Reviewability of agency enforcement discretion
Reviewability of Agency Enforcement Discretion — Overview
Enforcement discretion refers to the power of administrative agencies to decide whether to pursue enforcement actions against individuals or entities for violations of statutes or regulations. Courts generally recognize that agencies have broad discretion to prioritize resources and decide which cases to pursue.
Reviewability concerns whether courts can second-guess or compel agencies to enforce the law. The central tension is between:
Agency expertise and prosecutorial discretion (favoring non-reviewability),
Ensuring lawful and fair administration of laws (favoring some level of judicial oversight).
Key Legal Principles
Courts generally do not review agency decisions to initiate or decline enforcement (non-reviewability).
However, decisions that effectively determine legal rights or involve abdication of statutory duties may be reviewable.
Statutes may expressly provide for judicial review or limit agency discretion.
Courts apply doctrines like “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and “no law to apply” to determine reviewability.
Important Case Law with Detailed Explanation
1. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
Facts: Death row inmates petitioned the FDA to ban the use of lethal injection drugs, arguing non-enforcement of regulations made executions illegal.
Issue: Whether the FDA’s decision not to enforce a drug ban was subject to judicial review.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable, as such decisions involve prosecutorial discretion.
Reasoning: Enforcement decisions often require expertise, resource allocation, and policy judgment; courts are ill-equipped to interfere.
Significance: Established the foundational presumption of non-reviewability of enforcement discretion unless Congress provides otherwise or there is evidence of an abdication of statutory duty.
2. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
Facts: Citizens challenged the Secretary of Transportation’s decision to approve a highway through a park.
Issue: Whether the Secretary’s decision was reviewable under the APA.
Ruling: The Court held that agency actions are generally reviewable unless the statute commits the decision to agency discretion by law.
Reasoning: While discretion is broad, courts must review to ensure agencies do not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
Significance: Clarifies that reviewability depends on whether there is “law to apply” to the agency’s action, a key test for reviewing enforcement discretion.
3. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)
Facts: The plaintiffs challenged the Department of the Interior’s failure to enforce certain environmental protections.
Issue: Whether the agency’s failure to enforce environmental laws was reviewable.
Ruling: The Court held that the agency’s refusal to enforce was not subject to judicial review absent a clear statutory mandate.
Reasoning: Courts lack jurisdiction to review agency enforcement decisions unless there is a specific, mandatory duty.
Significance: Reinforces Heckler v. Chaney principles and emphasizes the necessity of a clear statutory directive for reviewability.
4. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)
Facts: Defendants argued selective prosecution because the government declined to prosecute other similar defendants.
Issue: Whether selective enforcement claims are justiciable.
Ruling: The Court recognized that selective enforcement claims are reviewable, but require the defendant to show discriminatory effect and intent.
Reasoning: While enforcement discretion is broad, it cannot be exercised in a discriminatory or unconstitutional manner.
Significance: Introduces a limited exception to non-reviewability where selective enforcement violates constitutional protections.
5. Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 870 (1983)
Facts: The plaintiffs challenged the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) refusal to conduct medical reviews.
Issue: Whether SSA’s refusal to investigate alleged fraud was subject to judicial review.
Ruling: The Court held that the decision not to investigate or enforce is generally non-reviewable, echoing Heckler v. Chaney.
Significance: Reinforces the presumption that agency refusal to act is not subject to court review, emphasizing separation of powers and agency expertise.
Summary Table of Reviewability Doctrine
| Case | Holding on Reviewability | Key Principle |
|---|---|---|
| Heckler v. Chaney (1985) | Agency enforcement discretion is presumptively non-reviewable. | Presumption against judicial review of enforcement decisions. |
| Overton Park (1971) | Agency actions reviewable unless committed to discretion by law. | “Law to apply” test for reviewability. |
| Lujan v. NWF (1990) | Enforcement refusals not reviewable absent statutory mandate. | Clear statutory duty needed for review. |
| U.S. v. Armstrong (1996) | Selective enforcement claims are reviewable with proof of discrimination. | Exception to non-reviewability for discrimination. |
| Heckler v. Lopez (1983) | Refusal to investigate or enforce generally not reviewable. | Reinforces non-reviewability presumption. |
Practical Implications
Agencies have wide latitude in deciding whom and when to investigate or prosecute.
Courts will not compel enforcement unless there is a clear statutory mandate.
Claims of selective enforcement or discrimination provide a narrow judicial review avenue.
The APA’s “final agency action” requirement also limits reviewability; enforcement discretion often is not “final.”
This framework maintains balance between agency expertise and judicial oversight.
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