Competition Law and Food System Platform Monopolization

1. Introduction

Food system platform monopolization refers to the acquisition or exercise of substantial market power by digital platforms that operate at important points in the food value chain—such as food delivery, online grocery, restaurant marketplaces, agricultural inputs, food logistics, cloud kitchens, food advertising, payment systems, and consumer-data ecosystems.

A food platform may connect:

• restaurants and consumers;
• farmers and buyers;
• grocery retailers and consumers;
• food manufacturers and distributors;
• delivery workers and restaurants;
• advertisers and food businesses; or
• multiple complementary services within a single digital ecosystem.

The competition-law concern arises when a platform moves from being merely an intermediary to becoming a gatekeeper capable of controlling access to customers, data, ranking, logistics, payments, or other essential commercial infrastructure.

In China, this issue has become particularly significant. The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has specifically addressed online food-delivery platform conduct, including exclusivity, algorithmic practices, differential treatment and platform governance. In January 2026, China's antitrust authorities also announced a sector-wide competition assessment of food-delivery platforms, citing concerns involving subsidies, pricing and traffic control.

2. Meaning of Food System Platform Monopolization

Platform monopolization does not necessarily mean that a platform is the only company operating in the market.

A platform may have substantial market power because of:

1. network effects;
2. large user and merchant bases;
3. control over data;
4. algorithmic ranking;
5. high switching costs;
6. exclusive contracts;
7. control over delivery infrastructure;
8. integration of payments and logistics;
9. consumer loyalty;
10. economies of scale and scope;
11. preferential treatment of its own services; and
12. access to commercially important information.

Thus, competition law generally distinguishes between:

being large and abusing market power.

A large food platform is not automatically a monopolist in the legal sense. The critical question is whether market power exists and whether the undertaking has engaged in conduct capable of excluding competitors, exploiting trading partners, or otherwise restricting competition.

3. Relevant Markets

The first major legal issue is market definition.

A food platform can potentially participate in several related markets.

A. Restaurant-delivery platform market

Possible competitors may include:

• Meituan;
• Ele.me;
• restaurant-owned delivery systems;
• other delivery applications.

B. Online grocery marketplace

The relevant market may include:

• online grocery platforms;
• supermarket delivery applications;
• marketplace-based grocery services;
• potentially offline supermarkets, depending upon substitutability.

C. Food logistics

A platform may control:

• delivery fleets;
• courier networks;
• warehousing;
• cold-chain infrastructure;
• routing systems.

D. Food advertising

Platforms can also operate advertising markets in which restaurants pay for:

• sponsored placement;
• search ranking;
• recommendation;
• promotional campaigns.

E. Data and digital services

Food platforms can accumulate:

• customer preferences;
• transaction histories;
• restaurant performance data;
• delivery data;
• geographic demand information.

This creates a potential data-based competitive advantage.

4. How Platform Monopoly Power Develops

A. Direct Network Effects

More consumers attract more restaurants.

More restaurants attract more consumers.

More transactions then improve the platform's data and algorithms.

This produces:

Users → Restaurants → Transactions → Data → Better service → More users

Once a platform reaches sufficient scale, competing platforms may find it difficult to attract enough users and merchants simultaneously.

5. Indirect Network Effects

Food platforms operate multi-sided markets.

For example:

Consumers ↔ Platform ↔ Restaurants ↔ Delivery workers

A platform may subsidise one side of the market while recovering costs from another.

For example, it may provide:

• consumer discounts;
• restaurant incentives;
• delivery subsidies;

while charging:

• commissions;
• advertising fees;
• delivery fees;
• data or promotional fees.

Competition authorities therefore need to examine the entire platform ecosystem, rather than looking at only one price.

6. Exclusivity and "Two Choices"

One of the most important monopolization mechanisms is forcing restaurants to choose between platforms.

A platform may tell a restaurant:

"If you remain on our platform, you cannot use competing delivery platforms."

This can produce foreclosure because restaurants are important inputs for competing platforms.

