Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India & Another
- ByPravleen Kaur --
- 07 May 2025 --
- 0 Comments
I. Introduction
A. Brief background on the case (Common Cause v. Union of India)
The case of Common Cause v. Union of India arose from a writ petition filed by Common Cause, a registered society, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner sought a declaration that the "right to die with dignity" is a fundamental right within the ambit of the "right to live with dignity" guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The petitioner argued that every individual is entitled to take a decision about the continuance or discontinuance of their life when the process of death has already commenced, and they have reached an irreversible, permanent, progressive state where death is imminent.
The petitioner contended that the right to die sans pain and suffering is fundamental to one's bodily autonomy and integrity. The petitioner also sought directions from the Supreme Court to the Union Government to adopt suitable procedures, in consultation with State Governments, to ensure that persons with deteriorated health or terminally ill patients can execute a document titled "My Living Will & Attorney Authorisation." This document could be presented to a hospital for appropriate action if the person is admitted with a serious illness that may threaten their life.
Alternatively, the petitioner requested the appointment of an expert committee consisting of doctors, social scientists, and lawyers to study and issue guidelines regarding living wills.
B. Significance of the issue (euthanasia and the right to die with dignity)
The case raised significant questions about the legality of euthanasia and the right to die with dignity in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.
The issue of euthanasia is complex and multifaceted, involving social, legal, medical, and constitutional perspectives. It touches upon the fundamental rights of an individual, the sanctity of life, and the State's interest in protecting life.
The case also highlighted the need to address the prolongation of treatment despite irreversible prognosis and the dilemma faced by doctors due to penal laws in this field. It raised questions about patient autonomy, the right to self-determination, and the balance between individual rights and societal interests.
The case had far-reaching implications for end-oflife care, medical ethics, and the interpretation of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.## Historical Context
A. P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994) - Unconstitutionality of Section 309 IPC
In the case of P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994), a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the constitutional validity of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalized attempted suicide. The court posed several questions, including whether Article 21 of the Constitution (the right to life) has a positive content or is merely negative in its reach, and whether a person residing in India has a right to die.
The court, after referring to various authorities under Article 21, took note of the decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, wherein it was observed that the right to life embraces not only physical existence but also the quality of life as understood in its richness and fullness within the ambit of the Constitution. Based on this, the court held that Section 309 IPC was unconstitutional as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
B. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) - Unconstitutionality of Section 306 IPC
The decision in P. Rathinam did not remain a precedent for long. In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the correctness of the decision rendered in P. Rathinam. In this case, the appellants were convicted under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) and assailed their conviction on the ground that Section 306 IPC is unconstitutional, relying on the decision in P. Rathinam.
The Constitution Bench disapproved of the foundation of P. Rathinam and held that the right to life under Article 21 does not include the right to die. The court observed that when a person commits suicide, they undertake certain positive overt acts, and the genesis of those acts cannot be traced to or included within the protection of the 'right to life' under Article 21. The court further stated that the 'right to life' is a natural right embodied in Article 21, but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of 'right to life'.
The Constitution Bench upheld the constitutional validity of Section 306 IPC while overruling the decision in P. Rathinam. It held that the right to live with human dignity cannot be construed to include within its ambit the right to terminate natural life, at least before the commencement of the process of certain natural death.## III. Aruna Shanbaug Case (2011)
A. Approach towards passive euthanasia
In the Aruna Shanbaug case, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court discussed various aspects of euthanasia, including active and passive euthanasia, as well as voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. The court noted that while active euthanasia is illegal, passive euthanasia is legal in certain situations, provided certain conditions and safeguards are maintained.
The court defined passive euthanasia as the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment necessary for the continuance of life, such as withholding antibiotics or removing a patient from artificial heart/lung support. It distinguished passive euthanasia from active euthanasia, which involves the administration of a lethal substance or force to end a person's life.
The court observed that the general legal position worldwide seems to be that while active euthanasia is illegal unless permitted by legislation, passive euthanasia is legal even without legislation, provided certain conditions and safeguards are maintained.
The court held that passive euthanasia should be permitted in India in certain situations, such as when a person is in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or is otherwise incompetent to take a decision, and there is no possibility of recovery. However, the court emphasized the need for safeguards to prevent misuse and laid down a detailed procedure for executing passive euthanasia.
