Heckler v Chaney and review of agency inaction
I. Foundational Case: Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
📌 Facts:
Death row inmates petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action against the use of lethal injection drugs in executions. They argued these drugs were not approved for such use and thus violated federal drug laws.
⚖️ Holding:
The Supreme Court refused to review the FDA’s inaction, holding that an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action is “presumptively unreviewable” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), §701(a)(2).
✏️ Key Principles:
Enforcement discretion: Agencies have wide discretion in deciding when and how to enforce laws.
Such decisions often involve complex balancing of factors: resources, priorities, policy.
Courts lack manageable standards to review inaction in most cases.
💥 Impact:
Created a presumption against judicial review of agency inaction unless there is a clear statutory mandate requiring action.
Established the idea that agency inaction is often insulated from court challenges.
Widely cited in later cases reviewing regulatory non-enforcement or neglect.
II. Cases Applying or Limiting Heckler v. Chaney
1. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004)
📌 Facts:
Environmental groups sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), arguing it had failed to prevent off-road vehicle use in protected wilderness areas — a failure to act under federal land management statutes.
⚖️ Holding:
The Supreme Court held that general statutory goals do not create specific, enforceable duties.
Courts can only review inaction when a statute specifically requires a discrete agency action.
🔍 Connection to Chaney:
Reinforced Heckler’s presumption of unreviewability of agency inaction.
Clarified that failure to act must violate a legally required, discrete duty to be reviewable.
💡 Implication:
Agencies cannot be sued for failing to achieve broad statutory goals.
Litigants must point to specific required actions the agency failed to take.
2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
📌 Facts:
Several states and organizations sued the EPA for failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act.
⚖️ Holding:
The Court ruled the EPA’s inaction was reviewable.
Found that the Clean Air Act required the EPA to determine whether GHGs endanger public health.
Refused to apply Heckler because the statute imposed a clear duty to act.
🔍 Connection to Chaney:
Important limitation on Heckler: When a statute mandates action, courts can review agency inaction.
Discretion is not absolute when Congress imposes a legal obligation.
💡 Implication:
Agencies cannot avoid judicial review by refusing to act when Congress has mandated action.
A powerful tool for forcing regulatory action, especially in environmental law.
3. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981) — Pre-Chaney, but foundational
📌 Facts:
A company challenged the FCC’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking proceeding.
⚖️ Holding:
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged the discretionary nature of rulemaking but held that the agency’s explanation must not be arbitrary.
Review of refusal to initiate rulemaking is limited but not absolutely barred.
🔍 Connection to Chaney:
Foreshadowed Heckler’s standard but carved out an exception where the refusal is arbitrary or capricious.
Courts retain limited power to review agency inaction when the agency fails to explain its decision adequately.
4. Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 452 F.3d 798 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
📌 Facts:
Consumer groups sued the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for failing to mandate recalls of allegedly defective car parts.
⚖️ Holding:
The court applied Heckler and found the agency’s refusal to act was not reviewable.
There was no specific legal requirement forcing the agency to act.
💡 Implication:
Reinforces that agency inaction is shielded from review unless a mandatory duty exists.
Even in consumer protection, broad safety goals do not override enforcement discretion.
5. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. USDA, 7 F.4th 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
📌 Facts:
PETA sued the USDA for failing to enforce the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) against certain exhibitors.
⚖️ Holding:
The D.C. Circuit applied Heckler and found no reviewable agency inaction.
The AWA did not impose a mandatory enforcement obligation.
The USDA had discretion to choose whether and how to enforce the law.
💡 Implication:
Confirms that failure to enforce against private actors generally remains unreviewable post-Chaney.
Unless the statute clearly limits discretion, courts won’t second-guess agency priorities.
6. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)
📌 Facts:
Private parties challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for failing to follow procedural duties under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
⚖️ Holding:
The Court held that certain procedural duties (e.g., consultation requirements) are mandatory and reviewable.
Distinguished between discretionary enforcement and non-discretionary procedural obligations.
🔍 Connection to Chaney:
Reinforces that failure to perform mandatory procedural steps is subject to review.
Only enforcement decisions enjoy strong Heckler protections.
III. Summary of Legal Principles
Principle | Explanation | Leading Cases |
---|---|---|
Presumption of Nonreviewability | Agency inaction is generally not reviewable under APA §701(a)(2) | Heckler v. Chaney |
Exception – Discrete Mandatory Duty | If a statute requires a specific action, courts may compel it | Massachusetts v. EPA, SUWA |
Procedural Duties Reviewable | Agencies must follow mandatory procedures even in discretionary contexts | Bennett v. Spear |
Refusal to Initiate Rulemaking | Narrowly reviewable for arbitrariness | WWHT v. FCC |
Priority and Resource Allocation | Courts defer to agencies’ resource and policy judgments | Center for Auto Safety, PETA v. USDA |
IV. Conclusion
Heckler v. Chaney laid the foundation for judicial deference to agency inaction, particularly in enforcement contexts. But courts have carved out key exceptions where inaction is reviewable, such as:
When a statute imposes a mandatory, discrete duty to act,
When agencies fail to perform required procedural steps,
When refusal to initiate rulemaking is arbitrary or capricious.
The post-Chaney doctrine reflects a delicate balance between:
Allowing agencies to set their own priorities, and
Ensuring agencies do not ignore binding legal duties.
This area remains critical in environmental, health, civil rights, and consumer protection law, where advocates often push agencies to act — and courts must decide when inaction becomes unlawful neglect.
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