If enough restaurants become exclusive, a rival platform may lose:

• merchant coverage;
• consumer attractiveness;
• delivery density;
• transaction data;
• advertising inventory.

7. Meituan Food-Delivery Antitrust Case — China

Facts

The Meituan food-delivery antitrust case is one of the most important examples of food-platform competition enforcement.

SAMR investigated Meituan in 2021 concerning its conduct in China's online food-delivery platform services market.

SAMR found that Meituan had used its market position to implement a "choose one from two" arrangement, including differential treatment, delays in onboarding restaurants, exclusivity deposits, data and algorithmic measures, and other mechanisms to enforce exclusivity.

Legal issue

The principal issue was whether Meituan had:

• a dominant position; and
• abused that position by restricting restaurants from dealing with competing platforms without legitimate justification.

Decision

SAMR ordered Meituan to cease the conduct, return approximately RMB 1.289 billion in exclusivity deposits and imposed a fine of approximately RMB 3.442 billion, equivalent to 3% of its 2020 domestic sales used for the calculation.

Competition significance

The case demonstrates that platform monopolization can occur through merchant foreclosure rather than merely through high consumer prices.

Principle

Exclusive dealing by a dominant platform may be abusive where it substantially forecloses competing platforms without sufficient justification.

8. Sherpa's Food-Delivery Case — China

Another important Chinese case involved Shanghai Sherpa's.

Sherpa's operated an online food-delivery platform serving customers and restaurants in Shanghai.

The Shanghai market regulator found that Sherpa's had imposed exclusivity requirements on cooperating restaurants and required restaurants to stop working with competing platforms.

Restaurants that failed to comply could be removed from the platform.

Competition concern

The regulator concluded that the arrangement:

• locked in restaurant resources;
• weakened competitors;
• affected merchant choice; and
• harmed competition and consumer interests.

Sherpa's was fined approximately RMB 1.1686 million, based on 3% of its relevant 2018 sales.

Importance

The case shows that China's food-platform competition law is not concerned only with the largest national platforms. Local or specialised platforms can also attract abuse-of-dominance scrutiny.

9. Delivery Hero / Glovo — European Union

The European Commission's Delivery Hero/Glovo investigation provides a major international example.

The Commission found that the companies participated in an online food-delivery cartel involving:

• exchange of commercially sensitive information;
• coordination concerning pricing and business strategies;
• geographic market allocation; and
• agreements limiting competition between the platforms. 

The conduct involved the online food-delivery sector across the EEA.

Competition significance

This case illustrates an important distinction:

Monopolization generally concerns unilateral conduct by a dominant undertaking.

Cartel conduct concerns coordination between competitors.

However, the two problems can interact.

For example:

Market concentration + minority investment + information exchange + geographic allocation

can reduce competitive rivalry even without a conventional monopoly.

Principle

Food platforms cannot use ownership relationships, information exchange or commercial coordination to eliminate independent competition.

10. Amazon–Deliveroo Merger Investigation — United Kingdom

The proposed Amazon investment in Deliveroo was examined by the UK Competition and Markets Authority.

This case is significant because it demonstrates that food-delivery platform competition concerns may arise before monopoly power is fully established.

The CMA considered whether the transaction could eliminate or weaken competition in food-delivery services and whether Deliveroo's continued presence as an independent competitor was sufficiently important to the market.

The case became particularly significant in the context of the failing-firm defence and the effect of COVID-era market conditions.

Competition lesson

Competition law may intervene at the structural stage where a transaction could remove an important competitive constraint.

Thus:

Platform monopolization can arise not only from conduct after dominance is achieved but also from acquisitions that eliminate emerging competitors.

11. Alibaba "Two-Choice" Case — China

The Alibaba exclusivity case, although not confined to food delivery, is highly relevant to food-system platforms because it establishes an important Chinese platform-economy principle.

SAMR found that Alibaba had required merchants to choose between Alibaba platforms and competing platforms.

The conduct involved restrictions on merchants' ability to operate simultaneously on competing marketplaces.

Relevance to food platforms

The same mechanism can operate in:

• food delivery;
• online grocery;
• agricultural marketplaces;
• food advertising;
• restaurant booking;
• cloud kitchens.

