforms connecting waste producers and processors.

Competition analysis therefore may need to consider the interaction between multiple user groups.

Conduct benefiting one side may simultaneously affect competition on another side.

16. Case 9: Google and Alphabet v Commission — Google Shopping

Case: C-48/22 P

Principle

The case concerns Google's treatment of comparison-shopping services within its search ecosystem and the application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary conduct by a dominant digital platform.

Relevance to green ecosystems

A dominant environmental platform could potentially control:

search;

ranking;

certification;

access;

visibility;

data;

transaction infrastructure.

If the platform systematically favours its own sustainability service over competing green services, competition concerns may arise.

The underlying principle is that environmental positioning does not prevent scrutiny of discriminatory or exclusionary platform conduct.

17. Case 10: Microsoft Corp. v Commission

Case: T-201/04

Principle

The General Court addressed Microsoft's conduct concerning interoperability and tying.

The case is particularly important for understanding competition in technologically interconnected markets.

Relevance to green transition

Green technologies frequently depend upon interoperability.

For example:

EV charging systems;

renewable-energy software;

battery systems;

smart meters;

energy-management platforms;

hydrogen distribution systems.

A dominant undertaking controlling a critical technological interface could potentially restrict competitors' access to interoperability.

Consequently, environmental infrastructure should not be permitted to become a technological bottleneck without competition-law scrutiny.

18. Joint Research and Development

Green transition frequently requires R&D cooperation because environmental technologies can involve enormous costs.

Examples include:

carbon capture;

green hydrogen;

advanced batteries;

sustainable aviation fuel;

low-carbon cement;

renewable storage;

carbon-neutral shipping.

Competition authorities should distinguish:

Legitimate R&D cooperation

Competitors jointly develop technology while continuing to compete in downstream markets.

Riskier cooperation

Competitors jointly determine:

commercial prices;

output;

customers;

market allocation;

downstream sales conditions.

The closer cooperation moves toward coordination of independent competitive decisions, the greater the competition concern.

19. Green Standards and Standardisation

Environmental standards can be highly beneficial.

A common standard can:

reduce transaction costs;

improve consumer information;

promote interoperability;

facilitate investment;

accelerate technology adoption.

However, standard-setting can become anticompetitive if dominant firms manipulate the process to exclude competing technologies.

Competition authorities should therefore examine:

transparency;

openness;

participation;

objective criteria;

access;

non-discrimination;

availability of alternative technologies.

20. Green Infrastructure and Essential Facilities

The green transition requires infrastructure such as:

charging stations;

electricity grids;

hydrogen pipelines;

carbon-storage facilities;

ports;

battery-recycling networks.

Where infrastructure becomes indispensable, competition questions may arise concerning access.

Traditional refusal-to-supply principles, including Bronner and IMS Health, become relevant by analogy.

The critical questions include:

Is the infrastructure genuinely indispensable?

Can competitors reasonably duplicate it?

Does the owner have market power?

Is refusal capable of excluding effective competition?

Is there an objective justification?

Would mandatory access undermine investment incentives?

21. Green Joint Purchasing

Competitors may jointly purchase sustainable inputs to create sufficient demand.

For example:

several manufacturers jointly purchase renewable electricity.

Potential advantages include:

economies of scale;

reduced transaction costs;

greater demand for renewable energy;

increased bargaining power.

But joint purchasing can become problematic if the arrangement:

suppresses supplier prices excessively;

excludes suppliers;

facilitates coordination among competitors;

extends into joint selling;

coordinates downstream prices.

Therefore, the scope of the purchasing arrangement is critical.

22. Green Procurement

Public authorities may increasingly incorporate sustainability requirements into procurement.

Examples include requirements for:

low-carbon construction;

renewable-energy use;

recycled materials;

zero-emission vehicles;

energy-efficient infrastructure.

Competition law must ensure that sustainability criteria are:

objective;

transparent;

proportionate;

technologically neutral where appropriate;

non-discriminatory.

Otherwise, environmental procurement requirements can unintentionally create barriers to entry.

23. Green Cartels

A particularly serious risk is the emergence of green cartels.

A green cartel occurs where competitors use an environmental objective as the justification for commercially restrictive coordination.