B. Critique and inconsistencies
The Supreme Court's decision in Aruna Shanbaug has been subject to criticism and has been identified as having several inconsistencies:
1. Incorrect interpretation of Gian Kaur case: The two-judge bench in Aruna Shanbaug incorrectly interpreted the Constitution Bench decision in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996). It stated that the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur had approved the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) and observed that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation. However, a subsequent three-judge bench pointed out that this observation in Aruna Shanbaug was factually incorrect, as the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur had merely made a brief reference to the Airedale case and did not approve it.
2. Flawed distinction between active and passive euthanasia: The decision in Aruna Shanbaug is based on the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, which has been criticized as suffering from jurisprudential incongruities. The distinction between an act and an omission, on which the active-passive divide is based, has been questioned by legal scholars and philosophers.
3. Inadequate consideration of criminal law: The decision in Aruna Shanbaug did not adequately dwell on the intersection between criminal law and passive euthanasia, beyond adverting to Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. Subordination of patient's interests: The decision in Aruna Shanbaug has been criticized for subordinating the interests of the patient to the interests of others, including treating doctors and supporting caregivers.
5. Violation of privacy: The procedure followed by the Supreme Court in Aruna Shanbaug, where a CD showing Aruna Shanbaug's condition was screened in an open court, has been criticized as a fundamental violation of privacy.
6. Inconsistent reasoning: The decision in Aruna Shanbaug contains internal inconsistencies in its reasoning, such as stating that no final view was expressed in Gian Kaur beyond the right to life not including the right to die, while also construing Gian Kaur as allowing the premature termination of life in certain cases.
Due to these criticisms and inconsistencies, the Supreme Court, in the present reference, found it necessary to revisit the issues raised and independently arrive at a conclusion based on constitutional principles.## IV. The Reference to the Constitutional Bench
The matter was referred to a Constitutional Bench by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court for the following reasons:
A. Reasons for the referral
1. Inconsistencies in the Aruna Shanbaug judgment: The three-judge bench observed inherent inconsistencies in the Aruna Shanbaug judgment, which dealt with the issue of passive euthanasia.
2. Incorrect interpretation of Gian Kaur judgment: The Aruna Shanbaug judgment incorrectly interpreted the Constitution Bench judgment in Gian Kaur case. It wrongly observed that the Gian Kaur judgment had approved the decision of the House of Lords in the Airedale case, which was merely a reference and not an approval.
3. Contradictory observations: The Aruna Shanbaug judgment made contradictory observations. In one paragraph, it stated that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation, while in another paragraph, it contradicted this interpretation and stated that the court had approved the Airedale case, which dealt with the discontinuation of life support for an incompetent person.
B. Key issues to be addressed
The Constitutional Bench was expected to address the following key issues:
1. Validity of passive euthanasia: Clarify the constitutional position on the validity of passive euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary, in light of the right to life with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.
2. Interpretation of Gian Kaur judgment: Provide a correct interpretation of the Gian Kaur judgment concerning the right to die with dignity and the validity of euthanasia.
3. Advance directives: Examine the legal recognition and enforceability of advance directives or living wills, which allow individuals to express their wishes regarding medical treatment in the event of incapacitation.
4. Comprehensive guidelines: Lay down comprehensive guidelines on various aspects of passive euthanasia and advance directives, considering social, legal, medical, and constitutional perspectives.
The Constitutional Bench was expected to provide an authoritative opinion and clear enunciation of the law on these complex issues for the benefit of humanity as a whole.# Analysis of Gian Kaur Judgment
A. Interpretation of Article 21 (Right to Life) The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab interpreted Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The key points regarding the interpretation of Article 21 are:
1. Right to Life does not include Right to Die: The Court held that the "right to life" under Article 21 does not include the "right to die" or the right to terminate one's life. The Court distinguished the right to life from other fundamental rights like freedom of speech and expression, where the absence of compulsion to exercise the right is included within the right itself. However, the right to life cannot be construed to include the right to terminate life.
2. Sanctity of Life: The Court emphasized the sanctity of life and held that extinction of life is inconsistent with the continued existence of life, which is protected under Article 21.