The underlying competition concern is identical:

A dominant intermediary uses control over merchant demand to prevent multi-homing.

The Meituan decision subsequently demonstrates how this principle applies specifically to online food delivery.

12. Digital Platform Food-Safety Enforcement and Competition

A broader platform-governance issue has emerged in China in 2026.

SAMR penalised seven major e-commerce and food-delivery platforms in the "ghost food delivery" cases for failures involving online food-business qualification verification and related platform responsibilities.

The platforms included Meituan, Ele.me/Taobao Instant Commerce, JD, Pinduoduo, Douyin, Taobao and Tmall. The total administrative penalties were approximately RMB 3.597 billion, with additional individual penalties.

This is primarily a food-safety and platform-governance enforcement matter rather than a classic Article 18 dominance case.

Nevertheless, it is highly relevant to platform competition analysis because it demonstrates that a platform can exercise substantial control over:

• merchant entry;
• merchant verification;
• consumer information;
• order routing;
• ranking;
• visibility;
• transaction infrastructure.

The more functions a platform controls, the greater the importance of ensuring that platform governance does not become a mechanism for excluding competitors or exploiting dependent businesses.

13. Self-Preferencing

A vertically integrated food platform may operate its own competing businesses.

For example:

Platform → Restaurant marketplace

while simultaneously owning:

Platform → Cloud kitchen

or:

Platform → Grocery retail

The platform may then manipulate:

• search rankings;
• recommendations;
• commission rates;
• delivery priority;
• advertising visibility;
• consumer discounts.

If its own affiliated business receives systematic preferential treatment, competition concerns may arise.

Example

Suppose Platform A:

1. owns a food-delivery marketplace;
2. operates its own restaurant brands;
3. controls search rankings;
4. controls delivery allocation; and
5. ranks its own restaurants above independent restaurants.

The competition-law inquiry would examine whether this conduct excludes equally efficient rivals.

14. Algorithmic Monopolization

Algorithms can transform traditional exclusionary conduct.

A platform can use algorithms to determine:

• which restaurants appear first;
• which restaurants receive discounts;
• delivery fees;
• restaurant commission rates;
• advertising prices;
• consumer recommendations;
• courier allocation.

Algorithmic control may create several competition risks.

A. Algorithmic discrimination

The platform may impose different commercial conditions on similarly situated restaurants.

B. Algorithmic exclusion

Competitors may receive systematically lower visibility.

C. Algorithmic retaliation

Restaurants cooperating with competing platforms may experience reduced rankings or higher commissions.

D. Algorithmic coordination

Competitors may use automated systems that facilitate coordinated pricing or conduct.

15. Data-Based Monopoly

Food platforms generate enormous volumes of commercially valuable data.

Examples include:

• consumer purchasing patterns;
• restaurant prices;
• delivery times;
• geographic demand;
• consumer preferences;
• peak ordering periods;
• menu popularity;
• cancellation rates.

A dominant platform can use this information to obtain competitive advantages.

For example, a platform might observe that a particular restaurant is extremely successful and then:

1. collect its transaction data;
2. identify its best-selling products;
3. promote competing platform-owned products;
4. use superior data to compete against the restaurant.

This creates a potential platform-as-competitor problem.

16. Tying and Bundling

A dominant food platform may require restaurants to purchase multiple services together.

For example:

Food-delivery access + advertising + payment processing + logistics

A restaurant may theoretically be free to reject one service, but practically unable to compete without it.

Competition authorities may examine:

• market power in the tying product;
• distinctness of the products;
• coercion;
• foreclosure;
• efficiencies;
• consumer effects.

17. Loyalty Rebates and Discounts

Food platforms frequently compete through subsidies.

Examples include:

• free delivery;
• restaurant commission rebates;
• consumer coupons;
• loyalty programmes;
• exclusive discounts.

Discounts are not inherently anti-competitive.

The concern arises when a dominant platform uses them strategically to exclude rivals.