Potential examples include agreements to:

stop selling particular products;

maintain a common minimum price;

restrict production;

divide green-technology markets;

allocate customers;

coordinate investment;

exclude a competing technology.

The environmental objective must therefore be separated from the competitive restriction.

24. Green Merger Control

Green transition can also generate substantial consolidation.

For example:

battery manufacturers may merge;

renewable-energy companies may consolidate;

charging networks may acquire competitors;

carbon-removal firms may combine;

recycling companies may consolidate.

Competition authorities should examine:

Horizontal effects

Will the merger eliminate an important competitor?

Vertical effects

Will a company controlling green infrastructure foreclose downstream rivals?

Ecosystem effects

Will the merged entity control several complementary technologies?

Innovation effects

Will the merger eliminate an important source of green innovation?

Environmental benefits may be relevant to merger analysis, but they should be substantiated rather than assumed.

25. Green Innovation and Competition

Competition can itself stimulate environmental innovation.

Rival firms may compete to develop:

more efficient batteries;

cheaper renewable technology;

lower-carbon manufacturing;

sustainable materials;

carbon-removal technologies.

Cooperation that eliminates this innovation rivalry can create long-term competitive harm even if the participants achieve short-term environmental gains.

Therefore, competition authorities should examine both:

static efficiency

and

dynamic innovation competition.

26. Indian Competition-Law Framework

Under Indian law, green cooperation primarily raises issues under:

Section 3

Anti-competitive agreements.

Section 4

Abuse of dominant position.

Sections 5 and 6

Combinations and merger control.

Section 19

CCI's power to inquire into agreements and abuse of dominance.

Section 26

Investigation procedure following information or reference.

Section 27

Orders that may be issued following an established contravention.

The Indian framework is sufficiently broad to address environmental cooperation even where the particular technology did not exist when the Competition Act was enacted.

27. Relevance of Indian Case Law

CCI v Steel Authority of India Ltd.

(2010) 10 SCC 744

The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework governing the CCI and the distinction between the prima facie stage and later investigation.

Relevance

Green cooperation allegations should be assessed through the statutory investigative framework rather than through assumptions based merely on the environmental character of an agreement.

Excel Crop Care Ltd v CCI

(2017) 8 SCC 47

The Supreme Court dealt with cartel conduct and penalties.

Relevance

The case demonstrates the seriousness with which coordinated conduct between competitors can be treated.

An environmental justification cannot simply transform a conventional cartel into lawful cooperation.

Competition Commission of India v Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians

(2017) 5 SCC 17

The Supreme Court examined restrictive conduct by an association.

Relevance

Industry associations involved in green-transition initiatives must be particularly careful because common sustainability standards can become vehicles for collective restrictions.

Samir Agarwal v CCI

(2021) 3 SCC 136

The Supreme Court considered issues concerning complaints/information before the CCI.

Relevance

The case is relevant to enforcement architecture where stakeholders identify potentially restrictive conduct in emerging green markets.

28. Green Transition Cooperation: A Competition-Law Test

A useful analytical framework can be constructed around six questions.

Question 1 — What is the environmental objective?

The parties should identify a precise objective such as:

carbon reduction;

pollution reduction;

waste reduction;

renewable-energy deployment.

Question 2 — Is the cooperation necessary?

Could the environmental objective reasonably be achieved through independent action?

Question 3 — Is the restriction proportionate?

The parties should use the least restrictive mechanism reasonably available.

Question 4 — Are environmental benefits measurable?

Claims should ideally be supported by:

emissions data;

lifecycle analysis;

independent verification;

technical evidence.

Question 5 — Are competitors excluded?

The arrangement should not unnecessarily prevent rival technologies or undertakings from participating.

Question 6 — Are competitive parameters protected?

The parties should generally maintain independent decisions concerning:

prices;

customers;

output;

commercial strategy;

competitive investments.

29. Governance Architecture for Green Cooperation

A robust framework should include:

1. Written sustainability objective

Clearly define the environmental objective.

2. Necessity assessment

Document why cooperation is required.

3. Competition-law risk assessment

Identify potential effects under Sections 3 and 4.

4. Information protocol

Limit exchanges to information genuinely required for the project.

5. Independent compliance officer

Monitor communications and meetings.

6. Access rules

Where common infrastructure is created, establish transparent access conditions.

