United States v Mead Corp and Chevron step zero
📌 I. Background: What is "Chevron Deference"?
Before understanding Mead and "Chevron Step Zero," it's crucial to understand the Chevron framework, from the landmark case:
✅ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
Chevron established a two-step test for courts reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers:
Step One: Has Congress spoken directly to the precise issue? If yes, that’s the end of the matter.
Step Two: If the statute is ambiguous, is the agency’s interpretation reasonable?
This doctrine gave great deference to agencies interpreting ambiguous statutes within their domain.
⚖️ II. What Is United States v. Mead Corp.?
📚 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)
Facts:
The U.S. Customs Service issued a "ruling letter" classifying Mead’s imported day planners as subject to tariff.
Mead challenged this classification, and the question arose: Should courts defer to the agency’s interpretation under Chevron?
Issue:
Does every agency interpretation of a statute it administers receive Chevron deference?
Holding:
No. The Court ruled that Chevron deference applies only when Congress intended for the agency to have lawmaking authority, such as through formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Key Takeaways:
Introduced the idea of Chevron Step Zero – a threshold inquiry before applying Chevron:
Did Congress intend to delegate authority to the agency to make rules with the force of law?
If not, the agency interpretation may still be given Skidmore deference, which depends on persuasiveness, not binding authority.
🧩 III. What is "Chevron Step Zero"?
"Chevron Step Zero" refers to the preliminary question courts must answer before applying the Chevron two-step framework:
Does the agency interpretation have the "force of law"?
Did Congress intend to delegate authority?
Was the interpretation made using proper procedures (e.g., rulemaking or adjudication)?
Is the decision binding, not merely interpretative or informal?
If the answer is yes, Chevron applies.
If no, the court might apply Skidmore deference instead.
🧾 IV. Key Cases Interpreting Mead and Chevron Step Zero
1. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)
Facts:
An agency (Department of Labor) issued an opinion letter about overtime compensation.
Holding:
Opinion letters do not carry the force of law and therefore are not entitled to Chevron deference.
May be given Skidmore deference based on their persuasive value.
Significance:
Precursor to Mead.
Clarified that informal guidance doesn’t automatically receive Chevron deference.
2. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)
Facts:
SSA interpreted “disability” under the Social Security Act through internal policy rather than formal rulemaking.
Holding:
Court applied Chevron deference, despite no formal rulemaking, because of:
Consistency of interpretation
Expertise
Importance of the issue
Significance:
Demonstrates that Chevron Step Zero is flexible and not limited strictly to formal procedures.
Introduced factors courts may weigh even when the agency used informal means.
3. National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)
Facts:
FCC interpreted "telecommunications service" to exclude cable modem services.
Holding:
Court applied Chevron deference to FCC’s interpretation.
Even if a court previously interpreted the statute differently, an agency's reasonable interpretation under Chevron can overrule a prior judicial interpretation.
Significance:
Emphasized that Chevron applies when the agency acts with force of law and within a delegated domain, reinforcing Mead’s principles.
Key for administrative supremacy in ambiguous statutes.
4. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)
Facts:
DOJ interpreted the federal Controlled Substances Act to prohibit physician-assisted suicide, challenging Oregon's law.
Holding:
Court rejected Chevron deference, finding that:
The Attorney General lacked delegated authority to make such a determination.
The interpretation was not made through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Significance:
Reinforces Chevron Step Zero: Congress did not delegate law-interpreting authority to the AG in this context.
Highlights limits of deference when agency acts beyond its domain.
5. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015)
Facts:
Interpreted part of the Affordable Care Act regarding health insurance exchanges.
Holding:
Court did not apply Chevron. Instead, the Court itself interpreted the statute because it involved a question of deep economic and political significance.
Significance:
Shows Chevron Step Zero’s outer boundary: Courts may retain interpretive authority over “major questions,” even when agencies are involved.
6. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (Auer Deference context, but relevant)
Facts:
Interpretation of a VA regulation by the agency.
Holding:
Court reaffirmed Auer deference (deference to agency’s interpretation of its own regulations), but significantly narrowed its scope.
Relevance to Mead:
Like Mead, emphasizes threshold inquiries:
Was the interpretation authoritative, official, and based on expertise?
Does the interpretation reflect fair and considered judgment?
Significance:
Reinforces that not all agency interpretations deserve deference, even of their own rules.
Echoes the "force of law" threshold established in Mead.
📌 V. Summary of Key Principles from Mead and Related Cases
| Case | Key Holding | Chevron Step Zero Insight |
|---|---|---|
| Mead (2001) | Chevron deference only applies when Congress intended to delegate lawmaking authority | Introduced Chevron Step Zero |
| Christensen (2000) | Opinion letters don’t get Chevron deference | Informal guidance = Skidmore only |
| Barnhart (2002) | Chevron can apply even without formal procedures | Context and expertise matter |
| Brand X (2005) | Agencies can overrule courts if Chevron applies | Agency interpretations can be supreme |
| Gonzales v. Oregon (2006) | DOJ lacked delegated authority | No Chevron where Congress didn’t delegate |
| King v. Burwell (2015) | Court interpreted statute directly | Courts reserve power in “major questions” |
📘 VI. Skidmore Deference (Alternative When Chevron Doesn't Apply)
From Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944):
If Chevron doesn’t apply, courts may still consider agency interpretations based on:
Thoroughness of reasoning
Consistency
Expertise
Persuasiveness
Skidmore is not binding, unlike Chevron—it’s respectful consideration.
✅ VII. Conclusion
United States v. Mead Corp. changed the landscape of administrative law by adding a threshold inquiry (Chevron Step Zero). Courts must now first decide whether Chevron deference applies at all, based on Congressional intent, procedural formality, and binding authority of the agency’s action.
Subsequent cases—Barnhart, Gonzales, Brand X, and King—have further defined the boundaries of when courts defer and when they decide. This balance continues to evolve, especially with increased judicial scrutiny of "major questions" and informal agency actions.
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