3. Natural Right: The Court viewed the right to life as a natural right, and suicide was considered an unnatural termination of life, incompatible with the right to life.
4. Dignity in Life and Death: While rejecting the right to die, the Court observed that the right to live with human dignity may include the right to a dignified life up to the point of death, including a dignified procedure of death.
5. Terminally Ill Patients: The Court acknowledged that in cases of terminally ill patients or those in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), where death is imminent and the process of natural death has commenced, the debate on physician-assisted termination of life remains inconclusive. However, the Court held that the argument to support termination of life in such cases to reduce suffering during the process of natural death cannot be used to interpret Article 21 as including the right to curtail the natural span of life.
B. Distinction between Active and Passive Euthanasia
The Gian Kaur judgment discussed the distinction between active and passive euthanasia:
1. Active Euthanasia: This involves an intentional act to end a person's life, such as administering a lethal injection. The Court held that active euthanasia is illegal and falls under the purview of offenses like culpable homicide or murder under the Indian Penal Code.
2. Passive Euthanasia: This involves withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or medical intervention, allowing the patient to die naturally. The Court did not explicitly rule on the legality of passive euthanasia but acknowledged that in cases of terminally ill patients or those in PVS, where death is imminent, the withdrawal of life support may be permissible to reduce suffering during the process of natural death.
C. Role of the Legislature
The Gian Kaur judgment emphasized the role of the legislature in addressing the issue of euthanasia:
1. Legislative Competence: The Court observed that the desirability of bringing about a change in the law regarding euthanasia is a function of the legislature by enacting a suitable law with adequate safeguards to prevent any possible abuse.
2. Reference to Airedale Case: The Court referred to the decision of the House of Lords in the Airedale case, which stated that legalizing euthanasia could only be achieved by legislation expressing the democratic will and ensuring appropriate supervision and control.
3. Inconclusive Debate: The Court noted that the debate on physician-assisted termination of life in cases of terminally ill patients or those in PVS remains inconclusive, implying that the legislature may need to address this issue through appropriate legislation.
In summary, the Gian Kaur judgment interpreted Article 21 as not including the right to die, distinguished between active and passive euthanasia, and emphasized the role of the legislature in addressing the complex issue of euthanasia through appropriate legislation and safeguards.# VI. Passive Euthanasia and Article 21
A. Right to refuse medical treatment
The Supreme Court recognized that every adult human being of conscious mind has the right to refuse medical treatment or opt for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This right stems from the individual's right to self-determination and autonomy, which is an integral part of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court held that the right to refuse medical treatment is not an absolute right, but any restriction on this right must be reasonable and pass the test of constitutionality. An individual's choice to refuse treatment must be respected, as it is an expression of their personal autonomy and dignity.
B. Concept of individual dignity and autonomy
The Court emphasized that individual dignity is a core value of Article 21 and is an inviolable aspect of the right to life. Dignity is not lost in the process of dying or after death occurs. The right to die with dignity, in the case of a terminally ill patient or one in a persistent vegetative state, is an extension of the right to live with dignity.
Autonomy means the right of self-determination, where an informed patient has the right to choose the manner of their treatment. A competent person has the right to refuse specific treatment, opt for alternative treatment, or refuse all treatment, even if such a decision entails a risk of death.
The Court held that passive euthanasia, in the form of withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment, would come within the ambit of Article 21, as it upholds the individual's dignity and autonomy. However, active euthanasia, involving positive steps to end life, would not be permissible under Article 21.
C. Social, moral, and ethical considerations
The Court acknowledged the social, moral, and ethical dilemmas surrounding euthanasia. While the State has an interest in preserving life, the individual's right to self-determination and dignity must be given priority in end-of-life situations.
The Court recognized that medical professionals might face ethical uncertainties when a patient is suffering unbearable pain and agony, and the decision to withdraw life support or hasten the process of death must be taken with utmost care and caution.
