Creation of independent regulatory agencies
📌 Concept of Independent Regulatory Agencies
Independent regulatory agencies are federal agencies created by Congress through enabling statutes. Unlike executive agencies (e.g., Departments under the President), these agencies are designed to operate with greater independence. They often have quasi-legislative (rulemaking) and quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) powers. Their independence is ensured by features like:
Multi-member commissions.
Staggered, fixed terms.
Removal protections for commissioners (President cannot remove except “for cause”).
Bipartisan requirements.
The constitutional question often arises: how much independence from presidential control can Congress give them without violating the separation of powers?
📚 Landmark Cases on Independent Regulatory Agencies
1. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935)
Facts: President Franklin D. Roosevelt removed William Humphrey, a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), because Humphrey did not support his policies. But the FTC Act allowed removal only for cause (inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance).
Issue: Can the President remove members of independent agencies at will?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the FTC was intended to be independent. Commissioners could not be removed simply for political disagreement.
Significance: Established the principle that Congress can restrict the President’s removal power for independent agencies performing quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.
2. Wiener v. United States (1958)
Facts: President Truman tried to remove a member of the War Claims Commission, even though the statute did not specify removal conditions.
Issue: Could the President remove the commissioner at will in the absence of an explicit removal clause?
Ruling: The Court held that the President had no unrestricted removal power, because the Commission was intended to be independent and adjudicatory.
Significance: Reinforced Humphrey’s Executor, showing that even without explicit removal restrictions, the nature of the agency’s function can imply independence.
3. Morrison v. Olson (1988)
Facts: Concerned the Independent Counsel created under the Ethics in Government Act. The Independent Counsel was removable only “for cause” by the Attorney General.
Issue: Did restricting the President’s removal power violate the separation of powers?
Ruling: The Court upheld the law, holding that limitations on removal did not impermissibly interfere with the President’s constitutional functions.
Significance: Expanded the Humphrey’s Executor principle, showing that Congress can create independent offices if they do not impede the executive’s ability to perform constitutional duties.
4. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010)
Facts: The PCAOB, created under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, had members removable only for cause by the SEC, whose commissioners were themselves removable only for cause by the President. This created two layers of for-cause protection.
Issue: Was this “double for-cause removal” structure constitutional?
Ruling: The Court struck it down, holding that such insulation violated the separation of powers because it unduly restricted presidential control.
Significance: Clarified limits on agency independence. Congress cannot create multi-layered protection that excessively isolates regulators from presidential oversight.
5. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020)
Facts: The CFPB was created as a single-director agency with for-cause removal protection. Unlike multi-member commissions, it concentrated power in one individual.
Issue: Could Congress restrict the President’s power to remove a single director heading an independent agency?
Ruling: The Court held that the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional. The President must be able to remove its director at will.
Significance: Limited Humphrey’s Executor to multi-member commissions. A single-director independent agency with removal protection is unconstitutional.
6. Collins v. Yellen (2021)
Facts: Similar to Seila Law, this case involved the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which had a single director removable only for cause.
Issue: Is the FHFA’s single-director structure with for-cause removal unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Court said yes, following Seila Law. The structure violated separation of powers.
Significance: Reinforced that independence via removal protection is allowed only for multi-member commissions, not single directors.
7. Bowsher v. Synar (1986)
Facts: Concerned the Comptroller General, who was given executive powers under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act but was removable by Congress.
Ruling: The Court invalidated the arrangement, holding that Congress cannot retain removal authority over officials performing executive functions.
Significance: Clarified that while Congress can create independent agencies, it cannot control them directly—that power lies with the President (with some limits).
⚖️ Overall Principles Established
Congress can create independent agencies with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.
Multi-member commissions (like FTC, SEC) can have for-cause removal protections (Humphrey’s Executor).
Single-director agencies cannot be insulated by for-cause removal protections (Seila Law, Collins).
Double-layer removal protections are unconstitutional (Free Enterprise Fund).
Congress cannot directly control executive officers (Bowsher).
✅ In summary: Independent regulatory agencies exist in a constitutional balance between Congress’s power to structure them and the President’s authority to ensure accountability.
0 comments