Should administrative adjudication move to Article III courts?
Should Administrative Adjudication Move to Article III Courts?
Background:
Administrative Adjudication: Agencies (like the SEC, NLRB, or Social Security Administration) often act as judges, deciding disputes in "trial-like" settings, sometimes with ALJs (Administrative Law Judges).
Article III Courts: The Constitution vests the judicial power in federal courts (Article III judges), who have life tenure and salary protections to ensure independence.
Constitutional Question: Does allowing agency judges to decide cases violate the separation of powers by encroaching on the judicial function? Should adjudication be exclusively in Article III courts?
Arguments For Moving Adjudication to Article III Courts:
Judicial Independence: Article III judges are protected from political pressure, ensuring impartial decisions.
Separation of Powers: Judicial power belongs to Article III courts, so agencies exercising this power threaten constitutional balance.
Fairness and Legitimacy: Litigants may perceive agency adjudication as biased since agencies combine prosecutorial and adjudicative functions.
Arguments Against Moving Adjudication:
Efficiency and Expertise: Agencies have technical expertise and can resolve disputes faster and more effectively.
Congressional Authority: Congress can delegate adjudicative authority to agencies under Article I to implement statutes.
Practicality: Moving all adjudication to Article III courts would overwhelm the judiciary and slow down enforcement.
Supreme Court Case Law on the Issue:
1. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)
Facts: The question was whether a federal agency could determine facts related to workers’ compensation claims, traditionally a judicial function.
Holding: The Court held that Congress can assign fact-finding to agencies but that ultimate judicial review of legal questions remains with Article III courts.
Implication: Agencies can act as adjudicators on factual issues but under judicial supervision, suggesting some administrative adjudication is constitutionally permissible.
This case lays the groundwork for agencies doing fact-finding but keeps the legal review with Article III courts.
2. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011)
Facts: The issue was whether bankruptcy courts, staffed by non-Article III judges, could finally adjudicate certain state law counterclaims.
Holding: The Court ruled that non-Article III bankruptcy judges could not finally decide claims that were outside their limited constitutional authority.
Implication: Limits on administrative adjudication exist, especially when the agency tries to exercise full judicial power over claims traditionally heard in courts.
This case stresses that some matters must remain with Article III judges, especially where the adjudication resembles traditional judicial functions.
3. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
Facts: Concerned whether administrative agencies can issue final decisions on disputes without Article III court involvement.
Holding: The Court acknowledged the constitutionality of administrative adjudication, provided Congress clearly authorizes it and courts retain oversight.
Implication: Supports administrative adjudication under certain conditions, affirming congressional power to delegate adjudicatory authority.
This affirms that agency adjudication can constitutionally coexist with Article III courts.
4. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991)
Facts: Whether a magistrate judge (non-Article III) could conduct jury selection for a federal trial.
Holding: The Court allowed non-Article III judges to perform certain judicial tasks but underscored limits where ultimate adjudicative authority is involved.
Implication: Non-Article III adjudicators can perform subordinate judicial functions but not exercise core judicial power fully.
While not directly about agencies, it relates to the limits of non-Article III adjudicators.
5. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010)
Facts: Challenged the constitutionality of a multi-layered agency structure where PCAOB members were protected from removal by SEC commissioners.
Holding: The Court held the double-layer of protections violated separation of powers but did not strike down the agency's adjudicatory power itself.
Implication: Highlights limits on agency independence and adjudicatory power, reinforcing constitutional safeguards.
While not about moving adjudication to courts, it signals judicial concern about unchecked agency power.
Summary of the Legal Landscape:
| Case | Key Holding | Relevance to Article III Adjudication |
|---|---|---|
| Crowell v. Benson | Agencies can find facts, courts review law | Supports agency adjudication under supervision |
| Stern v. Marshall | Non-Article III courts cannot finally decide some claims | Limits on agency adjudication powers |
| Thomas v. Union Carbide | Agency adjudication constitutional if Congress authorizes | Supports agency adjudication |
| Peretz v. United States | Non-Article III adjudicators can perform some judicial tasks | Limits on judicial power of non-Article III judges |
| Free Enterprise Fund | Limits on agency independence and power | Concern over unchecked agency adjudicatory power |
Practical and Policy Considerations:
Efficiency: Agencies provide faster, cheaper resolution of specialized disputes than courts.
Expertise: Agency judges have specialized knowledge (e.g., environmental, securities).
Checks and Balances: Judicial review by Article III courts ensures fairness and constitutional limits.
Political Independence: Article III courts offer insulation from political influence, but agencies are often politically accountable and may lack full independence.
Volume: Shifting all agency adjudication to federal courts would overwhelm the judiciary.
Conclusion:
Current legal framework permits administrative adjudication with judicial review by Article III courts.
Complete transfer to Article III courts would undermine agency expertise and efficiency.
However, some adjudicative functions must remain with Article III courts, especially those resembling traditional judicial roles.
Balancing efficiency, expertise, and constitutional safeguards means agencies continue to adjudicate, but with meaningful judicial oversight.
RELATED Blog
0 comments