The Court also noted that the possibility of abuse or misuse of euthanasia cannot be a valid ground to reject the right to die with dignity. Appropriate safeguards and guidelines can be put in place to prevent any potential abuse.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of passive euthanasia, subject to certain safeguards and procedures, as it upholds the individual's right to self-determination, autonomy, and dignity, which are integral facets of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.# VII. Advance Medical Directives
A. Legal Permissibility and Safeguards
The Supreme Court has recognized the legal permissibility of Advance Medical Directives (AMD) in India. AMDs are instruments that allow individuals to express their wishes regarding future medical treatment when they are unable to make decisions due to incapacity or unconsciousness. The Court has held that the right to execute an AMD is an extension of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
However, the Court has also acknowledged the potential for misuse of AMDs and has laid down certain safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals. These safeguards include:
1. Only adults of sound mind can execute an AMD when they are capable of understanding the consequences.
2. The AMD must be in writing, signed by the executor in the presence of two witnesses, and countersigned by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class (JMFC).
3. The JMFC and witnesses must record their satisfaction that the AMD was executed voluntarily and with full understanding.
4. Copies of the AMD must be preserved with the JMFC, District Court Registry, local government authorities, and the executor's family physician.
5. A Medical Board must be constituted to verify the executor's terminal illness and the applicability of the AMD before acting upon it.
6. The Medical Board must obtain the consent of the executor or their nominated guardian, if possible, before withdrawing or refusing medical treatment.
The Court has emphasized that the safeguards are necessary to prevent the misuse of AMDs while still upholding the individual's right to a dignified life and death.
B. Execution, Recording, and Implementation
The Supreme Court has laid down detailed guidelines for the execution, recording, and implementation of AMDs:
1. Execution: The AMD must be executed by an adult of sound mind, voluntarily and without coercion, after being fully informed of the consequences. It should clearly state the circumstances in which medical treatment may be withdrawn or withheld, and the instructions must be unambiguous.
2. Recording: The AMD must be signed by the executor in the presence of two independent witnesses and countersigned by the jurisdictional JMFC. The JMFC and witnesses must record their satisfaction that the AMD was executed voluntarily and with full understanding. Copies of the AMD must be preserved with the JMFC, District Court Registry, local authorities, and the executor's family physician.
3. Implementation: If the executor becomes terminally ill and is undergoing prolonged treatment with no hope of recovery, the treating physician must ascertain the authenticity of the AMD from the JMFC. A Medical Board comprising the Head of the treating department and at least three experts must be constituted to certify whether the instructions in the AMD should be carried out.
If the Hospital Medical Board certifies that the AMD should be followed, the jurisdictional Collector must constitute another Medical Board comprising the Chief District Medical Officer and three experts. This Board must visit the hospital, ascertain the executor's wishes (if possible), and endorse the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment as per the AMD.
The Court has emphasized that the instructions in the AMD must be given due weight by the doctors, but only after being fully satisfied that the executor is terminally ill, undergoing prolonged treatment, and has no hope of recovery.
C. Revocation and Inapplicability
The Supreme Court has recognized that individuals have the right to revoke or modify their AMDs at any time when they have the capacity to do so. The guidelines state:
1. The AMD should mention that the executor may revoke the instructions or authority at any time.
2. If there are multiple valid AMDs and none have been revoked, the most recently signed AMD will be considered the last expression of the executor's wishes.
3. An AMD may become inapplicable if circumstances arise that the executor could not have reasonably anticipated and would have caused them to change their decision.
4. The Medical Board constituted by the Collector must ascertain if any such circumstances exist that would render the AMD inapplicable.
The Court has acknowledged that AMDs should not be treated as rigid instruments, as individuals may change their minds or new medical advancements may alter the circumstances. The guidelines aim to balance the executor's autonomy with the need to ensure that their wishes are accurately reflected and implemented.# VIII. International Perspective
A. Euthanasia laws and practices in other countries
The report provides an overview of euthanasia laws and practices in various countries around the world. It highlights that assisted suicide was traditionally considered an offense in most countries, but in recent times, some countries have legalized or decriminalized certain forms of euthanasia, subject to specific regulations and safeguards.
Netherlands
The Netherlands has the most experience with physician-assisted death. Both euthanasia and assisted suicide remain crimes under Dutch law, but doctors who end their patients' lives will not be prosecuted if they follow the legal guidelines. These guidelines include:
• The patient's request must be voluntary and well-considered.