For example:

Platform A subsidises delivery below an economically sustainable level until Platform B exits, then raises prices after competitive pressure disappears.

The legal analysis must distinguish:

legitimate price competition

from

exclusionary pricing.

18. Predatory Pricing

Food delivery is particularly vulnerable to predatory-pricing allegations because platforms can sustain losses for extended periods.

A platform may have:

• venture financing;
• cross-subsidisation;
• advertising revenue;
• payment revenue;
• grocery revenue;
• cloud-service revenue.

Therefore, the relevant question is not simply whether delivery prices are low.

Authorities may examine:

• cost benchmarks;
• duration;
• recoupment;
• strategic intent where legally relevant;
• market structure;
• barriers to entry;
• multi-market subsidies.

19. Refusal to Deal and Access

A food platform can become a critical intermediary.

Suppose restaurants cannot realistically reach consumers without access to a particular platform.

A dominant platform might then:

• refuse onboarding;
• delay merchant approval;
• deny API access;
• block logistics integration;
• restrict payment integration;
• remove merchants;
• prevent interoperability.

Such conduct can potentially raise refusal-to-deal or access-discrimination issues, subject to the applicable jurisdiction's legal test.

20. Interoperability

Interoperability can reduce platform lock-in.

For example:

Restaurant management software

could theoretically connect to:

• Meituan;
• Ele.me;
• other delivery platforms.

If a dominant platform prevents interoperability without legitimate justification, competitors may face increased costs.

Competition authorities may therefore examine whether technical restrictions:

• increase switching costs;
• prevent multi-homing;
• exclude rivals;
• protect platform dominance.

21. Vertical Integration

Food platforms increasingly operate across multiple levels:

Agricultural producer → Food processor → Marketplace → Delivery → Payment → Advertising → Consumer

Vertical integration may create efficiencies.

However, it may also create foreclosure risks.

For example, a platform controlling both:

food marketplace + delivery infrastructure

could make access to delivery disproportionately expensive for competing marketplaces.

Similarly:

grocery marketplace + grocery retail

may create incentives for self-preferencing.

22. Merger and Acquisition Risks

Food-platform monopolization can also arise through acquisitions.

Important questions include:

• Does the acquisition eliminate an emerging competitor?
• Does the target possess valuable consumer data?
• Does the target provide an alternative delivery network?
• Does the transaction increase network effects?
• Does it increase switching costs?
• Does it create vertical foreclosure?
• Does it facilitate access to commercially sensitive information?

Traditional turnover-based merger thresholds can sometimes fail to capture acquisitions of rapidly growing digital businesses.

Therefore, competition regimes increasingly pay attention to:

nascent competitors + data + network effects + ecosystem control.

23. Essential-Facility Considerations

A food platform is not automatically an essential facility merely because it is large.

However, the doctrine may become relevant where a platform controls an infrastructure that competitors cannot reasonably duplicate and where access is necessary for effective competition.

Potential examples could include:

• dominant food-ordering infrastructure;
• unique restaurant-distribution networks;
• critical logistics systems;
• specialised food-market data;
• platform APIs.

Any essential-facility analysis remains highly jurisdiction-specific.

24. Consumer Welfare

Platform monopolization can affect consumers through:

Price

Higher:

• delivery charges;
• restaurant commissions passed through to consumers;
• subscription fees.

Quality

Potential deterioration in:

• delivery quality;
• food quality;
• customer service.

Choice

Consumers may face fewer:

• restaurants;
• delivery options;
• grocery suppliers.

Innovation

Reduced competitive pressure may affect:

• delivery technology;
• logistics innovation;
• restaurant software;
• consumer applications.

Privacy/data

A dominant platform can accumulate extensive behavioural data, raising additional regulatory concerns.

25. Small Restaurant and Farmer Effects

Food platforms have a special competition dimension because many participants are small enterprises.

A dominant platform may become a commercial gatekeeper for:

• independent restaurants;
• farmers;
• small grocery businesses;
• cloud kitchens;
• food manufacturers.