7. Non-discrimination

Avoid unjustified exclusion of smaller competitors.

8. Periodic review

Environmental and competitive effects should be periodically reassessed.

9. Sunset mechanisms

Some cooperation should expire unless its continued necessity can be demonstrated.

10. Auditability

Environmental claims and competition-law compliance should be capable of independent verification.

30. Important Distinction: Environmental Cooperation vs Environmental Cartel

The environmental objective is therefore not itself determinative. The structure, necessity, implementation and effects of the agreement matter.

31. Relationship Between Sustainability and Consumer Welfare

Traditional competition analysis frequently focuses on:

price;

output;

quality;

innovation;

consumer choice.

Green transition complicates this framework because consumers may value environmental quality even where it does not immediately appear as a lower monetary price.

A sustainable product may:

cost more;

generate fewer emissions;

reduce pollution;

create long-term environmental benefits.

Consequently, competition authorities increasingly need analytical methods capable of accounting for quality and sustainability dimensions of competition.

32. Digitalisation of Green Cooperation

Future green cooperation will increasingly operate through digital systems.

Examples include:

AI-enabled carbon accounting;

smart-grid coordination;

automated renewable-energy purchasing;

blockchain-based carbon markets;

algorithmic recycling marketplaces;

automated environmental certification.

This creates additional competition concerns.

An algorithm may unintentionally or deliberately:

coordinate prices;

reduce strategic uncertainty;

discriminate between competitors;

favour affiliated businesses;

restrict access;

reinforce network effects.

The Eturas and T-Mobile Netherlands principles are particularly relevant where digital systems facilitate coordination.

33. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

Green standards may impose substantial compliance costs on SMEs.

Competition authorities should therefore consider whether:

certification requirements are excessive;

infrastructure is accessible;

standards are unnecessarily complex;

large firms control essential inputs;

industry agreements create entry barriers.

A green transition that requires participation by thousands of businesses should not be structured so that only dominant firms can realistically comply.

34. Green Cooperation and Market Power

Market power changes the competition analysis.

An agreement involving several small firms may have limited competitive effects.

The same arrangement involving the majority of suppliers in a concentrated market may have substantially greater consequences.

Therefore, authorities should examine:

market shares;

concentration;

barriers to entry;

network effects;

countervailing power;

alternative technologies;

buyer power;

switching costs.

35. Six Core Competition Risks

Green transition frameworks present six major competition risks:

1. Coordination risk

Competitors may use environmental cooperation to coordinate commercial conduct.

2. Exclusion risk

Green standards may exclude competing technologies.

3. Concentration risk

Infrastructure-intensive transition industries may become highly concentrated.

4. Information risk

Environmental data-sharing systems may facilitate collusion.

5. Platform risk

Digital green platforms may become gatekeepers.

6. Innovation risk

Cooperation may eliminate independent innovation.

36. Case-Law Summary

37. Future Competition-Law Issues

The green transition is likely to generate novel competition questions concerning:

hydrogen networks;

carbon-capture infrastructure;

battery ecosystems;

EV charging networks;

renewable-energy platforms;

carbon-credit exchanges;

sustainable aviation fuel;

green shipping corridors;

smart grids;

circular-economy platforms;

environmental data markets;

carbon-accounting software;

AI-enabled environmental certification.

These markets frequently possess strong network effects, infrastructure dependencies and technological complementarities.

Consequently, conventional competition-law concepts will increasingly need to be applied to interconnected green ecosystems rather than isolated product markets.

38. Conclusion

Green transition cooperation is neither inherently anticompetitive nor automatically exempt from competition law.

Its legality depends on the relationship between:

the environmental objective;

the necessity of cooperation;

the degree of competitive restriction;

measurable environmental benefits;

proportionality;

market power;

exclusionary effects;

innovation effects.

The central principle should be that competition law should permit genuine cooperation necessary to achieve environmental improvements while preventing environmental objectives from becoming a mechanism for cartelisation, exclusion or market foreclosure.

The most important challenge for competition authorities will therefore be to distinguish collaboration that accelerates decarbonisation from commercial coordination disguised as sustainability cooperation. In emerging green markets, this distinction will require careful analysis of market structure, information flows, technology, infrastructure, innovation and demonstrable environmental outcomes.