• The patient's suffering must be unbearable and without prospect of improvement.
• The patient must be fully informed about their condition and prospects.
• There must be no reasonable alternative solution for the patient's situation.
• Another independent doctor must be consulted.
• The termination of life must be performed with due medical care and attention.
Belgium
Belgium has legalized euthanasia with the enactment of the Belgium Act on Euthanasia of May 28th, 2002. Patients can request voluntary euthanasia if they are in a "futile medical condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated." Doctors who practice euthanasia commit no offense if the prescribed conditions and procedures are followed, and the patient has the legal capacity and has made the request voluntarily and repeatedly without external pressure.
Luxembourg
Luxembourg has also legalized euthanasia with the passing of the Law of 16th March, 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. The law permits euthanasia and assisted suicide for those with incurable conditions, subject to repeated requests, consent from two doctors, and approval from an expert panel.
Switzerland
In Switzerland, assisted suicide is allowed only for altruistic reasons. A person can be sentenced to imprisonment for assisting suicide if it is done for selfish reasons.
United States
In the United States, active euthanasia is illegal in most states. However, some states like Oregon, Washington, Montana, and California have legalized physician-assisted suicide with statutory regulations.
United Kingdom
Euthanasia is a criminal offense in the United Kingdom under Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act, 1961, which prohibits aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring the suicide of another person. However, there has been parliamentary opposition to the current law, but no fundamental change has been made so far.
Canada
In Canada, Section 241(b) of the Criminal Code provides that everyone who aids or abets a person in committing suicide commits an indictable offense. However, in 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the prohibition on physicianassisted death for competent adults with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering.
The report also mentions that the predominant thought prevailing in other parts of the world is that assisted suicide is a crime, and no one is permitted to assist another person in committing suicide by injecting a lethal drug or by other means.
B. Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
The report discusses several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regarding euthanasia and the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Pretty v. United Kingdom
In this case, the ECHR ruled that the decision of the applicant to avoid what she considered would be an undignified and distressing end to her life was part of the private sphere covered by Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private life). The Court recognized, with conditions, a sort of right to self-determination as to one's own death, subject to the free will of the person concerned and their capacity to take appropriate action.
Haas v. Switzerland
The ECHR explained that Article 2 (right to life) creates a duty for authorities to protect vulnerable persons, even against actions by which they endanger their own lives. The Court concluded that the right to life obliges States to establish a procedure capable of ensuring that a decision to end one's life corresponds to the free will of the individual concerned.
Lambert and others v. France
In this case, the ECHR considered whether the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient in a persistent vegetative state violated the right to life under Article 2. The Court found the legislative framework laid down by domestic law and the decision-making process to be compatible with the State's positive obligation under Article 2.
The ECHR noted that in dealing with end-of-life situations, States have some discretion in striking a balance between the protection of the patients' right to life and the protection of their right to respect for private life and personal autonomy.
In summary, the ECHR has recognized, with certain conditions and safeguards, a right to selfdetermination regarding one's own death, provided it corresponds to the free will of the individual concerned. However, the Court has also emphasized the State's obligation to protect vulnerable persons and establish appropriate procedures to ensure that such decisions are made in accordance with the law and respect for human rights.## IX. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Summary of the Court's findings
The Supreme Court has arrived at several key conclusions and findings in this landmark judgment:
1. Right to Die with Dignity: The Court has reiterated and affirmed the fundamental right to die with dignity as part of the right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution, as previously recognized in the Gian Kaur case.
2. Passive Euthanasia: The Court has upheld the legality of passive euthanasia, both voluntary and non-voluntary, subject to certain safeguards and procedures. Passive euthanasia involves the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment or support systems, allowing a person to die naturally.
3. Active Euthanasia: The Court has maintained the existing legal position that active euthanasia, which involves the use of lethal substances or forces to cause death, remains illegal and impermissible.
4. Advance Directives: The Court has recognized the validity and enforceability of advance directives or living wills, which allow individuals to express their wishes regarding medical treatment and end-of-life care in advance, in case they become incapacitated or unable to communicate their decisions.