The bargaining imbalance may allow the platform to impose:

• high commissions;
• mandatory advertising;
• exclusivity;
• restrictive contracts;
• unilateral changes;
• ranking penalties.

Consequently, competition law can intersect with broader concerns regarding economic dependency.

26. Key Case-Law Principles

The first three are especially useful for analysing Chinese food-platform monopolization, while the European and UK matters provide comparative competition-law perspectives.

27. Competition-Law Test for Food Platform Monopolization

A structured analysis can follow this sequence:

Step 1 — Define the market

Identify:

• product/service;
• geographic scope;
• platform side;
• substitute products;
• offline alternatives.

Step 2 — Establish market power

Examine:

• market shares;
• network effects;
• entry barriers;
• switching costs;
• data;
• multi-homing;
• countervailing buyer power.

Step 3 — Identify the conduct

Possible conduct:

• exclusivity;
• tying;
• bundling;
• self-preferencing;
• discriminatory access;
• refusal to deal;
• predatory pricing;
• loyalty rebates;
• algorithmic exclusion;
• data exploitation.

Step 4 — Analyse foreclosure

Ask:

Can the conduct materially prevent competitors from reaching restaurants or consumers?

Step 5 — Examine justification

Consider:

• legitimate business justification;
• quality control;
• food safety;
• fraud prevention;
• logistics efficiency;
• consumer protection;
• security.

Step 6 — Examine effects

Consider:

• competitors;
• restaurants;
• farmers;
• delivery workers;
• consumers;
• innovation.

Step 7 — Consider remedies

Possible remedies include:

• termination of exclusivity;
• access obligations;
• interoperability;
• non-discrimination;
• algorithmic transparency;
• behavioural commitments;
• divestiture;
• merger prohibition;
• monetary penalties.

28. Special Importance of China's 2026 Food-Delivery Competition Review

The issue has become particularly current in China.

In January 2026, the State Council's antimonopoly office announced a competition assessment of the food-delivery platform industry, identifying concerns around subsidies, prices and traffic control and stating that the assessment would examine competition conditions and hear from platforms, merchants, workers and consumers.

In June 2026, SAMR also published a consultation draft concerning rules for food-delivery platform subsidies, following its competition assessment.

This indicates a shift from dealing only with completed monopoly violations toward continuous monitoring of platform competition dynamics.

29. Major Legal Issues for Future Food Platforms

Future cases are likely to involve combinations of:

1. AI-generated restaurant rankings;
2. algorithmic commission setting;
3. personalised pricing;
4. delivery-worker allocation algorithms;
5. food-data portability;
6. API access;
7. cloud-kitchen platforms;
8. grocery-platform ecosystems;
9. autonomous delivery networks;
10. digital agricultural marketplaces;
11. platform-owned private labels;
12. vertical integration;
13. food advertising dominance;
14. cross-platform data use;
15. acquisition of nascent food-tech competitors.

The central competition-law question will increasingly become:

Who controls access to the consumer within the food ecosystem?

30. Conclusion

Food-system platform monopolization represents a modern form of market-power problem in which the platform may not simply sell food itself but instead controls the infrastructure through which food is discovered, ordered, delivered, advertised and paid for.

The most important competition concerns include:

• dominance;
• merchant exclusivity;
• foreclosure;
• self-preferencing;
• algorithmic discrimination;
• data advantages;
• predatory pricing;
• loyalty rebates;
• tying and bundling;
• refusal of access;
• interoperability restrictions;
• vertical integration; and
• acquisitions of emerging competitors.

The Meituan and Sherpa's cases are particularly important for Chinese food-delivery competition law because they demonstrate how exclusivity can be treated as an abuse of dominance. The Delivery Hero/Glovo proceedings demonstrate the separate danger of coordination among food-delivery competitors, while merger cases such as Amazon–Deliveroo show how competition authorities may address structural risks before a platform becomes an entrenched monopoly.

Ultimately, the central regulatory objective is not to prevent platforms from becoming successful or efficient. It is to ensure that platform scale, network effects, data and technological control do not become mechanisms for unlawfully excluding competitors or exploiting businesses dependent upon the platform.