5. Safeguards and Procedures: The Court has laid down detailed guidelines and safeguards to be followed in cases of passive euthanasia and the implementation of advance directives. These include the constitution of medical boards, involvement of judicial authorities, and a cooling-off period to prevent potential abuse.
6. Revisiting Aruna Shanbaug: The Court has revisited and clarified certain aspects of the earlier Aruna Shanbaug judgment, which had dealt with passive euthanasia. The Court has acknowledged and addressed certain flaws and inconsistencies in that judgment.
7. Constitutional Values: The Court's decision draws sustenance from the constitutional values of liberty, dignity, autonomy, and privacy, emphasizing the importance of individual self-determination and the right to make choices regarding one's own life and body.
B. Future implications and the need for legislation
While the Court has provided a comprehensive framework and guidelines, it has also recognized the need for comprehensive legislation by Parliament to govern the complex issues surrounding euthanasia and end-of-life care. The Court's directions are intended to hold the field until such legislation is enacted.
The judgment has far-reaching implications for medical practice, patient rights, and societal attitudes towards end-of-life decisions. It recognizes the evolving nature of medical science and the need for legal and ethical frameworks to keep pace with these advancements.
The Court has acknowledged the diversity of opinions, moral and ethical considerations, and the potential for misuse or abuse in this sensitive area. It has emphasized the need for robust safeguards, oversight mechanisms, and a balanced approach that respects individual autonomy while also protecting vulnerable sections of society.
The judgment is likely to have a significant impact on the ongoing debates and discussions surrounding euthanasia, advance directives, and end-of-life care in India. It may also influence and shape future legislative efforts to create a comprehensive legal framework in this area.# X. Epilogue
A. Significance of the judgment
This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India holds immense significance in recognizing the fundamental rights of individuals to have dignity in life as well as in death. By upholding the legality of passive euthanasia and recognizing the importance of advance directives, the Court has reinforced the constitutional values of liberty, dignity, autonomy, and privacy.
The judgment acknowledges that the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution encompasses the right to live with dignity, which includes the right to refuse medical treatment or to opt for an alternative treatment, even if such a decision entails a risk of death. This recognition of an individual's autonomy and self-determination is a crucial step towards empowering people to make informed choices about their lives and their end-oflife care.
Furthermore, the Court's directions regarding the regime of advance directives provide a legal framework for individuals to express their wishes regarding medical treatment in the event of incapacitation. This not only respects an individual's autonomy but also provides legal protection and guidance for healthcare professionals and caregivers in adhering to the patient's wishes.
The judgment also acknowledges the complexities surrounding end-of-life decisions and the potential for abuse or misuse. To address these concerns, the Court has mandated the setting up of committees to exercise a supervisory role and ensure that the decisions taken are in the best interests of the patient and free from any lack of bona fides.
Overall, this judgment represents a significant step towards recognizing the inherent dignity of human life and the right of individuals to make choices that align with their values, beliefs, and personal circumstances, even in the face of terminal illness or incapacitation.
B. Way forward for society and the legal system
While the judgment provides a legal framework and guidelines for passive euthanasia and advance directives, it also highlights the need for further legislative action to comprehensively address this complex issue. The Court has invited the Parliament to enact a suitable legislation that can provide a robust and comprehensive legal regime governing various aspects of end-of-life care and decision-making.
Such legislation should aim to strike a balance between respecting individual autonomy and protecting vulnerable individuals from potential abuse or coercion. It should also address issues related to medical ethics, professional standards, and the role of healthcare providers in facilitating end-of-life decisions.
Additionally, the judgment underscores the importance of public education and awareness campaigns to promote a better understanding of end-of-life care options, advance directives, and the legal and ethical considerations involved. This can help individuals make informed decisions and engage in open discussions with their families, healthcare providers, and legal professionals.
Furthermore, the legal system and healthcare institutions should develop protocols and guidelines to ensure the smooth implementation of the Court's directives and any future legislation. This may involve training healthcare professionals, establishing ethics committees, and developing robust record-keeping and monitoring systems.
Ultimately, the way forward for society and the legal system lies in fostering a culture of respect for individual autonomy, dignity, and compassion, while also ensuring adequate safeguards and oversight mechanisms to prevent potential abuse or misuse of end-of-life care options.
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